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Abstract 
This thesis presents a three-area local case study of expressions of public opinion and the ‘public 
mood’ regarding British policy towards Germany and defence preparations.  The period covered is 
November 1937 to September 1939.  By using local case studies, which existing scholarship has 
largely ignored, the thesis adds to the national synthesis of events during this period, thereby 
allowing a more complete history to emerge.  The inclusion of local case studies confirms much of 
the existing narrative but challenges some of the traditional assumptions on issues such as the level 
of opposition to appeasement and the changes that had already taken place prior to March 1939, 
when elite opinion shifted.    That shift therefore marked the culmination of a process that had 
begun over a year earlier.  This process had been the result of a series of international crises, which 
provided the psychological changes required in the mind of the British public to enable the nation to 
prepare for war, despite the continuing desire to avoid a conflict.  By combining an analysis of 
expressions of opinion towards foreign policy with actions taken as part of defence preparations, the 
thesis identifies the Munich crisis as the major turning point, but it would require a further crisis 
before the change could be incorporated into mainstream opinion.   
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Introduction 
 
‘Millions of mothers will be blessing your name tonight for having saved their sons from the 
horrors of war.  Oceans of ink will flow hereafter in criticism of your actions.’ 1 
The prophetic words of Sir Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador to Germany, are part of what 
Daniel Hucker describes as the ‘unending debate’. 2  The vast appeasement literature requires 
researchers wanting to add to it to find a niche within established topics or research an 
underexplored area.  The latter includes race, gender, public opinion and localities.  Julie Gottlieb 
has been at the forefront of developing the gender strand in recent years and her book, ‘Guilty 
Women’, Foreign Policy and Appeasement in Interwar Britain, is an important scholarly contribution 
as it applies a gender analysis to the Munich crisis for the first time at a variety of different opinion 
levels. 3  This study will touch on the subject of gender but focusses principally on public opinion at a 
local level, thereby supplementing existing national studies and contributing to a broader national 
synthesis of events in a similar way to Daniel Soloff’s study of unemployment in Lancashire within 
the context of the Great Depression.  Therefore, it will begin to fill one of the gaps in the literature 
identified by Zara Steiner, namely public opinion in the 1930s.4    
 
Prior to Gottlieb’s contribution, Hucker was the last significant contributor to the public opinion 
topic.  His book, Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France,5 uses the 
sociological theory of representations to assess elite perceptions of public opinion from various 
source types, as well as the concepts of reactive and residual opinion.  Hucker’s focus on the 
national elites leaves a gap in the literature for a study of public opinion and the public mood at a 
local level.  References to these terms occur in this thesis but within a different context.  Within the 
thesis, reactive refers to short-term reactions to events, whilst residual means the longer-term 
                                                          
1 N. Henderson, Failure of a Mission: Berlin, 1937-1939 (London, 1940): 168. 
2 D. Hucker, 'The Unending Debate: Appeasement, Chamberlain and the Origins of the Second World War', 
Intelligence & National Security, 23, 4  (2008): 536-51. 
3 J. V. Gottlieb, 'We Were Done the Moment We Gave Women the Vote: The Female Franchise Factor and the 
Munich by-Elections 1938-1939,' in  The Aftermath of Suffrage: Women, Gender, and Politics in Britain, 1918-
1945, ed. J. V. Gottlieb and R. Toye (Basingstoke, 2013): 159-80; J. V. Gottlieb, 'The Women's Movement Took 
the Wrong Turning: British Feminists, Pacifism and the Politics of Appeasement', Womens History Review, 23, 3  
(2014): 441-62; J. V. Gottlieb, 'Guilty Women', Foreign Policy, and Appeasement in Inter-War Britain 
(Basingstoke, 2015). 
4 D. Soloff, 'Unemployment and the Working Class: Bolton, Lancashire in the 1930's' (Ph.D, University of Illinois, 
1994): 12; A. Adamthwaite, 'Historians at War,' in  The Origins of the Second World War: An International 
Perspective, ed. F. McDonough (London, 2011): 521. 
5 D. Hucker, Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France (Farnham, 2011). 
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trend.  This is different to Hucker, who uses it to describe the perceptions of the decision-making 
elites.  Recently, Dan Todman, in a general history of the 1937-1941 period has reaffirmed that there 
was a shift in public opinion by early 1939, though opinion polls had little influence upon 
government policy.  Todman also notes the rise of a self-protective apathy due to events such as the 
Munich crisis.6  However, as this is not an in-depth study of public opinion, the gap described above 
remains.  Considering the development of historical writing about the Great War, this gap is 
unsurprising.  J-J Becker produced the first major work on local-level opinion using Prefects’ reports 
to examine French public opinion during the war. 7   Jeffrey Verhey for Germany and Catriona 
Pennell for Britain have added to this literature with studies of the outbreak of war. 8    Both authors 
used an extensive range of sources from local newspapers to organizational records, a methodology 
repeated for this thesis.  Usage of a wide range of sources allows comparison between different 
geographical areas and the national historiography.  It is also the only way of finding a range of 
opinion levels during the 1930s and is therefore the proverbial search for a needle in a haystack.  
The study is therefore a mixture of local and national history but is not the type of comparative 
history advocated by Marc Bloch. 9 
 
The local history case studies cover a range of geographical areas: Bedfordshire, the London 
boroughs of Fulham and Hammersmith, and Bolton.  The three areas represent the Home Counties, 
London, and the north of England.  Figures 1-5 provide a brief map of each area.  All three areas 
were predominantly working-class, though in Bedfordshire there was a large rural population.  
However, the emphasis is on the urban areas of Bedford and Luton.  Additionally, Fulham and Bolton 
have a rich stream of archival material resulting from work carried out by Mass Observation (M-O).  
By combining this with other local sources, a relatively broad picture of local opinion is established.  
Much of the M-O material for the period of this study is available in digital format, thereby enabling 
easier access to archival material for the case studies areas.   
Bedfordshire is located approximately thirty-five miles north of London.  The interwar period 
witnessed an expansion of the county’s population, over half of which occurred in Luton, the 
                                                          
6 D. Todman, Britain's War: Into Battle, 1937-1941 (London, 2016). 
7 J. J. Becker, 1914: Comment Les FrançAis Sont EntréS Dans La Guerre Contribution à L'éTude De L'opinion 
Publique, Printemps-ÉTé, 1914 (Paris, 1977).   
8 J. Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth and Mobilization in Germany (Cambridge, 2000); C. Pennell, A 
Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland (Oxford, 
2012). 
9 M. Bloch, 'Towards a Comparative History of European Societies,' in  Enterprise and Secular Change: Readings 
in Economic History, ed. F. C. Lane (London, 1952): 494-521. 
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primary focus of this case study.  The female to male ratio was 52% to 48%.10  Prior to the Great 
War, Luton depended economically on the hat trade but following the conflict, the council 
proactively attempted to attract new industries to the town. Major arrivals in the engineering sector 
included: Laporte (chemicals), Vauxhall Motors (automotive), Electrolux (electronics), and Skefco 
(ball bearings).  These firms were attracted to the town due to its proximity to London and the lack 
of a unionised workforce, which began to change in the late 1930s as economic migrants from the 
depressed areas, arrived looking for work. 11  The lack of strong trade unions partly accounts for the 
weakness of the Labour Party in Luton during this period.  The Liberals dominated politically with 
support from the Conservatives.  E. D. Smithies noted that Luton’s councillors were concerned with 
keeping expenditure down and preventing encroachment by Bedfordshire County Council. 12  In 
addition, Luton’s MP, Leslie Burgin was a National Liberal.  He served in Chamberlain’s Cabinet, 
firstly as Minister for Transport (1937-1939) and then as Minister of Supply (1939-1940).  Joining 
Burgin at Westminster were two Conservatives, Alan Lennox-Boyd (Mid-Bedfordshire) and Sir 
Richard Wells (Bedford), thereby ensuring that National Government supporters dominated the 
county’s national political representation. 
Figure 1: Luton in the 1930s13 
 
© Landmark Information Group and Crown Copyright 2015. All rights reserved.  (1938) 
                                                          
10 Census of England and Wales, 1931: County of Bedford (Part 1) (London, 1932). 
11 F. Grundy and R. M. Titmuss, Report on Luton (Luton, 1945): 19; E. D. Smithies, 'The Contrast between North 
and South in England, 1918-1939: A Study of Economic, Social and Political Problems, with Particular Reference 
to the Experience of Burnley, Halifax, Ipswich and Luton' (Ph.D., University of Leeds, 1974): 41 and 104. 
12 Smithies, 'The Contrast between North and South in England':41. 
13 Landmark Information Group, 'Luton in the 1930s', (1938),  
http://digimap.edina.ac.uk/ancientroam/historic.  [16 June 2015]. 
13 
 
 
Figure 2: Bedford in the 1930s14 
 
© Landmark Information Group and Crown Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  (1938) 
 
                                                          
14 Landmark Information Group, 'Bedford in the 1930s', (1938),  
http://digimap.edina.ac.uk/ancientroam/historic.  [16 June 2015]. 
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London is an obvious case study choice for several reasons: the seat of government, population 
density, and the threat of aerial bombardment.  The adjoining Labour controlled boroughs chosen 
for study are Fulham and Hammersmith.  By 1936, they had an estimated combined population of 
268,000 and the same gender ratio as Bedfordshire. 15  Fulham features in the existing historiography 
of the 1930s due to the alleged influence of the 1933 East Fulham by-election on the decision to 
delay rearmament.  Martin Ceadel’s analysis highlighted several reasons for the Conservative defeat 
including poor organisation and the decision of the Conservative candidate and former mayor of the 
borough, John Waldron, to cut council wages.  Tom Stannage and Richard Heller concurred with 
Ceadel, that local politics had a greater influence on the result that international affairs.16   Thanks to 
the work of Mass Observation (M-O), Fulham place in the historiography is furthered by M-O’s 
analysis of expressions of opinion in the borough during the Munich crisis in September 1938. 17  
Politically, Fulham was a Labour stronghold at a local level as the party dominated the council, whilst 
Labour gained a majority in Hammersmith for the first time in the November 1937 local elections.  
Additionally, the Trades Council represented 4,366 members, nearly 500 more than Bolton’s 
representation. 18  However, despite a strong Labour presence, Fulham had two Conservative MPs.  
William Astor had regained East Fulham for the Conservatives at the 1935 election with 51.45% of 
the vote on a turnout of 72%.  Joining him was Cyril Cobb, who represented West Fulham until his 
death in February 1938, thereby triggering a by-election, which would be purported to be of national 
significance. 19  Hammersmith had a mixture of MPs.  Representing Hammersmith North was the 
Labour MP, Denis Pritt.  He received 52.79% of the vote on a turnout of 65.73%, whilst the MP for 
Hammersmith South was the Conservative, J. D. Cooke, who received 62.29% of the vote on a 
turnout of 60.06%.20 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 London County Council, London Statistics 1936-8, vol. 41 (London, 1938): 29-32. 
16 R. Heller, 'East Fulham Revisited', Journal of Contemporary History, 6, 3  (1971): 172-96; C. T. Stannage, 'The 
East Fulham by-Election, 25 October 1933', Historical Journal, 14, 1  (1971): 165-200; M. Ceadel, 'Interpreting 
East Fulham,' in  By-Elections in British Politics, ed. C. Cook and J. Ramsden (London, 1973): 118-38. 
17 T. Harrisson, C. Madge, and Mass-Observation., Britain by Mass-Observation (London, 1986). 
18 Sussuex Mass-Observation Archive (SxMOA): 1/2/66/7/A, Fulham Trades Council, 14 October 1938. 
19 'UK General Election Results November 1935: Flint-Gravesend',  
http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ge35/i08.htm.  [17 March 2014]. 
20 'UK General Election Results November 1935: Great Yarmouth to Holderness',  
http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ge35/i09.htm.  [21 June 2015]. 
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Figure 3: Hammersmith in the 1930s21 
 
© Landmark Information Group and Crown Copyright 2015. All rights reserved.  (1938) 
 
Figure 4: Fulham in the 1930s22 
 
© Landmark Information Group and Crown Copyright 2015. All rights reserved.  (1938) 
 
Bolton is the final geographical case study.  The town was subject to a three-year investigation by M-
O, which David Hall chronicles in Worktown: The Astonishing Story of the Project that Launched Mass 
Observation.23  This work provides a detailed account of the people involved and the different areas 
                                                          
21 Landmark Information Group, 'Hammersmith in the 1930s', (1938),  
http://digimap.edina.ac.uk/ancientroam/historic.  [16 June 2015]. 
22 Landmark Information Group, 'Fulham in the 1930s', (1938),  
http://digimap.edina.ac.uk/ancientroam/historic.  [16 June 2015]. 
23 D. Hall, Worktown: The Astonishing Story of the Project That Launched Mass Observation (London, 2015). 
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of research undertaken by different members of the organisation.  The work of Brian Barefoot, one 
of the early researchers, highlights several key factors in the town prior to the period covered by this 
thesis that are relevant; namely that speakers in the town barely mentioned foreign affairs and that 
the young were not interested in politics.  The members of the Left Book Club and the Peace Pledge 
Union (PPU) were the exception.  Barefoot described them as being youthful and having 
enthusiasm.24  The project produced a rich range of archival data, as Bob Snape describes in his 
overview of the collection.  Material ranges from pub conversations to comments on international 
affairs. 25  However, unlike Fulham, Bolton does not feature extensively in the historiography of the 
1930s, though two existing works examine public opinion and the approach of war.  G. J. Bryant 
found that a sombre mood existed upon the declaration of war. 26  David Wilson’s less detailed 
examination found that there were divisions in the town regarding foreign policy. 27   This thesis will 
go beyond both articles in terms of depth, whilst using similar sources.  Politically, the town was a 
Conservative stronghold, as the party held a majority on the council and the two MPs, Cyril Entwistle 
and John Haslam, were Conservatives.  The Liberals, who had been the dominant party prior to the 
Great War, supported the Conservatives.  After the war, many Liberals had moved away from the 
town, which had affected its development due to the paternalistic attitude that they had previously 
displayed towards it and their workers.  Thus, the council consisted of professional and shop-keeping 
classes who did not always think about the long-term interests of the town.  The town’s working-
class conservatism helped the Conservatives and reduced the impact of Labour, though the ruling 
elites had adopted the local leaders of the labour movement into their circles.28  Economically, 
Bolton depended upon cotton and associated industries such as bleaching.  The cotton industry was 
in decline due to the failure to innovate technically. 29  The reliance on the cotton had an impact on 
its political life.  The trade unions in the cotton industry were weaker and more interested in 
industrial matters than political ones, when compared to the mining industry, which dominated in 
                                                          
24 SxMOA: 32/7/1, Foreign Politics and Foreigners, 1937; SxMOA: 32/7/1, Education and Youth, 1937. 
25 B. Snape, 'The Worktown Collection', Mass Observation Online, 
http://www.massobservation.amdigital.co.uk/FurtherResources/Essays/Worktown [1 January 2016]. 
26 G. J. Bryant, 'How War Came to Bolton, 1938-40', Transactions of the Historical Society of Lancashire & 
Cheshire, 146 (1997): 107-32. 
27 D. H. Wilson, A Study of Public Opinion in the Town of Bolton on Selected Events Leading up to the Second 
World War (Bolton, 1970). 
28 P. A. Harris, 'Social Leadership and Social Attitudes in Bolton 1919-1939' (Ph.D., Lancaster University, 1973); 
J. K. Walton, Lancashire: A Social History, 1558-1939 (Manchester, 1987): 347-8; B. Morley and S. Davies, 
County Borough Elections in England and Wales 1919-1938: A Comparative Analysis, 3 vols. (London, 1999-
2006): 466; S. Davies and B. Morley, 'The Politics of Place: A Comparative Analysis of Electoral Politics in Four 
Lancashire Cotton Textile Towns, 1919-39', Manchester Region History Review, 14 (2000): 63-78. 
29 Walton, Lancashire: 330. 
17 
 
the rest of Lancashire. 30    This further reduced the impact of the Left.  Despite the limited influence 
of the Left, the Spanish Civil War was a point of debate in Bolton due to the presence of Basque 
children in the town and several residents having joined the international brigades.  References to 
the conflict are available in the Mass Observation Worktown project records and in letters to the 
Bolton Evening News during the early part of 1939.  However, detailed discussion of Spain falls 
outside of the scope of this thesis, though enough evidence exists for a potential article.  
 
Figure 5: Bolton in the 1930s31 
 
© Landmark Information Group and Crown Copyright 2015. All rights reserved.  (1931) 
 
References to two of the geographical areas in existing writing form a very small part of the 
historiography of appeasement, a full review of which would now require a multi-volume work.  
Thankfully, two extensive works already exist.  Robert Caputi’s, Neville Chamberlain and 
Appeasement, charts the development of the historiography and specific themes through the 
decades until the end of the 1990s.32  Joining Caputi’s work is David Dutton’s examination of the 
historical reputation of Neville Chamberlain. 33   Together, they form a good introduction to the 
historiography of Chamberlain’s appeasement policy, which divides into three distinct schools of 
thought: orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist. 
                                                          
30 A. Flinn, 'Labour's Family: Local Labour Parties, Trade Unions and Trade Councils in Cotton Lancashire 1931-
39,' in  Labour's Grass Roots: Essays on the Activites of Local Labour Parties and Members, 1918-45, ed. M. 
Worley (Chippenham, 2005): 106-8. 
31 Landmark Information Group, 'Bolton in the 1930s', (1931),  
http://digimap.edina.ac.uk/ancientroam/historic.  [16 June 2015]. 
32 R. J. Caputi, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement (London, 2000). 
33 D. J. Dutton, Neville Chamberlain (London, 2001). 
18 
 
 
The orthodox school criticising Chamberlain’s policy appeared in contemporary works before the 
declaration of war.  Much of this came from the Left and included works such as They Betrayed 
Czechoslovakia, which examined the Munich crisis from the Czech viewpoint.34  Joining this was 
Britain by Mass Observation, which included comments by ordinary people in the fictional London 
borough of ‘Metrop’ (Fulham) during the crisis. 35  This condemned Chamberlain’s policy.  Further 
attacks appeared in 1939, including But Who Has Won, which referred to public opinion being 
against Chamberlain in some letters to the editor. 36  A good source of contemporary articles about 
public opinion and the public mood was the journal, Nineteenth Century and After.  Articles 
published in this journal indicated a calm acceptance by the British people that war was coming and 
that it did not come as a surprise in September 1939. 37   These works were the lull before the storm, 
which was unleashed with the polemical Guilty Men.  Written following Dunkirk, Guilty Men blamed 
Britain’s leaders for failing to prepare for war, whilst ignoring many of the decisions that proved to 
be decisive in deciding the outcome of the Battle of Britain.  However, its authors would not have 
known this at the time of writing. 38  Attacks continued during the war,39 which set the stage for the 
entry into the debate of Britain’s wartime Prime Minister, Winston Churchill.  Published in 1948, The 
Gathering Storm40 consolidated the development of the orthodox school because of the author’s 
reputation and role during the conflict.41  However, caution is required with memoirs as they 
normally aim to portray the author in a favourable light.42  Despite the dominance of the orthodox 
school, attempts were made by the likes of Viscount Templewood (Samuel Hoare) to defend 
Chamberlain by arguing that he was right to try appeasement but as time went by it became clear 
that firmness would be required.43   Prior to the development of a revisionist school of thought, 
public opinion received few mentions.  The Munich Conspiracy by Andrew Rothstein is worth noting 
as he described the opposition to the government’s policy at the time on Munich.  Whilst this was in 
                                                          
34 G. J. George, They Betrayed Czechoslovakia (Harmondsworth, 1938). 
35 Harrisson et al., Britain by Mass-Observation. 
36 J. Scanlon, But Who Has Won? (London, 1939). 
37 E. Dashwood, 'What People Are Saying', Nineteenth Century and After, 75, 746  (1939): 482-7; J. Shand, 
'What People Are Saying - 2', Nineteenth Century and After, 75, 747  (1939): 625-7; H. Nicolson, 'Is War 
Inevitable?', Nineteenth Century and After, 76, 749  (1939): 1-13; J. Lepper, 'What People Are Saying', 
Nineteenth Century and After, 76, 751  (1939): 366-9. 
38 'Cato', Guilty Men (London, 1940). 
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keeping with the orthodox school, he advised that local sources needed studying to verify the claim, 
which to date has received little attention, hence the need for this thesis.44 
 
A challenge to the orthodox school emerged in 1961 with A. J. P. Taylor’s book, The Origins of the 
Second World War.  Taylor defied conventional wisdom by arguing that the war had resulted from 
diplomatic mistakes on all sides. 45  This argument was not original, as A. L. Kennedy had used it in 
1948.46  Taylor’s work began what D. C. Watt described as ‘the rise of the revisionist school’, in an 
article that noted the lack of studies about public opinion. 47   Within this context, and prior to the 
reduction of the archival closure period to thirty years in 1967, Milorad Vuckovic’s study of 
Parliamentary opinion provided a good indication of the climate of opinion that Chamberlain had to 
work in, namely one where political representatives wanted to avoid war.  Many of those returned 
at the 1935 election had served in First World War and wanted to avoid another, thereby explaining 
their pacifist outlook.48  This background acts as the starting point for the revisionist school, which, 
with the opening of the archives in 1967 sought to provide a rational explanation for the decisions 
taken, work that continues to this day.  The new subject areas included economics; 49 defence and 
strategy; 50 international relations theory; 51  and government-media relations, which is discussed in 
more detail due to its interaction with public opinion.  Some of the revisionist works refer to public 
opinion.  For example, Uri Bialer’s examination of British fears about aerial attack argued that the 
view taken by the political elite meant that British policy was in line with public opinion.  However, 
Bialer failed to explain how the elite knew what ‘public opinion’ or the ‘public mood’ was.52  
Following Bialer’s study, Patrick Kyba examined British defence policy and public opinion in the first 
half of the 1930s.  Kyba’s study is important as it made use of regional newspapers in addition to 
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national ones, thereby adding a local element that Rothstein had been keen to encourage.  Kyba 
demonstrated that the government was conscious of the potential reaction of the public but by the 
time the study ended in 1935, policy had moved ahead of public opinion.53  This hindered the 
government’s ability to comment in public about rearmament.  Both works sit within the revisionist 
school as they sought to provide a rational explanation for government policy.  Works of a similar 
nature have continued to appear with Sally Greene, Sara Wilkinson, David Gillard and Daniel Hucker 
all contributing works arguing that government policy operated within the limits that they believed 
public opinion would allow.54    
 
Challenging the revisionist school is a post-revisionist one, which sought to return the debate to 
examining the key decision-makers and their beliefs.  Chamberlain has been a target for this led by 
R. A. C. Parker’s book, Chamberlain and Appeasement.55  Parker portrays Chamberlain as a man 
following a rational policy given the circumstances, namely to maintain peace whilst preparing for 
war if necessary but is still very critical of him.  Churchill shared this objective, albeit via a different 
method.56  Parker’s 1993 book provided the first discussion of alternative policies, a topic that 
Andrew Stedman has covered in more depth.  The options included isolation, economic and colonial 
appeasement, and the League of Nations.57  Straddling the revisionist and post-revisionist schools is 
Hucker’s work, as it focuses on the decision-making process and perceptions of those involved, while 
seeking to provide a rational explanation for policy.58   
 
This historiographical overview briefly mentions a few works relating to public opinion.  
Government-media relations are associated with this topic.  This relationship is explored in Bernard 
Hagerty’s thesis on the changing nature of public opinion in Britain from 1935-45.  Hagerty argues 
that in 1935 ‘public opinion’ and interest in public affairs was limited to elites, but interest had 
broadened by the end of the Second World War due to reconstruction plans, though public apathy 
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remained.59  However, Hagerty’s argument is flawed as it fails to account properly for public feeling 
during the Abdication Crisis and the setting up of M-O.  Frank Mort in a 2014 article demonstrates 
that ordinary people were interested in the abdication and wrote directly to the monarch.60  The 
public’s reaction to the Abdication spurred on Tom Harrisson and Charles Madge to create M-O, 
which would allow the ordinary people to ‘speak for themselves’.61  This raises further questions for 
scholars studying public opinion in this period, given the diverse types of sources and range of 
opinions contained within the M-O archives.       
 
The works referred to in the previous paragraph lead to the trickiest question, how to define public 
opinion.  Henry Durant, a research student at the London School of Economics (LSE) and founder of 
the British Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO), described it as ‘awkward to describe, elusive to define, 
and difficult to measure’.62  This problem is emphasised in a 1940 M-O report entitled ‘What is Public 
Opinion?’  The report discusses what MPs think it to be; the differences between public and private 
opinions; and the sources that people rely on, which do not always provide a lead. 63  Tom Harrisson 
added to the arguments made in this report in an article published in Political Quarterly, stating that 
actual public opinion is those private opinions that a person would express to a stranger.64  These 
opinions often come to the fore when they receive societal sanction.  Noelle-Neumann describes 
this as the ‘spiral of silence’, an argument that Harrisson made thirty-four years earlier.65  Harrisson 
and Noelle-Neumann refer to two of the layers of opinion.   Lazarsfeld, Kyba, and Bell,66 refer to 
others, which only adds to the problem of producing a definition.  The search of a suitable definition 
for this thesis begins in 1909 with New Zealand politician, John Findlay.  He defined public opinion as 
‘an opinion on a public question entertained or shared by the majority of the adult population’.  He 
believed that the pressure of events influenced opinion. 67  Findlay’s definition partly supports E. H. 
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Carr’s description of opinion formation.  Carr argued that the ‘man in the street’ based his opinion 
on the emotional and ethical dimensions of a question. 68  These approaches run counter to two of 
the leading American thinkers on public opinion during the interwar period, Walter Lippmann and 
Thomas Dewey.  Lippmann argued that only experts should make decisions about foreign affairs, 
due to the emotional way people reacted: the direct opposite of Carr’s description of opinion 
formation.  Dewey shared Lippmann’s concern but argued for active public engagement to create an 
informed opinion.  Both writers were justified in their stances given the events of the 1930s, as well 
as by Harold Nicolson’s observation that it took years for the public to build up the required level of 
knowledge. 69  The late 1930s also confirmed Carr’s theory about opinion formation.  Nicolson’s 
viewpoint about public opinion received further reinforcement in John Shorrock’s comparative study 
of Nicolson, the National Labour MP for Leicester West, and Duff Cooper, the Conservative MP for 
Westminster St George’s.  Shorrock highlights Nicolson’s abhorrence of the ill-informed nature of 
public opinion, arguing that it was the job of politicians to educate.70   The points highlighted by 
contemporary writers during the period covered by this thesis, as well as its subject matter, means 
that a broad definition is required.  For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of public opinion is:  
 
‘An expression, sentiment or action of an individual or collective body at any level, outside of 
the Cabinet, whether published or not, on matters relating to British foreign and defence 
policy, regarding Germany and the civil defence preparations that were being made’ 
The one exclusion to the above definition in relation to the Cabinet is Leslie Burgin, as the MP for 
Luton.   
 
The definition of public opinion refers to sentiment, or as Carr described it, the emotional element in 
opinion formation that is used by the ‘man in the street’.  Within the context of this thesis, this is 
referred to as the ‘public mood’ but how does one go about constructing this?  This can be done 
from the implicit tones of voice present in diaries, letters, reports and street comments, a feature of 
M-O records and by using sources that are underused.  The M-O records represent a strong source 
as they provide access to what Harrisson termed ‘private opinion’ and therefore, an alternative 
public opinion to the visible ‘elite’ opinion or one put forward by local activists.  Often, ‘private 
opinions’ were gut reactions to events when there was a lack of official information, such as during 
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the Munich crisis as detailed in Britain by Mass-Observation.71  M-O’s type of opinion research is the 
subject of a 2015 article entitled The Road Not Taken in Opinion Research.72   This praises M-O’s 
qualitative approach as it revealed what motivated people and allowed them to explain their views.  
As such, they were what Harrisson described as ‘not quantifiable’. 73  The M-O records also reveal a 
degree of indifference towards events outside of people’s immediate interests such as the home.  
This indifference, as James Hinton suggests in his review of England Arise!: the Labour Party and 
Popular Politics in 1940s Britain,74 does not mean that people were totally ignorant of the facts.75  
The ‘public mood’ can therefore be explained on the following basis: that it is qualitative; comes 
from sources that have been underused, represents groups that have been traditionally voiceless; or 
is an emotional reaction to an event, often where respondents lacked sufficient information to make 
an informed decision.   
 
 
The sources used for studying public opinion vary.  The main source for guiding opinion during the 
1930s was newspapers, a fact confirmed by M-O’s work following Anthony Eden’s resignation.76  
Tom Harrisson regarded newspapers as published opinion.77  However, newspapers were subject to 
a form of government censorship, a subject explored in Richard Cockett’s, Twilight of Truth.78  
Cockett argued that editors came under pressure to print stories favourable to the government’s 
foreign policy, a verdict challenged by Michael Meznar.  Meznar emphasises content rather than 
personal relationships.79  Content is the emphasis for the three major studies of national newspapers 
and appeasement.  Franklin Gannon examined the national dailies and found that they were largely 
in favour of appeasement until the Munich crisis.80  A similar finding emerges from Barbara Kehoe’s 
study.  Kehoe highlighted that readers of the high circulation, popular newspapers did not receive 
the same extensive, in-depth coverage of foreign affairs that readers of The Times received.81  The 
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third study, by Benny Morris, examined the major weekly papers, such as The Economist.  He drew a 
similar conclusion to the two previous studies but with two notable exceptions, The Economist, and 
Time and Tide.82  The studies of newspaper content need to be set alongside the personalities 
behind the newspapers.  Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of The Times, and his deputy, Robert 
Barrington-Ward, favoured appeasement, a policy that Dawson promoted through sympathetic 
leaders.  However, Dawson’s views, unlike those of his deputy, failed to take account of the ethnic 
problems in Central Europe. 83  James Garvin, the editor of The Observer, was another who favoured 
appeasement but moved towards resistance during the winter months of 1938-9. 84  Editors were 
not alone in influencing the content of newspapers.  Owners like Lord Beaverbrook, who owned the 
largest selling national daily, the Daily Express, used his papers to promote the view that there 
would be no war, whilst also campaigning for conscription.85  Consideration of the paper’s editorial 
stance is required when using them for public opinion research, as this often dictated the type of 
letters published.       
 
Newspapers had the greatest influence but film had the greatest reach, as by 1939 cinema 
audiences had reached a weekly average of 21 million.  Many attending the cinema came from 
groups that politicians found difficult to reach: women, under-40s and people on low-incomes.86  
Newsreels were a popular part of the cinema programme in areas such as Lancashire.87  They 
featured news that was several days old.  However, they still allowed the audience to see how 
people behaved, and to receive messages, such as the need to volunteer for Air Raid Precautions 
(ARP) work. Sport received the most coverage with war not far behind.  War coverage included 
stories of aerial bombardment from the Spanish Civil War and Sino-Japanese conflict, thereby 
exposing the British public to the horrors of modern warfare.  Nazi Germany was another popular 
topic during 1938-9.88  The majority of stories were favourable to Germany, which reflected the 
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cautious editorial approach of the newsreel companies.  However, slip-ups did occur.  During the 
Munich crisis, a Paramount newsreel contained comments opposing government policy.  The 
Foreign Office quickly applied pressure to the American parent company to ensure withdrawal from 
circulation.89  Interventions such as this reflected the potential power of film to influence and 
educate opinion in the minds of politicians.   
 
Radio was another source of news provision and by 1939, 73% of households owned a set.90  The 
educational potential of this medium was quickly recognised.  During a 1933 roundtable, Mr Robson 
– identified in the list of speakers as Professor Robson from the LSE - spoke about listener groups, 
which listened to a programme and then discussed it, thereby establishing a link with adult 
education.91  The League of Nations Union (LNU) for example, actively encouraged listener groups.  
In early 1938, the BBC broadcast a series called the Way of Peace, which was listened to and 
discussed by 51 LNU youth groups and 17 branches.92  The series aimed to help people to 
understand various aspects of international affairs including organisations and potential policies.  
They provided a clear message that most people only saw the local horizon and that to solve world 
problems the education of the people was required.93  Education was part of the ethos of radio in 
Britain: hence the suggestion by the Cabinet Secretary, Maurice Hankey, that it should be used to 
educate people about the need for ARP.94  However, whilst recognising the educational value of 
radio, the government undertook some censorship of the BBC’s output.  In September 1938, the 
Foreign Office prevented the journalist, Vernon Bartlett from broadcasting on Children’s Hour about 
Central Europe. 95  This intervention came at a time when the government was beginning to use 
radio for propaganda purposes, to communicate its point of view to the German people.  This 
activity continued after the crisis with the establishment of the BBC German Service, though the 
Foreign Office undertook content vetting to prevent any disturbance in international relations.96    
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The news and broadcast media were susceptible to government interference.  This was not the case 
with books.  The war genre for most of the interwar period either portrayed a ‘never again’ message 
or highlighted the threat from the air.  The former trend reached its zenith between 1928 and 1932 
with the publication of a series of bestsellers describing the 1914-1918 carnage.  The biggest seller 
was Erich Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front, which highlighted the gap between those who 
had served and the world around them.97  This legacy, and the desire to avoid another war, were a 
feature of two books by the former war correspondent, Philip Gibbs.  He recorded his discussions 
with a wide range of people.  The discussions revealed an awareness of international affairs but also 
that greater education of the public was required. 98  Victor Gollancz attempted to provide this with 
the formation of the Left Book Club, which published books aimed at educating the public about 
Hitler and the fascist threat.  The books had a left-wing viewpoint, with several authors having 
Communist sympathies, though Gollancz denied any formal links with the Communist Party.99  The 
Club itself attracted a wide range of people, often in their 20s and 30s, who were disillusioned with 
mainstream politics.  Members’ interest in the topics led to the formation of discussion groups and 
the holding of protest meetings against government policy.100  Along with a series of Penguin 
specials, these books filled a vacuum in terms of information provision.  One gap that neither filled 
was the provision of a full English language translation of Mein Kampf.101  An abridged version, 
minus the most threatening passages, was available and left the reader with the impression of an 
overt offer of friendship.  Doug Phinney found that Adolf Hitler tightly controlled the translation 
rights, hence the lack of a full translation.102  However, this did not prevent others from publishing 
books such as What Hitler Wants,103 which described the contents of Mein Kampf.  This book 
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received praise from the Bolton Evening News for providing a clear warning.104  Works of this nature 
and Hitler’s activities made the British public more aware of the threat that they faced.   
 
Apart from books, most information sources were subject to potential government interference.  
This hampered the development of an effective opposition to government policy.  However, within 
the information sources it is possible to detect the underlying attitudes that were prevailing within 
society.  The anti-war pressure groups that emerged during the interwar period demonstrate such 
attitudes.  Ceadel has divided these into pacifist and pacificist: the former is unconditionally against 
war, whereas the latter will accept it under certain circumstances.105  The largest group, the LNU, 
straddled the divide for much of the period.  In 1934, it organised the Peace Ballot,106 which aimed 
to demonstrate Britain’s commitment to the ideals of the League.  The result was overwhelmingly in 
favour of the League, including the use of military force, and encouraged the LNU to campaign for 
the government to adopt a League-based foreign policy during the 1935 general election campaign.  
This election occurred during the Italy-Abyssinia conflict, an event however, that witnessed a move 
towards the policy of appeasement.  This outcome confirmed Daniel Waley’s conclusion that the 
LNU was only able to influence government pronouncements rather than policy.107  It also allowed 
the Opposition parties to accuse the government of abandoning the League.  The Abyssinia crisis and 
the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in March 1936 divided the peace movement.  The LNU, after 
realising that resistance to German demands was required, moved closer to the pacificist groups.  
Ceadel’s work, when combined with that of Cecilia Lynch, Wilkinson and Waley,108 reinforces the 
conclusion that the peace movement’s influence on policy was limited, but it did contribute to the 
operational limits of British policy.    
 
The attitudes of the 1930s gave rise to other events that set the limits of British policy.  In 1933, the 
Oxford Union staged the ‘King and Country’ debate.  This debate centred on the motion ‘that this 
House will in no circumstances fight for King and Country’.  Ceadel’s re-examination of the motion 
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highlights some of the interpretations at the time and concludes that it did much to define what 
absolute pacifism was.109  Vera Brittain and Ronald McCallum argued that the early interpretations 
did not account for divisions within the peace movement.110  However, the motion did not have any 
measurable impact on patriotism, as most men were still willing to serve their country in 1939.  
Therefore, the debate only slowed the development of opposition to Hitler 
 
Prior to the development of opinion polls, by-elections were one of the main barometers of public 
opinion, and they have been emphasised as a way of judging support for government policy in the 
weeks following the Munich agreement.  Roger Eatwell’s highly cited article argues that Bridgwater 
was the most important of these, due to the candidature of the anti-appeasement journalist, Vernon 
Bartlett, which meant that there was a greater concentration on foreign affairs.  His other major 
finding was that whilst the Opposition gained votes, the swing was lower in places where the 
government candidate was not a Conservative.111  This suggests that the public perceived 
appeasement to be a Conservative policy, though local issues may also have been involved.  Swings 
to the Opposition are part of the normal electoral cycle so this finding is unsurprising.  
Unfortunately, an enhanced level of detail for this and the Oxford by-election is not available from 
M-O as the material collected is missing from the archive, as revealed by Eatwell’s correspondence 
with Tom Harrisson.112  Bridgwater was not the only post-Munich by-election to focus on foreign 
affairs.  The Kinross and West Perth by-election occurred when the Duchess of Atholl resigned her 
seat following a clash with the local Conservative Association about her opinions on the Munich 
agreement, though she was out of the country at the time of the Parliamentary debate on Munich.  
She stood as an independent and lost.113  Her experience at the hands of her local association was 
not unique, as several Conservative MPs had disagreements with their associations who remained 
loyal to Chamberlain. 114  John Sparks has called into question the use of the post-Munich by-
elections as a way of judging public opinion on Chamberlain’s policy.  He argued that increased 
Conservative polling was not a vote in favour of Chamberlain but rather a habitual defence of the 
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Conservative candidate in the face of a strong challenger.115  However, the by-election literature is 
lacking a study of the 1939 by-elections and the role of foreign affairs, which would enable further 
discussion. 
 
The use of opinion polls in Britain began in 1937 with the creation of BIPO.  The political parties did 
not take the results seriously until after the Second World War.116  Publication of the results was 
initially in Cavalcade before transferring to the News Chronicle in October 1938, which resulted in 
the loss of some data from the early polls.  The transfer affected BIPO’s independence as the News 
Chronicle owner, Laurence Cadbury, often wanted questions asked on specific subjects.  Despite this, 
BIPO’s work was reasonably accurate, as it predicted that Labour would win the April 1938 West 
Fulham by-election with 51% of the vote.  The actual result was 52.2%.117  Nonetheless, opinion polls 
normally receive just a passing mention in the existing literature due to their contradictory nature.  
Philip Towle cites the example of an October 1938 poll where 75% were in favour of increased 
defence spending, while a similar number opposed conscription.118  M-O evidence explains some of 
these anomalies by providing descriptions of the impact of events upon the individual.   
 
Media sources, by-elections, and opinion polls form part of the source material used in this thesis, 
which examines the questions below: 
 What was local-level opinion? 
 Was there a delay between national and local discussion of events? 
 What regional variations were there? 
 What role did local newspapers play? 
 How did crises affect public opinion? 
 Were there any turning points? 
The answers to the above questions will help to provide a wider picture of public opinion and the 
public mood in the years immediately preceding the Second World War.  The local case study aspect 
of this thesis means that a broad range of sources are used, hence the extensive list in the 
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bibliography.  It is very much a case of looking for a needle in a haystack as mention of foreign affairs 
is often just a passing reference.   
 
Newspapers are the main source used for public opinion studies during the 1930s, due to their 
influence, reach, and the ability to allow some form of interaction, principally letters to the editor.  
These came predominantly from engaged readers, though a degree of caution is required due to a 
paper’s editorial policy as the editor normally selected the letters for publication.  The two national 
newspapers used for this study are The Times and the Manchester Guardian.  The former is the 
paper of record and regarded as reflecting government opinion.  By contrast, the Manchester 
Guardian, with its liberal background, published a wider range of views in its letters column than The 
Times.  Neither of these papers had the mass circulation of the Daily Express, Daily Mail, or the Daily 
Mirror, which are excluded from this study due to their more limited coverage of foreign affairs.  The 
exclusion also allows a concentration on the local case studies.  Local newspapers present an 
additional challenge, as it is difficult to find out further details about letter writers.  As such, the 
letters appearing in local newspapers are considered genuine on the basis that local newspapers 
served a wide range of views.  Jane Secker argues that local newspapers are valuable for studying 
international events as they allow an enhanced level of understanding, thereby complementing 
Soloff’s argument about moving towards an enhanced national synthesis.  Secker highlighted 
another strength of local newspapers, namely that council meeting reports were more detailed than 
the official minutes. 119  Such detailed reporting allowed for what J. B. Chaney described in 1898 as ‘a 
current history of the people in their respective localities, a history more complete than can be 
found in any other form’. 120  Newspapers reflected this in the breadth of topics and opinions 
reported, even if they did conflict with editorial opinion.  This breadth occurred in local newspapers 
in the geographical case studies and this representation further underlines the importance of this 
study, as a similar breadth was not always available in the national newspapers.  The local 
newspapers in Bedfordshire included an evening daily newspaper, the Beds and Herts Evening 
Telegraph, which printed a range of local, national and international news but did not offer a letters 
column.  A column was offered by the weekly newspapers:  Luton News and Bedfordshire Advertiser 
(Luton News), Bedfordshire Times and Independent (Bedfordshire Times), and the Bedfordshire 
Standard.  Prior to their merger in July 1939, the Times and Standard represented the liberal and 
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conservative viewpoints.121  The Bedfordshire Times was the largest of five newspapers in the county 
owned by Westminster Press Provincial Newspapers, and covered over 100 villages.  Therefore, the 
paper placed a strong emphasis on agriculture in its reporting.  The average weekly sales were just 
over 19,000.122  Bolton had a similar mix to Bedfordshire: the Bolton Evening News, the Bolton 
Journal and Guardian, and the Bolton Standard.  The liberal-orientated Tillotson family owned the 
Bolton Evening News and used the editorial column to promote what they believed to be in the best 
interests of the town and country.  The paper had an active letters column with contributions from 
across the social and political spectrum.  The other two were weekly newspapers and reported more 
of the social activities in the town.123  Some use is made of additional newspapers from the 
surrounding area to enhance the case study.  In contrast to the other two geographical areas, 
Fulham and Hammersmith did not have a dedicated local evening daily paper.  However, there were 
several weeklies: the West London Observer, the Fulham Chronicle, and the West London and 
Hammersmith Gazette.  Use is also made of other papers including the monthly newspaper of the 
local Labour Party.   
 
Local newspapers form the main evidence source used in this thesis.  Supporting them are records 
from a range of organisations including councils and churches.  The records used will demonstrate 
how local defensive preparations for war developed, the impact of crises, and public’s reactions to 
them.  Unfortunately, trade union records for all three case studies are lacking in detail about 
foreign affairs discussions.  However, the Bolton and Fulham case studies benefit from the records of 
M-O, which studies everyday life in both locations, as well as asking a national panel for responses 
on specific subjects, thereby helping to bridge the gap between the public’s knowledge and what the 
government referred to as public opinion.124  It helped to provide in Tom Harrisson’s words, ‘an 
anthropology and mass documentation of a vast sector of life, which did not at the time seem to be 
adequately covered by the media, the arts, the social sciences, and political leaders’.  Harrisson went 
on to explain in the introduction to Living through the Blitz that the relationship between the 
observers and the organisation was one of assured anonymity, thereby allowing them to be 
completely honest125 and ‘tell M-O things that they were not prepared to tell their closest friends’.126  
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This relationship is one of the strengths of using M-O for this type of study, as well as the range of 
people who wrote for the organisation.  The breadth of opinion, whilst not representative of the 
population, substantially expands the evidence base available for studies of public opinion during 
the 1937-1939 period.  However, the data collection methods used by M-O came in for criticism by 
the anthropologist, Raymond Firth, who was a Reader in Anthropology at the LSE.  He criticised M-O 
for failing to meet the standards of scientific research, 127 a criticism reinforced by N. S. Stanley, who 
provided an in-depth critical analysis of the organisation’s methodology in the 1937-1940 period.  He 
found that M-O lacked a coherent research methodology and had no quality control.128  The result, 
as Lucy Noakes argues, is that it is not representative of public opinion.129  Another point of concern 
regarding M-O is the relationship between the organisation and the Labour Party, as the former 
worked closely with the latter, especially during by-elections.  Academic disciplines such as sociology 
and history continue to debate the value of M-O as a source.  For historians, M-O continues to have 
value as it enabled ordinary people to articulate their views and provides them with a source of 
information that they would not otherwise be able to access.  Recent examples of studies using M-O 
records include Julie Gottlieb’s gendered examination of appeasement130 and Carla Pass’s 
examination of a steady growth in opposition to Chamberlain following the declaration of war, 
which came to the fore just before he resigned in May 1940.131  For sociologists. M-O continues to be 
a problematic source, just as it was for Raymond Firth, due to the ‘legitimacy’ of the data assembled.  
Hence, as Rachel Hurdley notes, M-O is both a source and a subject for academic research.132   From 
the point of view of this thesis, the value to historians of M-O applies, as it allows researchers (in the 
words of Jonathan Croall) to ‘find out what effect the actions of the rich and famous had on the 
lower social strata’.133  When combined with other national-level sources, such as letters to The 
Times and the Manchester Guardian, Cabinet Papers, Foreign Office records, Hansard, cinema 
newsreels, private papers and opinion poll data, M-O provides the national context for the local 
evidence.  M-O evidence is also local and can be used in combination with the local sources already 
mentioned to allow a triangulation of the evidence.  This approach for producing case studies is 
applicable for other areas of the country, thereby adding to the national synthesis of events. 
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Using the sources outlined above, the thesis will contain seven chapters.  The first four follow the 
chronological order of events from November 1937 until September 1939.  The remaining three are 
thematic ones, concerned with various aspects of defence preparations, primarily civil defence. 
 
Chapter one examines November 1937 to April 1938 focussing on five specific events.  The 1937 
Armistice Day ceremonies witnessed an increased attendance compared to previous years despite 
calls for their abolition.  The increased observance had a link to the perceived deterioration in the 
international situation, which remained in the background until Eden’s resignation in February 1938.  
This occurred after the Farnworth by-election campaign, which had demonstrated a general apathy 
towards foreign affairs.  Eden’s resignation began the process of raising awareness, a process that 
continued a few weeks later when the Anschluss occurred.  Three weeks after this came the West 
Fulham by-election.  The national perception of this by-election was that it was a chance to vote on 
the government’s foreign policy.  The portrayal reflects the East Fulham by-election five years 
earlier, but local issues again decided the outcome of the campaign.   
 
Chapter two examines the development of British attitudes towards the Sudeten crisis from the 
Anschluss until November 1938.  The chapter argues that until Chamberlain’s first flight, ‘mass’ 
opinion was not interested in the subject.  The involvement of Chamberlain heightened the tension 
and made people realise that its outcome would impact upon their daily lives.  Chamberlain’s flight 
triggered a period of rapid changes in the ‘public mood’ rather than in public opinion as restrictions 
on the information available prevented people being able to form an ‘informed’ opinion.  By the 
time the crisis was over, the British public had a greater awareness of the state of the national 
defences and the public mood was determined to prevent a recurrence as the overlapping thematic 
chapters will demonstrate.  The Munich crisis was a major turning point on the road to war.    
 
Chapter three covers the period from Kristallnacht in November 1938 until just after the German 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.  The chapter examines the British reaction to Kristallnacht 
as part of a wider discussion about national attitudes towards the Jews for the whole period covered 
by the thesis.  When combined with the reactions to Munich, a further hardening of opinion towards 
Germany occurred.  The winter months saw rumours circulating about Germany’s next move, a 
question resolved in March 1939 when German troops entered the remainder of Czechoslovakia.  
This breach of the Munich agreement hastened the hardening of opinion and led to a reorientation 
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of British foreign policy towards resistance, beginning with the issuing of the guarantee to Poland.  
Within the period covered by the chapter, there was increased discussion of the role of the Soviet 
Union and the need to consider it as a potential ally.   
 
Chapter four begins with a discussion of British attitudes towards the Soviet Union, as the 
government attempted to make an alliance to make the British guarantees effective.  This demand 
came from across the political spectrum, though there was strong resistance from conservative 
elites, and the failure to achieve it only added to the mistrust of the government, as the 
adjournment debate at the start of August demonstrated.  The focus on this issue represents a move 
away from the central focus of the thesis but is necessary to account for the change in British policy.  
Discussions about an alliance continued until the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which sent 
shockwaves around the world.  However, rather than deterring Britain, it only made the country 
more determined to resist even if opinion remained bewildered by events in the days leading up to 
the declaration of war.   
 
Chapter five is the first of the thematic chapters.  It charts the development of ARP in the three 
geographical areas and the impact that each crisis had.  The Munich crisis was the turning point as it 
created the public will necessary to accelerate preparations, especially in London, which was 
woefully behind the rest of the country.  Enhanced information is available for London thanks to the 
work of M-O, which undertook a survey to find out what people thought of ARP in Fulham and why 
they had volunteered.  Related to ARP is the subject of shelters, which forms a specific case study 
within the chapter.  As with preparations generally, the Munich crisis accelerated the development 
of a shelter policy, though not one that would provide protection for all.   
 
Chapter six discusses the safety of children, a specific subset of civil defence work.  This included 
evacuation, which received little attention prior to the Munich crisis except from the London County 
Council (LCC).  The LCC, without permission from the Home Office, had started to prepare an 
evacuation scheme in early 1938, which formed the nucleus of the plans implemented during the 
Munich crisis and received extensive attention during 1939.  The public attitude and response to 
evacuation varied depending upon the designation of each area. 
 
The last chapter considers the idea of national service, with an emphasis on the debate surrounding 
conscription from March to September 1939.  The introduction of peacetime conscription was a 
measure designed to ensure that Britain had enough trained soldiers and could demonstrate the will 
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to resist.  Debates about conscription were encouraged by local newspapers and from the letters 
columns various views emerged.  However, despite some opposition from the Left, acceptance of 
the decision occurred in an equivalent way to that of the declaration of war.  
 
Over the course of the seven chapters, it will be demonstrated that public opinion and the ‘public 
mood’ changed substantially to one that accepted the possible need to fight Germany, whilst at the 
same time continuing to hope that a conflict could be avoided. 
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Chapter 1: A long expected union – November 1937 to April 1938 
 
November 1937 witnessed several crucial events on the road to war.  On 5 November, the German 
Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, met his senior military commanders to outline his plans, which included the 
Anschluss and the takeover of Czechoslovakia.  His aide, Colonel Hossbach, recorded the details of 
the meeting.  The Allies at the Nuremberg trials used the Hossbach memorandum – as this 
document is known – as evidence of Germany’s future intentions.  Soon afterwards, Hitler met the 
Lord Chancellor, Lord Halifax, who, prior to his visit had sought the advice of the Foreign Office.  
Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, wanted Halifax to warn Hitler off Czechoslovakia.  Instead, 
Halifax indicated that Britain would not be averse to peaceful change in Europe.134  One way of 
achieving this would be via an international conference, which the United States President, Franklin 
Roosevelt, proposed in January 1938.  Chamberlain, much to the annoyance of Eden who was on 
holiday in France, rebuffed the offer.  This incident added to an increasingly strained working 
relationship.  Eden reached breaking point in February over a proposal to open negotiations with 
Italy.  He was against this but the Cabinet supported Chamberlain, resulting in Eden’s resignation.  
Halifax replaced him as Foreign Secretary.  Soon afterwards the Anschluss occurred, an event that 
Britain responded to by only making a formal protest.  It was against this backdrop that the West 
Fulham by-election campaign would be undertaken.  These events form the context to this chapter, 
which begins by examining attitudes to Armistice Day in November 1937 before moving on to the 
Farnworth by-election in January 1938.  References to foreign affairs during the campaign revealed 
the divide between the political parties, a divide that intensified following Eden’s resignation.  This 
caused a brief flicker of public interest, revealing a confused state of opinion.  The confusion 
remained during the Anschluss.  The combination of these two events and an appeal for ARP 
volunteers led to an increased emphasis on foreign affairs during the West Fulham by-election 
campaign.  Using the above case studies, the chapter argues that ordinary people displayed a limited 
interest in foreign affairs, though events were beginning to increase awareness.       
 
Armistice Day was a time to remember the indelible mark that the Great War left on British society.  
The idea of the ‘lost generation’ was one of those marks.  As time went by, commemoration also 
occurred on Remembrance Sunday, the Sunday closest to Armistice Day.  Adrian Gregory examines 
the history and development of Armistice ceremonies in The Silence of Memory.  Gregory argues 
that prior to the mid-1920s the day was a mixture of remembrance and celebration.  This changed 
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after 1926 when a sense of seriousness overtook the celebratory element.135  This coincided with the 
introduction of the Festival of Remembrance to emphasise what Britain owed to those who had lost 
their lives.136  This change occurred just prior to the publication of several works portraying a more 
personalised and disenchanted side of the conflict than the one that people had come to accept.  
Gregory goes on to argue that people’s reactions to Armistice Day provided an indication of public 
attitudes to war.  He supported this by using M-O data collected in November 1937, an examination 
of which forms part of this chapter.  Gregory’s work is part of a wider debate about the meaning of 
remembrance.  Debra Marshall discusses this, referring to Dominik Dendooven’s interpretation of 
the Last Post ceremony held each evening at Ypres in Belgium.  To some it is militaristic, whilst 
others believe that it is a warning about the nature of war.137  Ross Wilson would agree with the 
latter as he refers to the conflict as ‘an historical trauma – a lesson in human suffering’, 138 a message 
prevalent in the 1930s. 
 
The themes highlighted by Gregory, Marshall and Wilson all find some outlet in the Armistice Day 
observations collected by M-O in November 1937.  M-O asked observers to record events between 
10.30am and 11.30am.  From the data collected, several themes emerge such as the size of crowds 
(also a feature of local newspapers), poppies, how people felt towards the act of remembrance and 
an incident at the Cenotaph.  Observers based in London reported large crowds, as did the British 
Gaumont newsreel on 15 November.139  Most in the crowds wore the traditional red poppy, though 
some white poppies representing peace were also present and a source of interest to some in the 
crowd.140  Other comments from observers reveal hints about how people felt about the act of 
remembrance, some of which correlate with the evidence at a local level:141 
 Kent housewife, 34 – somehow the utter futility of wars seems to strike me more forcibly 
than ever just now.  What good can it do except take toll of useful lives and create a false 
standard of security of the future. 
 Female Kent boarding house owner – I offer a silent prayer for not only those killed in the 
wars but for the ones who are about to face another, and those who are at war. 
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 24-year-old male engineering machinist from County Durham – I feel very strong about this 
armistice service.  To my mind, it is a first-rate example of British hypocrisy – a government 
which treats the living heroes of the last war with callous indifference and which subjects its 
people to the means test is represented here piously paying lip service to those who died for 
King and country.  Felt that this would be the last remembrance service. 
 
In Bedfordshire, local newspapers reported high attendances at services on Remembrance Sunday.  
At the Priory Church in Dunstable, the neighbouring conurbation to Luton, people were described as 
‘fighting to get in’, a scene not witnessed by others attending the service.142  Large attendances also 
occurred in Bedford, with the Bedfordshire Standard describing them as the largest ever seen.143   
Yet, alongside reports about large attendances, there was also some discussion about whether 
Armistice Day should continue.  In a letter to the Luton News, H. S. Knowles, the chair of Dunstable 
Old Contemptibles, called upon the young to allow the old one day when they could grieve for their 
fallen comrades.  Knowles went on to warn that the young might yet experience the horrors of 
war.144   H. F. Outen, a resident of Mountfield Road in Luton, agreed, stating that there was ‘more 
apparent reverence and appreciation of the situation than there had been over recent years’.  Outen 
equated this with the deterioration of the international situation.145 
 
M-O observers in Bolton and reports in the Bolton Journal and Guardian told a similar story 
regarding the numbers paying their respects.146  Many of those gathered wore poppies, whilst at the 
Labour Exchange the observer described the scene, ‘when the lights went out all of the clerks stood 
up whilst the unemployed took off their hats.  Silence appears to least about four minutes rather 
than two.  Everything reverted to normal when the lights came back on’.147  Given these displays, the 
Bolton Evening News speculated about the reason for it.  The editorial believed that it was due to 
the deterioration of the international situation. 148  Some hints about the international situation were 
made during street conversations recorded by M-O.  Working outside the Post Office one observer 
noted two conversations.  The first involved two men, where one stated ‘there has never been a 
declaration of war whilst the Tories have been in office and there never will.  This will stop war’.  A 
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few minutes later, the observer spoke to an ex-serviceman who said, ‘I was thinking about how soon 
we would be joining up again’.149  These two comments provide a small shred of evidence that some 
people were aware of the changing nature of the international situation.  However, the lack of 
further background information on those making the comments, prevents any conclusion about 
whether they were informed opinions.        
The crowds witnessed in Bedfordshire and Bolton, also occurred in Fulham and Hammersmith.  
However, they received only a passing mention.150  The generational divide was present in Fulham as 
Reverend Greaves of St John’s Church in Walham Green asked the young not to resent those who 
wished to remember especially amongst the older generation.151  M-O collected statements from 
children about Armistice Day that demonstrated however, that they understood its meaning with 
some even praying during the silence for the continuation of peace.152    
 
Stanley Storey was one man who did not respect the silence.  He broke the silence at the Cenotaph, 
by calling attention to the hypocrisy of praying for peace but preparing for war.  The Times reported 
the incident as having caused anxiety, which M-O reports confirm.  The observer reports speculated 
as to what it might have been: an assassination attempt on the King,153 a protest about the military 
nature of the service, 154 or one against the hypocrisy of the silence.155  The protest and observers’ 
speculation reflected the purpose of Armistice Day, namely to remind people about the horrors of 
war and the need to prevent a repetition.  The Cenotaph incident received little comment in the 
three areas.     
 
Armistice Day 1937 witnessed a greater reverence and appreciation of the sacrifices made during 
the Great War, as witnessed by the crowds described around the country.  Some of those attending 
stated that the international situation was deteriorating and it was necessary to remember the past 
to prevent a repetition.  However, ordinary people would prove to be powerless to do anything 
about this.   
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One of the messages preached on Armistice Day was the need for justice to ensure peace.  For 
Labour and Liberal politicians, this was only achievable through the League of Nations and the 
principle of ‘collective security’.  Examples include an address by the Liberal leader, Archibald 
Sinclair, at Bedford School on Armistice Day and another by Edith Summerskill, the prospective 
Labour candidate for West Fulham, at a packed meeting at Fulham Town Hall.156  Speakers visiting 
Bolton included the Labour leader, Clement Attlee and his deputy, Arthur Greenwood.  Greenwood 
attacked the government for basing its foreign policy solely on the national interest, an attack 
criticised by the Bolton Evening News for failing to offer viable alternatives.157  However, some 
support existed for the government’s position as the end of 1937 approached.  Mrs Wells, the wife 
of Bedford MP Sir Richard Wells, addressed an audience of over 200 at a meeting of the Bedford 
Conservative Association.  Her optimistic tone was the result of private assurances to her husband 
by Eden that peace was nearer than it had been for a long time.  This message received criticism 
from the Bedfordshire Times editorial on 24 December, as it ignored the rise of conflict and that 
Britain was rearming rather than relying on the League to ensure peace.158 
 
The respective party positions on foreign affairs featured in the Farnworth by-election campaign in 
January 1938.  Farnworth is located three miles from Bolton and was a predominantly working-class 
area with connections to the cotton and mining industries.  The by-election was triggered by the 
death of the sitting Labour MP, Guy Rowson, who had been elected in 1935 with a majority of 5,201 
and a 51.7% share of the vote on a turnout of 82%.159  Newspaper coverage of the by-election began 
on 23 December 1937 when the Bolton Evening News profiled the likely candidates.160  The Labour 
candidate, George Tomlinson, was active in local government and the trade unions, as well as being 
the former President of the Farnworth Labour Party.  He undertook humanitarian work during the 
Great War in accordance with his Christian pacifist beliefs and was an ardent supporter of the 
League.161  His Conservative opponent, Herbert Ryan, a London barrister, was unknown in the local 
area but described as having excellent credentials.162   
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The campaign itself covered a mixture of local, national, and international issues.  The latter featured 
in Labour’s opening speech of the campaign, given by the LCC leader, Herbert Morrison.  He accused 
the government of betraying peace and democracy, themes already established in the Bolton 
speeches of Attlee and Greenwood.  Attlee spoke in Farnworth during January 1938 at a full capacity 
Empire cinema on the themes of peace and social justice, both of which were required at home and 
abroad.  He accused the government of failing the democratic cause and allowing British prestige to 
suffer.  In addition, Morrison, as well as Tomlinson, spoke on matters relating to unemployment.163  
The foreign affairs part of the speeches made at this meeting reinforced the party’s election 
literature, which attacked the government and accused Ryan of paying lip service to the League.164  
Tomlinson’s speeches on domestic affairs mainly regarded issues affecting the cotton and coal 
industries.  In his first speech, he spoke about holidays with pay as well as international affairs.  He 
accused the government of trying to side step the holidays with pay issue by appointing a committee 
of inquiry to examine it.  He believed that this would be one of the issues in the by-election 
campaign, along with the level of unemployment.165  On 18 January, he referred to rearmament, 
which overlapped the domestic and international spheres.  Tomlinson believed that rearmament 
was necessary but that it diverted funds away from helping to prevent people starving.  He also 
emphasised the League as the alternative to the government’s foreign policy.166  On 19 January, he 
followed this speech with one that focussed on social security, particularly pensions and savings.  
The speech also contained an attack on his opponent for his attitude towards the miners.167  
Tomlinson’s focus on social issues continued until the end of the campaign, with unemployment one 
of the main focuses of his campaign meeting speeches on 25 January.168 
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Figure 6: George Tomlinson speaking at the Empire Cinema169 
 
Figure 7: Canvassing the Flower Estate170 
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Herbert Ryan’s campaign placed a greater emphasis on foreign rather than domestic affairs.  He 
outlined Chamberlain’s policy as protecting British interests and settling disputes by negotiation, a 
major principle of the League.  He viewed the government as having the only logical view on foreign 
affairs.  Ryan attacked the Socialists for wanting to get Britain involved in Abyssinia and Spain, 
arguing that government policy had prevented this and therefore people should vote for him.  
Domestically, he believed that the government’s record spoke for itself, with fewer people 
unemployed and rising prosperity.171  At a National Government meeting on 16 January, the speaker, 
Mr Ramsbottom, attacked Labour for leaving the country in a financial mess.  He argued that 
through the work of the government, exports and savings had increased.172  Herbert Ryan picked up 
the theme of improvements at a meeting on 20 January.  He spoke about the foundations for 
prosperity that the government had laid.  In addition, he indicated his support for rearmament and 
the efforts made by the government to keep Britain from becoming involved in the civil war in 
Spain.173  These themes occurred again during a campaign meeting on 25 January.174 
Figure 8: National Government campaign meeting at Co-op Hall, Farnworth175 
 
M-O’s coverage of the by-election resulted in a range of material.  This included election ephemera, 
meeting observations, and some analysis of the canvassing returns.  M-O mainly worked for Labour 
and helped to cement a relationship that had already begun to grow.  As part of their work, Tom 
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Harrisson wanted to study the election returns (presumably canvassing returns).  M-O had access to 
the Labour ones and managed to obtain the Conservative ones by deception.  M-O later sold them 
to the Labour Party, thereby revealing an underhand side to the organisation’s work.176 
 
Figure 9: Conservative Election Poster, Farnworth By-Election January 1938177 
 
 
The Farnworth by-election resulted in a victory for Tomlinson, which increased Labour’s share of the 
vote to 59.1% on a turnout of 77.8%, which was the highest of any by-election since 1935.178  The 
Bolton Evening News did not analyse the precise reason for Tomlinson’s victory, but one possible 
conclusion was the emphasis he placed on domestic affairs.  The paper acknowledged Tomlinson’s 
convictions, noting that there were certain subjects where they disagreed.179   The by-election 
confirmed the political divide over foreign affairs that was present in the other two geographical 
areas.  Broadly speaking, Conservatives backed the policy that Chamberlain was beginning to pursue, 
whilst the Opposition placed their faith in the League.  
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The political divisions intensified in February following the resignation of Eden over the question of 
opening negotiations with Italy.  This led to a debate about the future course of British policy.180   
Chamberlain and Eden discussed the opening of talks at a meeting with Count Grandi, the Italian 
ambassador, who knew following a letter from Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, that ‘this was the 
last moment for talks with England’.181  Chamberlain favoured the immediate opening of talks, whilst 
Eden argued that evidence of Italian good behaviour was required first, due to previous experience.  
These differences emerged in Grandi’s presence before an adjournment to enable a Cabinet 
discussion to take place.  Most of the Cabinet – including Leslie Burgin – agreed with Chamberlain, 
leading Eden to resign.182  This event marked the point that the government finally turned away from 
the League in favour of bilateral negotiations.  Victor Rothwell argued in his biography of Eden that 
his decline mirrored that of government support for the League.183  Eden’s resignation triggered a 
House of Commons debate, which provided further evidence of the political divide.  During the 
debate, twenty-five MPs voiced dissatisfaction, including six Conservatives.  Associated with the 
debate, Labour tabled a motion of censure against the government, a division that the government 
won despite fifty MPs abstaining.  This outcome allowed William Rock to conclude that the level of 
opposition to the government’s policy went far deeper. 184  
 
Debate about Eden’s resignation took place in informed circles and the wider country.  For example, 
the LNU wanted to use it to galvanise support for the League,185 whilst All Souls concluded that it 
marked a shift in government policy.186  The national impressions of the crisis can be seen in the 
BIPO poll for February and data collected by M-O.  The BIPO poll found that 71% believed that Eden 
was right to resign and that 58% of respondents were against Chamberlain’s foreign policy.187  The 
results of the poll indicated that the public were against Chamberlain, a conclusion that the M-O 
records neither confirm nor deny as they are somewhat contradictory depending upon the access 
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route.  The M-O report entitled Eden Resigns, England Reacts reported that many of those 
questioned favoured Eden, which contradicts the records available via Mass Observation Online, 
which suggest a more even split.  The explanation for this is that a lot of early M-O material is 
missing from the archive.188  Both the records and the report confirm that most people followed the 
crisis via newspapers and that interest quickly declined.  The comments collected by M-O reflected 
the political divisions aroused by this event.  An unnamed 58-year-old Scottish Conservative MP 
thought that while Chamberlain would never be loved, he would be respected for his efforts, whilst 
a working-class girl aged 25 thought that things would not improve until Chamberlain left office.  
Three further comments in the report stand out.  Mrs Bertha Hammond, an Ipswich housewife 
commented that ‘nobody had spoken to her spontaneously about it and wondered if the 
international situation is more serious than ordinary folk imagine’.    Meanwhile, Dennis Frone from 
Essex got into conversation with a member of the British Union of Fascists (BUF), who did not think 
the situation was dangerous and opposed the idea that there would be war within two years.  The 
final comment of note provides an excellent summary of the crisis stating: ‘felt it was always the 
same with crisis – big outcry, protest meetings but after the first few days, people begin to think 
themselves quite safe as nothing else had happened’. 189   When taken together, the different 
elements of public opinion at a national level confirmed the divisions that existed within the country.  
Parliamentary opinion favoured Chamberlain for the moment despite the misgivings of a large 
minority of MPs.  However, surveys of ordinary people demonstrated a clear support for Eden and 
the principles that he stood for.  This still leaves the question of what was occurring at a local level.   
 
The Parliamentary division on Labour’s motion of censure saw all three Bedfordshire MPs vote for 
the government.  Lennox-Boyd had spoken in the debate, arguing that there was a need to be 
realistic when it came to diplomacy, a clear expression of opinion praised by the Luton News.190  
‘Democrat’, a resident of Luton, who called on Leslie Burgin to hold a constituency meeting to allow 
people to express their opinions, did not share the views of the MPs.  This appeal came after the 
letter writer had attended a meeting, which had passed a resolution calling for Chamberlain to 
resign.191  The requested meeting was not forthcoming.  ‘Democrat’ was not alone in expressing 
opposition to the government.  Norman Mickle, the prospective Labour candidate for Bedford called 
for a general election as the government had moved away from the League-based foreign policy that 
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it had promised at the 1935 general election.192  However, it is notable that the report of Mickle’s 
speech contained no other reference to the League. 
 
 
The divisions present in Bedfordshire also occurred in the two London boroughs.  Here, William 
Astor, speaking to the Walham Ward branch of the Conservative Association, expressed his regret at 
Eden’s resignation and emphasised Chamberlain’s argument that it was not possible to pursue 
negotiations on a League basis with non-member countries. 193  Opposition parties overlooked this 
point, despite solving disputes by negotiation being one of the League’s principles.  Astor’s opinion 
was the only one in favour of the government, with opposition being widely reported.  Both 
prospective Labour candidates for the Fulham constituencies, Edith Summerskill and Michael 
Stewart, along with the women’s section of the West Fulham Labour Party, believed that the 
government had broken its election pledge.  The South Hammersmith Labour Party, Hammersmith 
Young Communists, the North Hammersmith Citizen, the South Hammersmith Citizens, and Fulham 
Trades Council joined them.194  T. H. Gibb, the secretary of Fulham Trades Council, sent the 
resolution passed at a meeting to the West London Observer.  It stated: 195  
 ‘The Fulham Trades Council, representing the organised workers in the Fulham district, 
views with alarm the resignation of Mr Anthony Eden from the post of Foreign Secretary.  
We consider he was jockeyed into this action by some members of the Cabinet who were 
obviously seeking to solve their problems at the expense of the democratic countries.  
Further, the government, having broken its election pledge should resign…’ 
 
The restrained tone of the resolution followed the standard arguments made on the Left, namely 
that the government had broken its election promise and should call a general election.  Individual 
letter writers joined the organisations who expressed opposition to the government.  One of these, 
‘Man with a Mop’, applauded Eden’s work and referred to protests by women in the West End 
carrying placards stating, ‘Chamberlain must go’.196  This was a rare contribution from outside 
‘informed’ opinion in the two London boroughs.      
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Evidence of Conservative support was more prominent in Bolton than the other two areas.  Both 
MPs voted with the government on the motion of censure and refrained from saying that Eden’s 
resignation was a good thing.  The Reverend A. W. Fawcett condemned the two MPs, reminding 
them of the expectation to fulfil their election pledge, not to sustain their party in power.  In reply. 
Entwistle argued that both MPs remained supporters of the League and that a Socialist government 
would be more dangerous.197  The restraint shown by the Conservative MPs over Eden’s resignation 
was missing at a Bolton branch meeting of the BUF.  The 24 attendees heard the speaker forcefully 
criticise Eden, when he said ‘Eden hates Mussolini and the Nazis.  People say they don’t trust the 
dictators yet Eden goes to Russia and shakes hands with Stalin, Litvinov and any other Jew he can 
find.  He will accept their word but not that of Mussolini or Hitler’. 198  This part of the speaker’s 
speech reiterated some of the core beliefs of the BUF.  However, the low attendance indicated a lack 
of support for the BUF in Bolton.  The Bolton Labour Party did not share the BUF’s joy at Eden’s 
resignation.  Prior to their February meeting, they issued a resolution condemning the government’s 
foreign policy.  Soon afterwards, Herbert Morrison spoke at a meeting that attracted a large crowd.  
Some people were unable to get into the meeting, with one lady stating that ‘it’s not often they fill 
Spinners Hall, but I think they will because of this Eden business’,199 a comment that indicates an 
awareness of events.  Morrison’s speech referred to the confused state of public opinion and went 
on to declare that although he personally disliked dictatorships, the Soviet Union had always fulfilled 
its commitments to the League.200  This maintained Labour’s advocacy for the League as an 
alternative to government policy.  The League alternative did have some support amongst people 
who spoke to M-O observers or wrote letters to the Bolton Evening News.  However, Chamberlain’s 
policy received a similar amount of support.  For example, ‘T.W.D.’ argued on 28 February, that Eden 
had dictated foreign policy until Chamberlain took office and that Chamberlain deserved the 
country’s support.201  These two letters are just some examples that demonstrate how divided 
opinion was in February 1938. 
 
‘Sharply divided’, was the verdict of Lord Halifax at the end of August 1938, when reflecting on the 
state of public opinion during Eden’s resignation.202  This verdict was correct at national and local 
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levels.  In all three geographical areas, Conservative opinion supported Chamberlain’s course and 
said very little against Eden.  In fact, the only direct criticism of Eden came from the BUF in Bolton 
and people replying to the M-O directive.  Political opponents of the government supported Eden as 
he stood for the principles of the League, a policy they favoured.  This was the case on the Left in 
Fulham, Hammersmith and Bolton.  The wider public, based on opinion polls, the work of M-O, and 
local newspapers, were confused about the specifics of the crisis but generally favoured the stance 
taken by Eden, whilst realising that Chamberlain’s policy might succeed.203  The brief spike in public 
interest is quite striking given the general apathy of the public about politics especially foreign 
affairs.  Part of the explanation for this spike may have been to do with Eden’s popularity amongst 
the electorate. 
 
Following Eden’s resignation, Lord Halifax became Foreign Secretary, resulting in the Parliamentary 
Undersecretary, Rab Butler or Chamberlain answered foreign affairs questions in the Commons.  
Halifax had barely taken office when an international crisis occurred, the Anschluss.  The German 
takeover of Austria was the culmination of a sequence of events that had been set in motion six 
weeks earlier after a meeting between the Austrian Chancellor, Kurt Von Schuschnigg and Hitler. 
During the meeting, Hitler demanded the inclusion of Austrian Nazis into the government, 
specifically Arthur Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior.  On the day after Eden’s resignation, a 
statement in the Commons outlined the details.  However, despite several attempts by Labour, they 
were unable to obtain a clear statement of the British position from Sir John Simon, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer.204  Following increasing disturbances caused by the Austrian Nazis, Schuschnigg 
called a plebiscite to decide Austria’s future.  This infuriated Hitler, who ordered his generals to 
prepare for an invasion of Austria if cancellation of the plebiscite did not occur.  Schuschnigg refused 
Hitler’s demands and resigned, leaving Seyss-Inquart able to ask Hitler to help restore order in 
Austria.  German troops crossed the frontier on 12 March to a warm reception.  Meanwhile, the 
German Foreign Minister and former ambassador to London, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, was 
attending his farewell luncheon.  As news reached London, Chamberlain and Halifax expressed their 
concerns to him before making an ineffective formal protest, as there was nothing more that the 
government could do.  However, the Cabinet did discuss what steps it could take in the future, 
including increased rearmament and stronger diplomatic language.  Neither found favour with 
Chamberlain, as he wished to avoid giving the impression that the country was on the brink of 
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war.205  Intermingled with international events during the weeks following Eden’s resignation were 
two defence related announcements.  On 2 March, the BBC news bulletin featured a report on the 
defence white paper, which outlined progress including a note that the supply of gas masks would 
be complete by the end of the year.206  A few days later, Sir Samuel Hoare, the Home Secretary, 
broadcast about ARP and the need to ensure that England was prepared.207  Both announcements 
were likely to have had an impact.  
 
The Anschluss reignited the public interest, with M-O observers reporting that people who did not 
normally discuss politics were doing so.  Two observers, Beryl Webb from Essex and C. R. Woodward 
from Middlesex, categorised the reactions of those around them.  The elderly and middle-aged, 
particularly women, feared war, whilst younger members of the public did not seem alarmed at the 
prospect.  For example, Beryl Webb overheard the discussion of some middle-aged women, the 
chief speaker of whom believed that ‘war was too terrible to think about’.208  Such comments once 
again revealed awareness amongst people about where events could lead. 
 
The Anschluss itself coincided with the end of Bedford Peace Week.  The prospective Labour 
candidate for Hammersmith South, W. T. Adams, addressed the closing meeting.  Adams urged the 
formation of a united front, a view that differed from Norman Mickle, who referred to the Anschluss 
as ‘the first fruits of the government’s decision to side with the dictators’.209  The report of the rally 
contained no indication of the crowd’s reaction.  Labour’s criticism of the government continued in 
Luton, where the prospective candidate, Mr F. Kerran, viewed the Anschluss as a serious 
development and predicted that war would occur later in the year.  W. S. Donson, a resident of 
Marsh Road in Luton, agreed with this prediction in a letter to the Luton News, given government 
policy.210  By contrast, ‘Had Some’, a resident of Hemel Hempstead, was more concerned with the 
attitude of a previous correspondent, A. Shaw of Carisbrooke Road in Luton, who wanted a greater 
level of isolation and appeasement.211  Shaw’s letter was not one that clearly supported 
Chamberlain’s policy, and indications of support for the government are missing from the reported 
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reactions in Bedfordshire.  Instead, government supporters focussed on Czechoslovakia, a topic 
discussed in the next chapter.   
 
Support for the government was more obvious in Fulham, with Astor reaffirming his backing and 
urging increased rearmament.  The limited Conservative response differed from Labour’s, which was 
strongly against Chamberlain, especially as expressed in the pages of the North Hammersmith 
Citizen.  A selection of articles in the April edition blamed Chamberlain directly for Eden’s 
resignation, called for an alliance with the Soviet Union, and demanded a firm stand in order to 
maintain peace.212  The call to work collectively with other countries received support from the 
North Hammersmith Labour Party, the Co-operative Party and ‘Another Hammersmith Voter’. 213  In 
a letter to the West London Observer, ‘Another Hammersmith Voter’ called for Britain to work with 
France, Spain, the USA and the Soviet Union.214  The last of these options would prove to be 
problematic for Britain, when she came to seek an alliance a year later.  However, the main reaction 
to the Anschluss in Fulham and Hammersmith came during the West Fulham by-election.   
 
The Anschluss revived public interest in foreign affairs in Bolton, where over 600 people attended 
the annual meeting of the Bolton Conservative Association.  Addressing the meeting, Cyril Entwistle 
described the grim atmosphere in Parliament as resembling August 1914.  Prior to his speech, the 
Association chair, Colonel Grierson, urged the young to support the government.  He continued by 
saying that whilst war was not imminent, the country had to be prepared.215  The government’s 
response to the Anschluss received little support in the letters column of the Bolton Evening News.  
‘Scotty’ was one letter writer who did support the government for maintaining a clear policy and 
attacked the socialists for their inconsistencies of wanting intervention, only then to attack the 
government as warmongers.216  The Left in Bolton responded with further criticism of the 
government.  ‘Candidus’, writing in the Bolton Citizen – the newspaper of the Bolton Labour Party – 
described the invasion as a ‘triumph for gangster diplomacy’.217  The Bolton Evening News editorial 
and letter writers adopted this tone.  For example, J. B. O’Hara, one of the leaders of the local labour 
movement, criticised the government for having ‘ideological objections to alliances with workers’218 
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presumably a reference to the Soviet Union.  However, the main attack was once again the failure of 
the government to adhere to its election pledge, as referred to by J. M. Grove.219  This highlighted 
the question of what British policy should be.  The letters published by the Bolton Evening News 
during this period demonstrate a lively interest in current affairs, which was noted as early as 14 
March in the ‘Town Topics’ column.220 
 
 
One M-O researcher, Brian Barefoot, produced summaries relating to conversations overheard 
around the town a couple of days after the Anschluss, as well as in response to a questionnaire.  The 
references made demonstrated a range of opinions from the belief that Austria belonged to 
Germany to the likelihood that there would soon be war.  The overheard conversations only 
numbered 12.221  The second approach, asking specific questions, generated around 100 replies.    
The three questions asked people to state what they thought of the situation, how it affected 
Britain, and what could be done about it.  Of the 76 replies to the first question, 51 stated that the 
situation looked bad, which included 11 references to Hitler.  Question 2 received 100 replies, of 
which the majority indicated that events had made war either certain or possible.  Several 
comments relating to this question were included in Barefoot’s analysis, including a man of who 
stated that ‘it will in the end.  He’ll go for Czechoslovakia next, then the Mediterranean.  Then we’ll 
get involved’.  Another respondent, a man of 60, believed that war was about two years away, whilst 
a woman of 50 stated ‘I imagine if Hitler does anything against Czechoslovakia that war will start’.  
Answers to the third question resulted in most people giving an impersonal response with several 
comments aimed firmly at Hitler.  A woman of 40 stated ‘shows Mr Chamberlain what Hitler and 
Mussolini really are…they’re both robbers…ought to be shot’, whilst a man of 50 said ‘tell Hitler 
we’ve had enough…tell him any more of that and we’ll bloody well show him what we can do’.  The 
responses to the questions demonstrate that there was some understanding of the international 
situation, including the likelihood of Hitler’s next target being Czechoslovakia.  The comments 
directed at Hitler were part of the start of a process that would increase over time, whereby the 
public showed an increasing dislike for him. 222   
 
 
Emerging from the three geographical areas and the national discussion of Eden’s resignation and 
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the Anschluss, was the question of which policy Britain should pursue.  For the Conservatives and 
other government supporters the answer was placing faith in appeasement and rearmament.  This 
was evident in the case of Lennox-Boyd, who used a speech at Sandy Conservative Club following 
Eden’s resignation to praise the new policy direction, one endorsed by A. Shaw in the Luton News.223  
However, John Haslam, one of Bolton’s Conservative MPs, also hoped that Chamberlain would 
consider the merits of Churchill’s idea of a ‘Grand Alliance’, which was loosely based upon the 
League’s collective security principle.224  The League was the favoured policy of the government’s 
opponents, particularly on the Left in Bolton, where it received support from Bolton Left Book Club 
and Councillor Knowles (Liberal).225  ‘T.W.D.’ criticised it as not being credible, due to the realities of 
the situation and the need for armament to make the collective ideal workable.226  Mentions of the 
League as an alternative policy had occurred in Bedfordshire but not to the same extent as in Bolton 
with only the odd reference in the aftermath of the Anschluss from the likes of L. C. Turner, the 
secretary of the local LNU branch.227 
 
Discussion about alternative policies in Fulham occurred during the West Fulham by-election.  This 
was triggered by the death of the sitting Conservative MP, Cyril Cobb, who had won the seat in 1935, 
with a majority of 3,483 on a turnout of 69.87%.228  The by-election attracted national attention as it 
was the first one after the Anschluss and therefore seen as a chance for the electorate to give their 
verdict on the government’s foreign policy.229  The two candidates in the by-election were Dr Edith 
Summerskill (Labour) and John Busby (Conservative).   
 
Penny Summerfield and Julie Gottlieb discuss Summerskill’s candidature, highlighting her main 
concerns as women and children’s health, both of which meant that she had the ear of female 
voters.230  This was important in Fulham due to the gender balance.  However, she began her 
campaign with a 53-minute speech attacking the government’s foreign policy, arguing that League 
collective security was the only way to maintain peace.231  The initial emphasis on foreign affairs 
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continued.  On 28 March, she attacked on her opponent’s policy, which she considered suicidal.  
Linked to this was criticism that armaments spending prevented spending on improving social 
conditions, thereby ignoring the link between armaments and security.232  Foreign affairs continued 
to remain an important theme at Labour meetings but they soon began to concentrate on domestic 
affairs.  Work undertaken by M-O on Labour’s behalf revealed that people were more interested in 
domestic affairs and that both sides had overestimated the importance of foreign affairs.  Therefore, 
Tom Harrisson advised Labour to change its focus.233  The change in emphasis was seen in 
Summerskill’s speeches on 29 and 31 March, with nearly half of the time being spent on domestic 
affairs compared with only a couple of minutes on 24 March.234  Segments of her speeches 
continued to be attacks on the government’s foreign policy and advocacy for the League, which 
drew some shouts of ‘hear hear’ from her audiences.235  The importance of domestic affairs was 
clear to Summerskill by the time of her campaign meeting at Fulham Baths on 4 April, attended by 
over 700 people.  Despite this, references to foreign affairs continued. 236   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Edith Summerskill campaigning in West Fulham, 1938237 
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Figure 11: Election poster, Fulham West238 
 
 
The election ephemera reflected the perceived importance of foreign affairs to the campaign.  M-O’s 
analysis found that 4 out of 14 Labour leaflets were devoted entirely to foreign affairs and coverage 
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accounted for 228 out of 382 column inches of text during the campaign.  The Conservatives 
produced only half the amount of column inches, though the same percentage was devoted to 
foreign affairs.  A most detailed breakdown can be seen in Figure 12.239   
 
Figure 12: Analysis of election literature 
 
BY-ELECTIONS 1936-1947, January 1936 - December 1947, © Mass Observation Archive. University 
of Sussex Special Collections.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
 
Canvassers discovered on the day before polling day that electors had ignored them.  Of those they 
spoke to, women acknowledged receipt of the leaflets and despite not having read them, indicated 
that there were likely to vote for Summerskill, with one admitting that she thought Eden had been 
correct.240  The Daily Star had picked up the indication that the female vote favoured Summerskill, 
noting that some women who normally voted Conservative had written to Summerskill to say that 
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they would be voting for her.241   Unfortunately, none of the letters has survived in Summerskill’s 
personal papers but the evidence does support Gottlieb’s conclusion referred to earlier.  
 
The Conservative candidate, John Busby, was the managing director of a coal merchants’ in Fulham 
and stood against Attlee in the Limehouse constituency at the 1935 general election.242   As the 
election ephemera suggests, he placed a strong emphasis on foreign affairs throughout his 
campaign.  At his adoption meeting, he expounded the virtues of the government’s foreign policy for 
67 minutes as part of his 75-minute speech.  This had halved by the time of his meetings on 29 and 
31 March.243  The 29 March speech called for unity, increased defence preparations, and was critical 
of Labour’s attitude.244  In a further speech at Cobb’s Hall, he described England as ‘the greatest 
country’, to which a member of the audience retorted, ‘we are a country of Mickey Mouses’.245  This 
gave an indication of how some viewed the government’s foreign policy.  The subject of foreign 
affairs continued to dominate at his campaign meeting on 4 April, attended by 250 people.  The 
audience heard him once again praise the government’s foreign policy, though nobody cheered 
when he sat down after having made a statement about the National Government keeping the 
country at peace.246   
 
With both candidates placing a heavy emphasis on foreign affairs, they shared the platform at a 
meeting held under the auspices of the local LNU branch on how to safeguard peace.  Both 
candidates stuck to their party lines, though Busby argued in his speech that the government had 
adhered to the principles of the League but felt that collective security was not a viable way to 
achieve peace.  A letter published in the West London and Fulham Gazette from Chamberlain to 
Busby reinforced this message.247 
 
The campaign provided M-O with the opportunity to collection information from the electors of 
Fulham, including comments on polling day.  The comments provided as part of this indicated a 
sense that Summerskill was going to win, as the area was working class and she understood what 
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was going on.  Examples of this and comments about foreign affairs included:248 
 
 Man aged 20-25 – I’d like to see her get in.  It’ll bugger up old Hitler and Mussolini. 
 Two working-class plumbers aged 25-30 – comments about the Fascists winning in Spain and 
that Chamberlain backs them up.  Thinks that Chamberlain ought to be got rid of. 
 Conversation in a café with man 26, and the proprietor – man stated that ‘felt it was an 
important election as would show if people were behind the Prime Minister or not’.  The 
proprietor agreed with this statement. 
The comments about foreign affairs are surprising given that most people questioned in the area 
during the by-election placed a greater emphasis on domestic affairs.  M-O’s research found that 
Conservative voters and older men displayed a greater interest in foreign affairs.  Those who 
commented recognised the tense international situation and hoped that Chamberlain’s policy would 
succeed, though there was a growing mistrust towards Hitler.  One man commented that ‘it is time 
to kick Hitler in his pants’.249  The comments M-O recorded placed international events within an 
individual’s terms of reference.  
 
The by-election resulted in a victory for Summerskill.  She received 52.2% of the vote and a majority 
of 1,400.  The Left-wing press portrayed this as a vote against the government, a view shared by ‘Vox 
Populi’, who claimed that the result reflected the will of the people of West Fulham.  This letter 
writer indicated that there was evidence of the dislike of the government’s foreign policy as the 
words ‘Chamberlain must go’, were written on the pavement.250  The Evening Standard challenged 
the conclusion of the Left-wing press, arguing that Busby suffered due to a lower turnout than at the 
general election.251  The Fulham Chronicle and the West London Observer took the view that with so 
much emphasis on foreign affairs, it was difficult to judge the candidates on domestic affairs despite 
their importance to the electorate.252  This judgment is a fair reflection of the information available 
from various evidence sources.    
 
 
The words scrawled on the pavement were just one of the signs that by April 1938 public awareness 
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of foreign affairs was stirring, an awareness that can be loosely associated with the manifest 
reverence for the fallen, on Armistice Day in November 1937.  The reverence of the crowds 
demonstrated an appreciation for the sacrifices made, which the Bolton Evening News linked to the 
deteriorating international situation.  The comment made by one person in Bolton about joining up 
again, was a further reflection of this.  However, these connections do not tell us much about the 
attitudes of people in the geographical areas towards war.  Unlike Gregory’s wider study, the local 
evidence does not have a broad enough base to draw any firm conclusions on this question.  
 
The references made around Armistice Day to the international situation demonstrated that public 
interest in foreign affairs was limited at this point.  This situation continued during the Farnworth by-
election in January 1938, which Labour’s George Tomlinson won.  Whilst foreign affairs did feature 
as part of his campaign, he placed an emphasis on domestic affairs, particularly those with 
connections to local industries.  The campaign itself revealed a clear division between the two main 
political parties with Conservatives favouring Chamberlain’s emerging brand of appeasement and 
Labour supporting the League.     
 
Public interest in foreign affairs increased dramatically in February, when Eden, who was popular 
with the electorate, resigned.  This sudden increase fell away just as dramatically.  However, the 
spike in interest was enough to reveal a confused and uninformed public that relied on newspapers 
to provide a lead in terms of opinion formation in times of crises.  Published opinion during this 
period, in the form of articles and letters, reflected the divisions within the national state of opinion.  
Conservatives and National Liberals supported Chamberlain but did not attack Eden following his 
resignation.  The Left shared this trait but opposed Chamberlain’s policy.  The opposition of the Left 
received the majority of the coverage in Fulham and Bolton.  However, the Left in Bolton took a 
different view from the editorial column of the Bolton Evening News.  The Left favoured a League 
based policy, whilst the paper did not believe that Chamberlain’s policy was in the long-term 
interests of the country but did not clearly state an alternative to it.  Opinion polls and M-O’s 
findings added to the confused state of public opinion.  These expressions of what Tom Harrisson 
termed ‘private opinion’ indicated support for Eden and opposition to Chamberlain’s brand of 
appeasement.  However, the strength of the underlying opposition to Chamberlain’s policy was not 
sufficient to become residual opinion and it therefore failed to attract the attention of elite opinion 
leaders.   
The public’s interest in foreign affairs reignited a few weeks later when the Anschluss occurred.  The 
immediate reaction in Bedfordshire and Fulham was less than in Bolton, though the divisions 
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highlighted by Eden’s resignation remained.  Greater interest occurred in Bolton in the form of 
meetings and an acknowledgement in the Bolton Evening News that people were discussing the 
situation in the street.  These discussions involved two policy options – appeasement and collective 
security – both of which contained elements of League principles.  However, the Left did not 
recognise this factor within Chamberlain’s version of appeasement.   
 
The clearest evidence of the divisions within the country occurred during the West Fulham by-
election.  This, like the East Fulham one in 1933, was portrayed as a chance to give a verdict on the 
government’s foreign policy.  However, people were more interested in domestic affairs and these 
had a greater influence on the result as confirmed by data collected by M-O.  Despite this, the 
candidates placed an emphasis on foreign affairs as witnessed in their election addresses, election 
ephemera, and newspaper coverage.  The primacy of domestic affairs did not mean that people 
were not aware of foreign affairs, which tended to interest older men and Conservative voters more 
than women.  Women were more interested in domestic affairs since they had a greater impact on 
their daily lives.  
 
The findings summarised in the previous paragraphs confirm several points within the existing 
historiography.  Crowson in his study of Conservative parliamentary dissent refers to Churchill’s 
point about Eden’s resignation meaning the loss of the only popular member of the government.253  
Data from BIPO and M-O confirms that Eden was popular with the electorate and validate Dorothy 
Thompson’s assessment in her 1939 book, Let the Record Speak that ‘if the poll last week of the 
British Institute of Public Opinion is to be believed, the man in the street is much more on the side of 
Eden than Chamberlain’.254  Further confirmation of the existence of opposition to Chamberlain’s 
policy comes from the words on the pavement described by ‘Vox Populi’.  These examples 
demonstrate why it is important to study national and local sources together to increase historical 
understanding of an event.  Taken together they help to challenge existing writing on this period, 
which downplays the level of opposition to Chamberlain’s policy.   
 
In relation to the questions posed in the introduction to the thesis, this period was one where there 
was a very minor delay between national and local discussion of events, as Eden’s resignation and 
the Anschluss occurred suddenly.  However, there were some differences in opinion between the 
three geographical areas.  Reports indicated that people took an interest in events in the days 
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following Eden’s resignation and again during the Anschluss.  This interest did not necessarily result 
in expressions of opinion about the government’s foreign policy.  ‘Informed’ and ‘published’ opinion 
undertook this role, revealing a clear divide between the political parties and in the case of Bolton, a 
clear indication of the local newspaper’s opinion.  These divisions were on display in the other two 
geographical areas.  Thanks to the work of M-O during the West Fulham by-election, further 
confirmation of public awareness, though not necessarily expressions of opinion about foreign 
affairs, is available.  The events of this period were not a turning point regarding public opinion but 
they did mark the start of a slow growth in public awareness of foreign affairs and the international 
situation.  This interest was confused and divided but has a strong enough evidence base to add 
credence to Adamthwaite’s argument that opposition did exist in early 1938.  However, it would 
take a dramatic event that would have a direct impact on the lives of every citizen for this opposition 
to emerge vocally and harden to the point that British policy could become one of resistance.  This 
event would be the Munich crisis. 
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Chapter 2: Escalation and Escape – March-November 1938 
 
The strategic changes resulting from the Anschluss meant that Czechoslovakia became Germany’s 
next target.  The changes allowed Germany to circumvent Czechoslovakia’s natural and border 
defences.  The border areas contained the Sudetenland, which was home to a large ethnic German 
minority, who had suffered during the Great Depression.  This added to the sense of grievance that 
the German minority had towards the government in Prague, which had failed to implement the 
nationalities legislation promised in 1919.  Hitler used these grievances in his quest to take over 
Czechoslovakia following the Anschluss, resulting in a prolonged period of tension.  This worsened in 
May following reports of German troop movements.  In response, the Czech government called up 
one class of reservists, and Britain warned Germany that it should not rely on Britain remaining 
uninvolved.  The crisis left Hitler feeling aggrieved, prompting him to order his generals to finalise 
plans for invading Czechoslovakia in the autumn.  It also highlighted the danger faced by Britain and 
France due to France’s alliance with Czechoslovakia.  Accordingly, they both stepped up their 
pressure on Prague to reach a settlement.  This included the dispatch of Lord Runciman, the former 
President of the Board of Trade, to investigate and propose a solution, but international events 
overtook Runciman’s work.  At the Nazi Party rally at Nuremburg in September, Hitler left the door 
open to the possibility of a negotiated settlement.  This was enough to prompt Chamberlain to hold 
three meetings with him to discuss the orderly transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany.  These 
efforts culminated in the Munich agreement following a period of dramatic mood swings in Britain 
between optimism and despair.  The avoidance of war brought a huge sigh of relief but acted as a 
wake-up call, triggering the beginnings of a change in the national mood towards one of ensuring 
that the country was prepared for the future.   
 
This chapter examines the period from late March until Armistice Day, focussing on reactions to the 
development of British policy relating to Czechoslovakia with an emphasis on the period surrounding 
the Munich agreement.  Prior to this period, the public remained uninterested in the development 
of events.  Public awareness of the severity of the situation began properly with the announcement 
of Chamberlain’s first flight to Germany.  From here onwards, the public mood fluctuated.  The 
emphasis will be on mood rather than opinion because the lack of information prevented an 
informed public opinion from developing.  The chapter will demonstrate that the mood swings and 
viewpoints expressed in the existing literature occurred in all three geographical areas before the 
onset of a period of sombre reflection.  
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Following the Anschluss, the British government realised that Czechoslovakia would be Germany’s 
next target and began to consider British policy accordingly.  In 1932, the British Minister in Prague, 
Joseph Addison, had warned that to achieve European peace, Czechoslovakia’s frontiers would 
require alteration.  In 1936, the government remained reluctant to become involved since this area 
was not a vital British interest.255  This, along with the desire to retain freedom of action, meant that 
policy remained vague and avoided definite commitments.  Chamberlain reiterated this position on 
24 March but did offer British assistance in finding a solution.  The vagueness and nature of the 
British offer reflected an undecided public opinion on the subject.  The BIPO poll for March 1938 
found that only 33% favoured a British promise to assist, against 43% who did not support the idea 
and 24% who offered no opinion.256  This last statistic adds to the findings of the previous chapter 
that British opinion was confused.    
 
The content of Chamberlain’s speech on 24 March mirrored opinions expressed a few days earlier by 
Lennox-Boyd at the AGM of the Mid-Bedfordshire Women’s Conservative Association.  He argued 
that there should be no British guarantee of Czechoslovakia, because he did not believe in ‘the strict 
maintenance of the frontiers fixed by the Treaty of Versailles, as a British interest’.257  His speech 
caused controversy following his recent appointment as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of 
Labour.  Questions were forthcoming on this in Parliament, as German radio had reported it as a 
statement of government policy.  Lennox-Boyd duly apologised to the House for these comments 
but was subject to intense scrutiny by the Opposition due to the international situation.  Lennox-
Boyd was not the only Bedfordshire MP to express views of this nature. Sir Richard Wells joined him.  
In a speech at the Kempston Constitutional Club, Wells argued that the fundamental aim of British 
policy was to keep the peace, though not at any price.258  This suggests that there was a limit to any 
possible changes.  Opposing both MPs was Norman Mickle.  During a whist drive held by the Harpur 
Ward committee of the Bedford Labour Party, he argued that the government should have made a 
bold statement aimed at deterring German actions.  R. L. Poirier, a Frenchman living in Britain, and 
‘H.A.F.’, a resident of the village of Harlington about five miles from Luton, added to this criticism in 
the Luton News.  Both writers implied that the government’s policy went against the principles of 
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the League and would destroy collective security.  They believed that obtaining a temporary peace 
would do more damage in the longer term. 259   
 
The political divisions highlighted in Bedfordshire were evident during the West Fulham by-election, 
as described in the previous chapter.  Away from the campaign, Labour continued its criticism of the 
government’s foreign policy.  The East Fulham Citizen, Labour’s constituency newspaper, criticised 
the government for a continuing lack of clarity and failing to draw a line in the sand.260  Councillor De 
Palma, the chair of the ARP committee, added to this by suggesting that voters in the constituency 
did not like their MP’s support for government policy.261  However, such criticisms were not 
forthcoming based upon the lack of letters to local newspapers.   
 
 
Bolton’s interest in foreign affairs remained high.  The Bolton Evening News reiterated its concerns 
about Eden’s resignation, arguing that Britain needed to be clear that it would not tolerate 
lawlessness.  However, it failed to state a policy that would prevent this from occurring.262  One way 
of helping to prevent lawlessness would be to achieve a degree of preparation and national unity, a 
message Mr Taylor, the retiring President of the Bolton Chamber of Commerce, urged at the AGM.263  
Achieving unity was one of the aims of a protest meeting held by the Bolton branch of the Left Book 
Club to protest against the government’s foreign policy, though members of the Bolton Conservative 
Association disrupted it by handing out leaflets arguing for the opposing point of view. 264  The Left 
Book Club meeting was one of a number that discussed foreign affairs during April.  Another was a 
meeting of the Bolton Women’s Liberal Association, where the speaker, Gretton Ward from 
Northwich, spoke on foreign affairs.  He argued that increased armaments did not lead to peace.  At 
the end of their report on the meeting, the Bolton Evening News reported that those leaving the 
meeting commented that they felt they had learnt something. 265  The underlying message of 
Gretton Ward’s talk was the desire to maintain peace, a desire that an M-O observer overheard a 
woman express at the annual atlas exhibition, when she said ‘the common people don’t want war.  
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It’s the politicians telling us that they are making it safe for democracy and all that’.266       
 
The discussions about British foreign policy continued to indicate a divide between the political 
parties.  Contributions from others were limited despite meetings taking place that enabled people 
to learn more about the international situation.  The aim on all sides was to maintain peace but the 
question was how to achieve this.  The League remained the favoured option of the Left, though 
their emphasis was on attacking the government’s policy rather than promoting an alternative. 
 
While the domestic debate continued, the Sudeten situation began to develop.  On 24 April, Konrad 
Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten German Party, outlined his demands in a speech at Karlsbad.  
Foreign journalists did not attend this event, which prevented them from reporting the actual text of 
the speech. 267  Three days later, British and French ministers met in London to discuss the situation.  
The French Prime Minister, Edouard Daladier, stated ‘that the peace of Europe could only be 
maintained if Britain and France were clear about their intentions to protect the rights and liberties 
of people’.268  A demonstration of this occurred on 20 and 21 May when rumoured troop 
movements prompted the Czech government to call up one class of reservists and for Britain to warn 
Germany that Britain might become involved.  The precise details of the crisis remain a mystery.269  
The British press portrayed Britain’s actions as standing firm, precisely the image that the 
government wished to avoid for fear of angering Germany.  The government was right to be 
concerned as Hitler proceeded to ask his generals to formalise plans for Operation Green, the 
proposed invasion of Czechoslovakia.   
 
The May crisis aroused little interest amongst the public, a situation confirmed by the small number 
of reports received by M-O about it.  Comments included:270 
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 30-year-old male from Cheshire - one of my colleagues bet that Hitler would march into 
Czech …. I said, I hope your [sic] wrong and changed the subject  
 33-year-old female clerk from Northampton - I was satisfied that they were quite aware of 
the news but I doubt if they considered it a crisis.  On passing out, I spoke to a man who felt 
that it wasn’t serious 
 
The most detailed report came from Southampton based observer, G. Webb, whose report noted on 
several occasions the lack of interest: 271 
 My friends and assistants are working-men.  I have been looking out for signs from this of 
the crisis.  I regret to say that they remain uninterested. 
 I spoke to another man on the subject.  He didn’t appear to be concerned about immediate 
happenings. 
 Went again to the pub and again there were no signs of it.  If anybody was thinking of it, 
they didn’t seem likely to mention it. 
 
 
 A similar position existed in Bedfordshire, where one of the few mentions was in a Bedfordshire 
Times article by J. A. Spender, the former editor of the Westminster Gazette.  Spender argued that a 
solution to the underlying situation was required.272  Two other articles published in the Beds and 
Herts Evening Telegraph joined Spender’s article.  The first criticised the League for failing to stand 
up to the dictators, which the second contradicted by arguing that the actions taken were in 
accordance with the principles of the League. 273  The references to the League in Bedfordshire did 
not occur in Fulham and Hammersmith, where reaction was limited.  Bernard Jolivard, a regular 
letter writer to the West London Observer, wrote on 3 June to argue that recent events had made 
people more aware of the danger, including some unnamed youth organisations who held a protest 
rally. 274  However, evidence from the rest of the country does not support Jolivard’s claim.  
 
 
Despite the limited reaction to the May crisis, it served as a warning of the dangerous nature of the 
situation.  Correspondingly, the British government increased its efforts to find a peaceful 
settlement.  The Cabinet decided to send Lord Runciman, to investigate and propose a solution.  
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However, he was not an official representative of the British government.  Whilst the primary aim of 
the mission was to find a solution, it was not the only one as Tony McCulloch has highlighted.  He 
refers to Chamberlain’s speech and the hope expressed that ‘it will inform public opinion to the real 
facts of the case’.275  Developments in the Sudetenland were reported by the Bolton Evening News 
and the Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph but comment, both here and in the weeklies, virtually 
disappeared for a couple of months.  There were occasional references to hopes that Britain would 
stand firm and that a solution would depend upon Berlin.276  The subject began to re-emerge at the 
end of August.  In a private letter to Lord Halifax, Arthur Mann, the editor of the Yorkshire Post, 
expressed the view that divisions existed in the country about the government’s foreign policy.277  
Halifax agreed but believed that they were less than at the time of Eden’s resignation.278  This private 
exchange occurred prior to a meeting of ministers on 30 August, which Leslie Burgin did not attend, 
as he refused to alter his travel plans.  The meeting allowed Chamberlain and Halifax to update their 
colleagues and discuss policy.  Halifax considered public opinion to favour government policy but 
acknowledged that this could change if the chances of war increased.279  War, as an M-O directive 
found, was on people’s minds.  Keith Robbins notes that 35% of respondents believed that war was 
likely, compared with 40% who held the opposite view.280  Only 190 of the 1,100 replies to this 
directive survive in Mass Observation Online.  Of these, 70% indicated that they considered war 
likely in the future.  The comments made by respondents to the survey provide a general summary 
of the state of parts of the public mood and an indication of what they thought was going to happen.  
Examples include:281  
 
 31-year-old female teacher from Northumberland - I found it exceedingly difficult to get 
anyone to give an opinion on the chances of war. 
 Male from West Yorkshire - the immediate chance of war depends chiefly on the British 
handling of the Czech situation.  It is probable that a peaceful settlement of this problem will 
grant a temporary peace. 
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Out of all the replies examined, one stands out for the excellent summary that it provides.  This 
came from Dennis Argent, a 21-year-old reporter from Essex.  The summarised points were:282 
 Newspapers are mistrusted 
 The general attitude to war is that most people do not want it and do not think about it 
 Nobody is taking ARP serious except those of the CP and PPU who are busy denouncing it 
 No amount of pacifism can stop our rearmament 
 Must try and make public opinion see that any war will be a disaster, however well-armed 
we are 
 
Taken together, the figures and comments reveal that respondents were consciously aware of 
events, even if they did not discuss them openly. 
 
 
The Cabinet’s concerns and the M-O respondents’ desire to avoid war, were themes echoed in the 
Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph.  The editorial on 30 August stated that ‘a crisis, which would 
disturb the peace of Europe more than any event since the Great War, was approaching.283  The 
paper followed this on 5 September with an impromptu survey of female opinion leaders in Luton.  
The views expressed were overwhelmingly in favour of peace, with a realisation of the potential 
impact on the home front – thereby locating events within their primary area of concern.  Mrs 
Marsden, the President of the Sereptimist Club stated: 284 
 ‘If the women of the world could form an international union against war, peace would be 
assured.  As a class, women are more whole heartedly against war than men.  They realise 
more vividly the horrors that war would bring to the home.  Men too often disregard the 
consequences in the heat of the moment.’ 
Some young people shared similar views as they gathered on 11 September for a peace service at 
Waller Street Methodist Church.  The service was addressed by local pacifist minister, Reverend 
Leslie Brewer, and Dorothy Brooker, secretary of the local LNU youth section.  Both stressed the 
need for a peaceful resolution.  The emphasis on a peaceful solution did not feature in the other 
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geographical areas at this point.285 
 
 
Coverage of the developing international situation took a different angle in Bolton.  On 1 September, 
A. Booth, a member of the local fascists (as readers were informed a day later), asked what Britain’s 
interests in Czechoslovakia were.286   This question would occur several times during September.  
Further information about events inside Czechoslovakia appeared when the Bolton Evening News 
interviewed a local man who had just returned from there and was only referred to as ‘S’.  He 
emphasised the clamour amongst the Sudeten Germans for union with Germany and added that the 
danger of communism was a major part of the ongoing propaganda war.  He also overheard a train 
conversation between some Germans that indicated that they knew very little about the situation.287     
 
 
With the situation in the Sudetenland deteriorating, The Times editorial on 7 September suggested 
the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany as a possible solution.  R. J. Mokken described this as 
‘unwittingly revealing the true intentions of the British government.288  However, the editorial was 
consistent with the stance that The Times had taken since June.289  The letters published over the 
next couple of days in The Times were favourable, with one describing it as ‘the only feasible 
solution’.290  In contrast, letters published in the Manchester Guardian covered a broader opinion 
spectrum.  William Goodchild, a resident of Glasgow, described the editorial as ‘throwing 
international law and order to the wind’.291  However, a letter from Helena Swanwick, former chair 
of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) praised The Times for bringing 
the matter to the attention of the British people.292  Local newspaper comment on the editorial only 
appeared in the Bolton Evening News on 8 September, which criticised the timing rather than the 
content.293  The Times editorial appeared five days before Hitler was due to speak at the annual Nazi 
Party rally.  The Cabinet met on the morning of 12 September, discussing The Times editorial and the 
options that Britain had.  It agreed to avoid provoking Hitler, as a peaceful settlement depended on 
him.  The Nuremburg speech resulted in an estimated 10,000 gathering in Whitehall to await news, 
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294 whilst one couple went even further as detailed in the observer’s crisis report entry for 12 
September.  It stated:295   
 
      ‘915: observer and his fiancée were making love when the radio news bulletin was switched on in          
 the adjoining room.  Fiancée said that she wanted to listen to Hitler’s speech but the radio          
 was turned down and became inaudible.  By straining, we just heard what Hitler had said     
 about the Czechs.  We were both appreciative of his saying nothing when he knew the world   
 was waiting.’  
 
The various actions highlighted the level of interest amongst parts of the public.  Hitler’s speech 
proved to be inconclusive but indicated that a plebiscite might be acceptable.  The only way to find 
out would be to ask him directly, which Chamberlain duly set out to do with the implementation of 
Plan Z.  This involved him flying to Germany to direct talks with Hitler, thereby ushering in what 
David Reynolds describes as modern summitry.296  However, Robert Shepherd describes this move as 
controversial as Chamberlain still needed Cabinet approval and the King’s permission to leave the 
country. 297   The Cabinet supported the idea, as did the crowds in Whitehall who shouted ‘good old 
Chamberlain’ when the news broke. 298  The national press, including the Daily Herald, were in 
favour, though this was on the assumption that Chamberlain would tell Hitler that Britain would 
stand firm. 299       
 
Whitehall was not the only place to experience crowds.  On 13 September, the Bolton Evening News 
reported that people had gathered the previous night to await a special edition of the paper.300  The 
waiting crowds give an indication of the level of interest.  The following day, the paper referred to 
discussions that had taken place in a barber’s shop, which enabled the barber to get an hourly 
consensus of public views.  For example, a young customer might request a good job, as he will not 
be here for a long time, whilst another swears that he will not go until called for.  Comments of this 
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nature did not indicate a refusal to fight but rather an indication that people would do their duty 
when the time came.301     
 
 
The crowds in central London and Bolton did not occur in Fulham, where the streets were quiet and 
a newsstand announcing a special edition was the only indication of the crisis.302  However, M-O 
undertook a survey in the borough with two questions: whether home or foreign affairs were more 
important, and if people thought there would be war.  The 75 replies on 13 September rated home 
affairs as more important and war as unlikely.  This was followed a day later by 15 replies about 
people’s opinion of Chamberlain.  Eleven were favourable.  When combined with data published in 
Britain by Mass Observation, ‘Metrop’ opinion favoured Chamberlain at this point.  The free text 
replies to the questions were a mixture of praise for Chamberlain and dislike of Hitler, the latter 
continuing a trend that had begun earlier in the year:303  
 
 Man 34 – providing no catch then looks like all over bar the shouting.  Praises Chamberlain 
as a clever man. 
 Woman, 40 – I don’t bother about it now.  We were just talking about Chamberlain being 
brave to go and see that swine Hitler. 
 Man, 50 – If we get over this business of Chamberlain going to Germany, there will be no 
war for a long time 
 Woman, 38 – We think there will be war before the next two weeks is out.  He’s a dirty 
swine and liar is Hitler.  I wouldn’t trust him. 
 
 
The eight days prior to Chamberlain’s flight had seen three events that affected the development of 
the crisis and the public mood.  The Times editorial and Hitler’s speech were discussed by ‘informed’ 
opinion at the national level.  However, it was the actual news of Chamberlain’s forthcoming visit to 
Germany that had the most impact, as it underlined the seriousness of the situation and the 
potential it had to impact upon the individual.  This event marked the start of a process that would 
take Europe to the edge of the abyss over the next two weeks and has been subject to in-depth 
discussion by many writers.304 
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Chamberlain’s flight to Germany captured the imagination of the nation.  The Beds and Herts 
Evening Telegraph editorial and political leaders in Bedfordshire shared this sentiment.  Sir Thomas 
Keens, the Liberal leader of Bedfordshire County Council stated:305 
‘Living as we are in circumstances of the most extreme gravity, I feel it is incumbent on the 
part of every English man and woman, to say how proud we are of our Prime Minister, who 
is prepared to throw convention to the wind in making a last desperate effort to preserve 
the peace.’ 
Elite expressions of gratitude masked the apprehensiveness felt by local people.  For example, the 
arrival of army trucks in Dunstable led to rumours of a declaration of war until more informed 
people stated that they were associated with planned army exercises.306 
 
 
Fulham’s reaction to news of Chamberlain’s flight was favourable.  The local newspaper editorials on 
16 September echoed the sentiments of the M-O surveys.  The West London Observer and the West 
London and Hammersmith Gazette both hoped that the visit would mean the avoidance of war.307  
This optimism masked concerns that British policy lacked clarity, thereby risking a repeat of 1914.  
The Fulham branch of the LNU duly expressed their hope that the British delegation would be clear 
to Germany that ‘the country would not be able to remain neutral in the event of aggression against 
Czechoslovakia’.  This implied that Britain would not tolerate aggression but would accept a peaceful 
solution.308 
 
 
Editorial opinion in Bolton continued local newspaper praise for Chamberlain’s visit, describing it as 
‘an outstanding move for peace’.  However, the Bolton Evening News editorial continued its 
opposition to Chamberlain’s attempts to buy peace through concessions.309  ‘Politicus’, a regular 
columnist for the paper, reinforced the editorial in his column by arguing that Britain would 
eventually have to make a stand against Germany.310  Those writing for the paper were in favour of 
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resisting German demands without recourse to war.  Support for Chamberlain’s efforts was also 
forthcoming from the synod of the Bolton and Rochdale Methodist Circuit, who wrote to him to 
assure him of their prayers for his efforts.311  It is difficult to judge further local reactions during 
these days since the Bolton Evening News letters column was notably quiet, with the only letter of 
note coming from the Liberal, Marjorie Hammersley.  She argued that the current situation had 
arisen due to the refusal of previous German demands.312  
 
 
The general reaction to Chamberlain’s first visit to Germany was one of relief and praise for the 
boldness of the move.  Underlying this was the desire to find a peaceful solution without recourse to 
war and a hope that a firm stand would deter aggression.  Upon his return to London, Chamberlain 
informed the Cabinet of the content of the discussions.  He did this from memory, as he had not 
taken a note taker and the German Foreign Office refused to provide an official transcript.313  The 
proposed solution was a mixture of direct territorial transfers and plebiscites in areas where there 
was not a clear German majority.  The Cabinet supported the proposal subject to appropriate 
guarantees.314  Having gained the assent of the Cabinet, Chamberlain and Halifax held discussions 
with Daladier and the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet, on 18 September.  After a lengthy 
discussion, they agreed to transmit the proposals to the Czech government with a request for a 
quick response.  The Czechs initially declined the terms but further pressure finally forced a reluctant 
acceptance, thus allowing Chamberlain to set out for his second meeting with Hitler. 
 
 
The period between Chamberlain’s return and his departure for Bad Godesberg witnessed a change 
in the ‘public mood’.  The emphasis is on mood since the lack of information about the talks 
prevented an informed opinion from being established.  The withholding of information may have 
been deliberate to prevent provocation of Germany.  The Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph editorial 
appealed for people to avoid doing anything that might affect the negotiations. 315  Thomas Lodge, 
the Liberal candidate for Bedford, echoed this appeal during his acceptance speech by stating that ‘it 
would be ungracious to comment or criticise at the moment as the government alone know the 
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basis of their actions’.316  The pleas for restraint did not prevent the publication of articles.  One 
article described a talk by Captain G Pitt Rivers, whom Richard Griffiths describes as a fellow 
traveller.317  Speaking at a meeting in Luton following a recent tour of Central Europe, Pitt Rivers 
argued that the press had hidden the suffering of the Sudeten Germans from the British public and 
that Britain should not defend Czechoslovakia.  Reverend Morgan of All Saints Church, whilst 
thanking Pitt Rivers for the talk, expressed the opinion that ‘if he could see inside the minds of the 
members here, he would find almost total disagreement’.318  A. Shaw was another supporter of the 
Sudeten Germans’ cause.  He wrote to the Luton News to highlight their suffering.319  However, this 
was only one factor in the crisis.  Another was the desire to avoid war, as a man who had recently 
returned from Germany had found following a series of conversations in quiet corners.  The Beds 
and Herts Evening Telegraph column ‘Along the Street’ on 22 September referred to this story but 
did not name the man as he wished to remain anonymous.320  On the same day, the paper published 
an interview with an unnamed Luton woman in her early twenties.  She spoke about how her 
generation had been subject to anti-war propaganda and that recent events had undermined the 
belief that war could never happen again. 321 
 
The lack of an evening daily paper specific to Fulham and Hammersmith is a hindrance to an 
effective study of the crisis, as it restricts the ability to track daily changes in the public mood via the 
letters column.  However, M-O surveys partly make up for this.  In Britain by Mass-Observation 
several comments are made about the attitudes of people towards news reports relating to the 
crisis.  Comments included:322 
 Woman of 33 – I read all the papers on it.  I don’t understand the politics of it but they are 
all different.  That’s why people have less faith in the papers. 
 Woman of 42 – it’s a crisis everyday if you believe the papers. 
 Woman of 35 – the papers, you read them and you are more in the dark still. 
 Man of 38 – got that I don’t believe the papers now. 
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In addition to the published comments, there is a range available from the M-O survey undertaken 
on 21 September, which asked people what they thought about the Czech crisis.  Female responses 
predominantly indicated either a lack of interest or that they were trying to avoid thinking about it: 
323 
 Woman, 30 – I don’t think about it. 
 Woman, 38 – We don’t bother much about it…not because we are not thinking about it.  
Life’s too short to keep on with war, war, war.  
 Woman 35, - We don’t want to talk about it, of course we think.  My mother is old and ill so 
we never mention it.  It doesn’t make pleasant reading…We ought to demand for peace…. 
It’s hateful, there they are ready to start killing again, Hitler and Mussolini. 
 Woman, 48 – Everybody’s fearing it.  They don’t talk much now because it never seems to 
come to anything at all, just goes on being one crisis after another.  I don’t really know what 
it’s all about, we don’t get all the facts. 
Male respondents were more forthcoming in their responses, acknowledging the complexities of the 
situation and blaming Hitler.  However, even here a lack of interest is noticeable: 324 
 
 Male, 48 – It’s too complicated for me.  The newspapers all give conflicting reports.  I feel 
sorry for the Czechs, but I had enough of war in the last one.  And I don’t want my son to be 
in one either.  If they want Sudeten Germanland [sic], which they tell me belonged to 
Germany before, they can have it. 
 Male, 18 – I don’t want war for wars sake, but I’d go straight away without waiting for 
conscription.  My parents want me to do my bit. 
 Male, 20 – Don’t take any notice, mate…what’s the good…if they want yer they’ll take 
yer…they don’t ask your permission like…. 
 Male, 37 – It’s these dictators, all greed and gain.  It was when they went to Abyssinia that 
they should have been stopped.  Somebody should bump Hitler off. 
 Male, 40 – Hitler wants knocking off proper, there’s enough trouble without making more 
now.  It looks damned bad as it is.  They’ll want us all when it breaks out. 
 Newspaper man – That bastard is only bluffing us, they know it, he’ll never dare start it off, 
he’ll be beaten.  I think it might, if it does, come now or later if he gets away with this lot. 
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The comments made about Hitler reinforced the idea that the ‘public mood’ was hardening, 
although it is notable that criticism of British policy appeared to be lacking.  The limited evidence 
available from the weekly newspapers reinforces the evidence collected by M-O that the mood was 
hardening.  The editorial in the West London and Hammersmith Gazette referred to a theme that 
had featured in Herbert Morrison’s speech at Hammersmith Town Hall, namely that world opinion 
was against the fascist dictators.  This, along with the editorial in the West London Observer, agreed 
that a stand would soon be required to prevent Hitler from becoming master of Europe.325   
 
 
The newspaper editorials in Bedfordshire, Fulham and Hammersmith all urged caution, a policy 
continued by the Bolton Evening News and approved of by ‘Briton’.326  However, the paper’s 
editorial worried that there might be a repeat of the Hoare-Laval Pact as people appeared ‘willing to 
accept a temporary peace at almost any price’.  People would have to accept, though, that further 
demands would not be forthcoming.327  This line of thought continued with an editorial entitled 
‘Stop the rot’.328  The editorials were part of the paper’s efforts to encourage the people of Bolton to 
see the fallacy of Chamberlain’s policy.  The letters column reflected this effort.  For instance, Robert 
Davies wrote to argue that Britain needed to stand firm to prevent war, whilst J. B. O’Hara stated 
that the trade unions questioned the wisdom of Chamberlain’s policy.329  However, given that the 
Bolton Evening News aimed to reflect the breadth of opinion of the community that it served, letters 
from ‘H.T.’ and W. Barnes, a resident of Hilden Street in Bolton were included.  The latter warned 
that the lack of war-mindedness meant that concessions were the only realistic solution.330  This 
summed up Britain’s predicament, one that ‘Politicus’ stated had historical precedent, as the British 
repeatedly failed to recognise a crisis until it was nearly too late.331  
 
 
The week between the two meetings witnessed newspaper editorials urging readers to display 
caution when commenting on the international situation.  Despite this, the Bolton Evening News and 
newspapers in Fulham and Hammersmith expressed reservations about Chamberlain’s policy, 
attempting to encourage public support for a degree of firmness towards Germany’s demands.  
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However, it is difficult to detect in Bedfordshire, where there was greater emphasis on the 
maintenance of peace.  The evidence available indicates that the ‘public mood’ was hardening 
towards Germany but hope remained that a peaceful solution could be found.  In addition, there 
were no local references to Winston Churchill, the Conservative MP for Epping, who supported 
resistance to German demands. 
 
 
Upon Chamberlain’ departure from Downing Street for Godesberg, protestors urged him not to 
abandon the Czechs.  Despite this, there were no indications that the protestors were prepared to 
support war.  The Whitehall crowds continued to be a presence during the meeting.  Halifax, given 
the continuing presence of the crowd and communications of influential people and groups, 
informed the British delegation that opinion was hardening and required a contribution from 
Germany: 332 
 
‘It may help you if we give you some indication of what seems predominant public opinion 
as expressed in press and elsewhere. While mistrustful of our plan but prepared perhaps to 
accept it with reluctance as alternative to war, great mass of public opinion seems to be 
hardening in sense of feeling that we have gone to limit of concession and that it is up to the 
Chancellor to make some contribution. We, of course, can imagine immense difficulties with 
which you are confronted but from point of view of your own position, that of Government, 
and of the country, it seems to your colleagues of vital importance that you should not leave 
without making it plain to Chancellor if possible by special interview that, after great 
concessions made by Czechoslovak Government, for him to reject opportunity of peaceful 
solution in favour of one that must involve war would be an unpardonable crime against 
humanity.’ 
 
The phrasing of the first two sentences of the telegram raise a couple of questions about what 
Halifax meant by ‘and elsewhere’, as well as ‘the great mass of public opinion’.  The first is 
presumably a reference to the individuals and groups from whom he received communications.  
However, the second phrase is harder to explain, as this phrase theoretically means the wider public.  
The question is how Halifax would have known about this.  The contribution referred to in the 
telegram, Chamberlain found was unlikely to be forthcoming after the first of several meetings.  
After he had informed Hitler that the Czechs accepted the proposed terms, Hitler stated that this 
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was no longer sufficient and that he had to support the claims of Poland and Hungary.  Chamberlain 
was shocked.  To establish clarity, he asked for a written statement specifying the German demands.  
Upon reviewing this statement, Neville Henderson and Sir Ivone Fitzpatrick, a member of the British 
embassy in Berlin, described it as a ‘diktat’.  Whilst all of this was going on, Paramount released a 
newsreel featuring an interview with Henry Wickham Steed, the former editor of The Times.  In the 
interview, he called upon people to make clear to the government that ‘we repudiate its policy of 
surrendering our vital interests and besmirching our good name’.333  Only a small number of people 
saw it, as it was quickly withdrawn following pressure from the Foreign Office on the American 
parent company.334  This action and the British Gaumont newsreel on 26 September added to the 
lack of publicly available information.  The newsreel showed pictures of Chamberlain but contained 
no details about the discussions that had taken place.  Upon his return, Chamberlain received a 
lukewarm applause in Whitehall from crowds, who were not protesting against war, an indication, 
according to Paul Einzig, that people might be willing to fight.335  However, the mood was continuing 
to harden with the crowd providing comments such as ‘Hitler’s gone too bloody far this time.  He 
needs teaching a lesson and I’m prepared to give it to him’.336  This was like some of the comments 
recorded by M-O the previous week. 
 
 
On 24 September, Chamberlain made his report on the Godesberg meeting to the Cabinet.  He 
concluded by asking the Cabinet to consider whether Britain would be better able to protect itself 
now or later, thereby indicating that war was an option.  The discussions continued next day.  In the 
interim, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, had berated 
Halifax for failing to take a stronger line about the need to resist Hitler.  After listening to Cadogan, 
Halifax had his ‘Damascus Road’ moment and indicated that he preferred a strong line – a move that 
disappointed Chamberlain.337  Other Cabinet members were now prepared to indicate that they 
agreed with Halifax, partly because they were worried about how Parliament and the Press would 
react.338  The Cabinet were right to be worried about ‘informed’ opinion.  Letters to The Times and 
the Manchester Guardian indicated support for opposing the terms since this offered ‘the only real 
hope for peace’. 339  Yet not all letters favoured resistance.  The opposing arguments also featured in 
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M-O reports.  Yorkshire based observer W. J. Speers summarised this well: ‘whilst most people 
wanted peace to be preserved, there was a feeling that Hitler should be told where to get off’.340  
 
 
‘Informed’ opinion in Bedfordshire reflected the national situation.  Speaking at the Bedford 
Conservative Association conference, Sir Richard Wells continued his support for Chamberlain by 
acknowledging that the last ten days had been ones of high tension that were beyond the 
comprehension of ordinary people.341  Meanwhile, George Matthews, the Labour candidate for Mid-
Bedfordshire at the 1945 general election, took a different view.  Addressing a Labour rally at 
Biggleswade, Matthews argued that Lennox-Boyd was partly to blame because of his speech in 
March.342  In contrast, Thomas Lodge chose his words more carefully but warned that Britain could 
not give away parts of other countries. 343  The views of the three politicians provide a good 
indication of the respective party positions.  One Labour supporter, E. A. Richards, expressed a 
similar view to George Matthews.  He stated that Chamberlain could have been in no doubt about 
the mood of the British people when he left but he had ignored this, which left Richards wondering 
where the crisis would end.344  Within this letter, there are hints that confirm that view of Wells, that 
the public did not understand the complexities of the situation but had hardened their opinion 
nonetheless.  
 
 
The West London and Hammersmith Gazette provided a potential answer to the question posed by 
Richards, though the paper would not have known about it.  This was that Hitler would be master of 
Europe. 345   This answer does not appear to have been one that concerned a Labour League of Youth 
rally associated with the crisis, which included a meeting at Hammersmith Town Hall.  The 
unidentified speaker in the M-O records is most likely to have been Herbert Morrison, based on a 
local newspaper report.  He stated that ‘it was distressing to know that, owing to the workings of 
capitalism and the failings of European statesmanship, the youth of this and other countries must 
think about the possibilities of war’.  He went on to suggest an exchange of populations. 346   Joining 
Morrison’s words were slogans like ‘Chamberlain must go’ and ‘Chamberlain means war’, 347  thereby 
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providing a further indication of the level of opposition that existed to the government’s foreign 
policy and an awareness of where events could lead.  The Labour message was one of opposition to 
Chamberlain’s policy but one that is open to differing interpretations.  The most likely is that 
appeasement could go further to ensure a peaceful solution, though this would be contrary to the 
call for a firm stand.     
 
 
The active opposition of the Left in Fulham and Hammersmith was also in evidence in Bolton, 
despite the Bolton Standard describing people as not being interested.348  The ‘informed’ elite 
certainly were.  The Bolton Evening News continued to advocate a firm stand, a position supported 
by Labour MPs, Rhys Davies (Westhoughton) and George Tomlinson (Farnworth).  Tomlinson argued 
that one man should not have the power to control the destiny of Europe and criticised the 
government for failing to make contact with the Soviet Union.349  Further support for contact with 
the Soviet Union came from ‘D.T.’ in a letter with a socialist slant, while Robert Davies, writing from 
an address identified as the local Communist bookshop, called for a firm stand against aggression.350  
Austin Kavanagh condemned letter writers such as the above for stabbing Chamberlain in the back 
at the very moment that he needed the support of everyone during delicate negotiations.351 
 
Newspaper coverage in the days surrounding Godesberg focussed primarily on ‘informed’ opinion.  
This occurred in all three geographical areas.  Those calling for a firm stand refrained from 
advocating war.  Surprisingly, there continued to be no mention of Churchill in letters or editorials.  
 
 
The final days of September witnessed a nation frantically preparing for war, which made the crisis 
very real for ordinary people.  On 27 September, Chamberlain broadcast to the nation.  He explained 
what had occurred and vowed to continue working for peace until the last moment.  Parliament met 
the following day to hear more details, including about Chamberlain’s meetings with Hitler.  
Approaching the end of his speech, Chamberlain received a note inviting him to a third meeting the 
following day in Munich.  He announced this to the House, which erupted into cheers and wished 
him good luck.  However, as Lennox-Boyd recalled, MPs such as Churchill remained in their seats.352  
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The Parliamentary reaction spread across the country as the mood changed to one of hope.  Sir D. F. 
Howard, who worked at the Foreign Office, described it as ‘brilliant news’ in his diary,353 whilst a 
man in Yorkshire stated to an M-O observer that ‘it’s all over now.  We can go to bed and sleep 
undisturbed’.354  The following day, Chamberlain met Hitler, Mussolini, and Daladier at Munich to 
agree the terms of the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, leaving an international commission 
to make decisions on other areas.  The representatives had no choice but to accept the terms of the 
Munich agreement. 
 
 
Chamberlain’s address on 27 September occurred when prospects for a peaceful resolution were 
diminishing.  Listening to the broadcast was a group of Luton women who were assembling gas 
masks in the basement of a disused hat factory.  They murmured their agreement that Britain should 
not go to war unless her vital interests were threatened and applauded at the end of the speech.  
The Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph reported this on 28 September, commenting that the women 
hoped that what they were doing would prove unnecessary.355  Even if it did not, they, along with 
Luton Rotarians appreciated the efforts that Chamberlain was making to maintain peace.356  
 
 
The day before Chamberlain’s address, Hitler spoke to a crowd in Berlin.  His speech included a fierce 
denunciation of the Czechs.  The Bolton Evening News editorial commented on both speeches, 
describing Hitler’s as displaying a lack of willingness to contribute towards a peaceful solution.  
People had once again been queuing at the gates for a special edition.357  Active discussion 
continued in the letters column but this time it was the turn of Chamberlain’s supporters.  Ronald 
Andrew, a resident of Heaton, and ‘P.H.’, criticised the advocates of a firm stance since many had 
continuously refused to support rearmament.358 
 
M-O, whilst predominantly active in ‘Metrop’, also collected a range of opinions about the crisis in 
Bolton.  The comments made indicated that there was a general hope to avoid war but that people 
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would be willing to fight for their country if needed in most cases.  Once again, there is evidence of a 
dislike of Hitler within the comments.  Examples of comments made include:359 
 
 Male, 25 – I’ll fight only if sent for but I’m not going to fight if they don’t. 
 Male, 30 – Hitler had gone too bloody far this time.  He needs to be taught a lesson. 
 Male, 32 – I’m fed up with war.  It’s war in a morning, war over the counter all day, war on 
the wireless, let’s be getting at him and this time we must do a thorough job of it. 
 
In addition to the opinions expressed, M-O also noted various street greetings as the people of 
Bolton went calmly about their business, in the knowledge that war might be close.  These included  
‘have you got your gas mask’, ‘have you got your gun’, and ‘have you got your call-up papers’. 360 
 
 
The announcement of the conference marked the end of a period of swings in the public mood.  
These had initially been in Chamberlain’s favour but soon switched to advocating a firm stand.  
Behind the swings in the public mood, there was a clear divide along political lines.  This applied to 
both politicians and newspaper letter writers, since it was often possible to spot political affiliations.  
Even as preparations for war mounted, the people remained calm and hoped for the preservation of 
peace. 
 
 
The signing of the agreement was the culmination of months of tension but the start of ‘oceans of 
ink’361 that surround Chamberlain’s actions to this day.  The relief that Neville Henderson expressed 
in his letter was widespread across the country.  From Whitehall to Scotland, Wales to East Anglia, 
celebrations occurred.  BBC News reports describing Chamberlain’s return from Munich, noted that 
the crowds were singing a variety of songs and the scenes were reminiscent of the armistice in 
1918.362  Further evidence of the national relief manifested itself in letters to The Times and the 
Manchester Guardian, although there was dismay at the price.363  A series of unconnected letters in 
the Manchester Guardian expanded on this.  The letters raised a number of concerns: Britain’s moral 
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obligations towards Czechoslovakia;364 going to the edge of war for inadequate reasons;365 and the 
negotiating method.366  The economic historian, R. H. Tawney expanded on this last point, arguing 
that the importance of the negotiations and a lack of time were not appropriate reasons for failing 
to consult Parliament.367  Tawney’s unease was shared by one member of the public, who told an M-
O observer that ‘it is perfectly disgusting for one man to have done all Chamberlain did, without 
asking anyone else’.368    
 
 
The national feeling of relief was evident in Bedfordshire on 30 September with the Beds and Herts 
Evening Telegraph describing Chamberlain as ‘the greatest statesman in history’.369  Reverend 
Keeble (vice-president of the Luton and District Free Church Council), Mr H W Pocock (chair of the 
Old Contemptibles) and the Bedford Women’s Conservative Association, all of whom sent 
resolutions to Chamberlain, joined the editorial’s praise.370  The county’s two Conservative MPs 
joined them over the next fortnight, with Lennox-Boyd criticising those who attacked Chamberlain.  
However, a BUF speaker dared to do just that, as well as making derogatory remarks about the 
people of Luton, before an audience of 900 outside Luton Corn Exchange, where the crowd removed 
him from the platform.  At the trial resulting from this disturbance, witnesses testified that the 
crowd had protested by saying that the speaker could not run Chamberlain down in front of them.371 
 
Readers of the Bedfordshire Times contributed to the debate on 7 October.  The published letters 
contained relief and reflection.  ‘C.W.’ praised Chamberlain for ‘saving a defenceless island’, while 
‘Realist’, a resident of Bedford, criticised the continued lack of attention given to Mein Kampf and 
called for the introduction of national service as Britain’s very existence was threatened.372  Mr 
Kerran, in a speech at Luton Corn Exchange, added to the criticisms, warning his audience that 
German demands would only grow.  This was obvious to anyone who was familiar with the literature 
circulating in Germany.373  In response to Kerran’s criticism of the agreement, F. C. Bright, a resident 
of Richmond, raised the question of what Labour would have done.  A. Turnball, a resident of Shirley 
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Road in Luton responded, stating that Labour would not have imposed the harsh terms of the Treaty 
of Versailles, that they would have supported the Weimar Republic, and used the League to settle 
international disputes.  This statement did not convince Bright, who continued to believe that no 
other party could have done better.374 
 
 
Jubilation and relief were the initial reactions in Fulham.  A quick M-O poll found that 54% were in 
favour of Chamberlain, though 36% were sceptical about the agreement.375  William Astor, speaking 
at a well-attended central committee meeting of the East Fulham Conservative Association, praised 
Chamberlain’s efforts.  The Association, along with the West Fulham Association, sent a resolution to 
Chamberlain expressing their gratitude but did not comment on the actual contents of the 
agreement.376  This is in keeping with the finding of Crowson’s study about the lack of ‘public’ 
comment from Conservative Associations.377  John Busby, the defeated candidate in the West 
Fulham by-election, claimed during a concert interval that there was not a woman in West Fulham 
who would not vote for Chamberlain, as he had saved them from war.378  This reinforced the gender 
stereotype that women favoured peace.  Conservative politicians were not the only ones to praise 
Chamberlain.  On 7 October, the West London Observer published letters from Albert Maple and 
Bernard Jolivard, praising his efforts.379  However, the editorial on 14 October drew attention to one 
of the lessons of the crisis: the need to be prepared.380  Letters praising Chamberlain did not just 
appear in newspapers.  Some people wrote to him or his wife directly, as the ample collection of 
crisis letters in his personal papers demonstrates.  One such writer was Mary Heinemann, a Fulham 
resident.  On 16 September, she wrote to Mrs Chamberlain expressing her thanks for the efforts that 
Neville was making for peace.  A further letter followed on 24 October expressing the wish that 
England had more like them and asking for an autograph.  The Chamberlains ignored this request.381 
 
Opponents of Chamberlain in Fulham refrained from praising him but were thankful for the 
preservation of peace.  Instead, Edith Summerskill – along with the Reverend Kenneth Oliver and 
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William Church, the mayor of Hammersmith – chose to focus on the humanitarian cost. This resulted 
in the setting up of a fund to collect money to provide relief.382  The early focus on humanitarian 
relief soon changed to vocal criticism of the agreement in both boroughs.  Labour’s Hammersmith 
constituency newspapers led the attack.  Articles published in the October and November editions 
were strongly critical of the government, which included a ‘we told you so’ type article.383  The South 
Hammersmith Citizen raised the question of Britain’s relations with the Soviet Union, arguing that 
these needed improving prior to the signing of an alliance.384  The two Hammersmith Labour papers 
were not the only ones to voice criticisms of the agreement.  Writing to the West London Observer, 
Harry Granger, a resident of Hammersmith, referred to a speech by William Eady, the 
undersecretary of the ARP department, which admitted that the country was unprepared.385  
‘Nightshirt’ expressed similar concerns.386  Granger wrote several letters to the paper during October 
and November highlighting Britain’s unpreparedness.  It was therefore a surprise when at the end of 
November, a letter from him supporting Chamberlain’s actions appeared.  This change resulted from 
the facts of the situation emerging.387 
 
 
Defensive preparations were not a major concern for the people of Bolton when news of the Munich 
agreement came through.  They joined the national sense of relief but with a foreboding for the 
future.  The Bolton Evening News reported scenes of joy, with descriptions of people lighting 
bonfires and setting off fireworks.  However, the editorial continued to oppose Chamberlain’s policy 
despite the efforts he had made.  It warned that a period of reflection was approaching.388  
Meanwhile, Chamberlain’s efforts did received praise in the letters column, where Reverend 
Havelock Davidson, the vicar of the town’s main church, was amongst the letter writers.  He argued 
that the choice made by Chamberlain was the only possible one.389  Eva Thornley (a resident of 
Hereford Road), ‘S.J.’ (a resident of Great Lever), ‘War Weary’ and Eileen Knowles (a resident of 
Egerton), all joined Davidson in praising the efforts of Chamberlain.390  Support was even 
forthcoming from the local labour movement, which appreciated the efforts made.  Bolton 
Conservative Association, like the associations in the other two geographical areas, displayed 
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support for Chamberlain, whilst calling for the continuation of rearmament.391  However, unlike the 
other two areas, Bolton residents had to wait two months before they heard their MPs speak on the 
subject.  When they finally spoke in December, over 600 people attended the meeting.  Foreign 
affairs dominated the speeches but questions from the audience concentrated on domestic 
matters,392 thereby reaffirming the latter’s importance. 
 
Further evidence of the relief experienced by the people of Bolton is available in the M-O records, as 
well as a degree of scepticism about the future:393 
 Socialist – this Chamberlain success will put the Labour party back for 10 years. 
 Housewife, 55 – thinks that Chamberlain has shown himself up.  Her bosses felt that he 
should be ashamed.  Does not like the country hobknobbing to Hitler. 
 Man, 60 – if there is one thing that crabs me about this agreement, it is the leaving out of 
Russia.  There you have a country, who wouldn’t have listened to what Hitler dictating and 
would had have a smack at him straight away. 
The degree of scepticism in the above, found further expression in the letters column of the Bolton 
Evening News during the first two weeks of October.  They included the feeling that the lions share 
had gone to Hitler, whilst others wondered how long it would be before he asked for something 
else.394  This was certainly true of the passengers of one bus driver, who wrote to say that he had 
overheard passengers saying ‘bet you two bob that he wants something else inside a year’.395 
Interwoven with these general comments about Germany’s future intentions was discussion of two 
other important matters: how to improve Britain’s defences, and the effect of the pact on the Soviet 
Union.  Regarding the former, L. M. Hagan, a resident of Park Road in Bolton, placed the blame on 
Labour because they had voted against rearmament – a view challenged by Reg Crowshaw of Mill 
Street in Bolton.  Crowshaw argued that the real blame lay with Austen Chamberlain since he had 
argued that other countries would not disarm unless Britain did.396  These opposing viewpoints 
sought to play the blame game in a continuation of the attitudes displayed by the political parties 
towards foreign affairs during 1938.  Other letters took a more practical stance by suggesting that 
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people use their leisure time for military training, including learning to shoot.397 
 
Discussion about the Soviet Union occurred in the letters column of the Bolton Evening News, unlike 
in The Times or the Manchester Guardian, where only a few letters discussed it.  One of those 
published warned that the Soviet Union might come to terms with Germany, whilst another 
criticised the lack of co-operation during the crisis.398  Even seasoned scholars like Michael Carley 
and Keith Neilson make very little reference to the Soviet role during the Munich crisis, mainly due 
to problems accessing the relevant material in the Russian archives.399  Geoffrey Roberts, in his 
discussion of the Soviet role during the Munich crisis, argues that the Soviets were angry at 
references to their involvement in the dismemberment and as a result, adopted a wait-and-see 
policy, whilst continuing to dislike Chamberlain’s policy.400  Within Bolton, support for the Soviet 
Union came from J. B. O’Hara, who viewed the agreement as a four-power pact against that country, 
while ‘Truth-seeker’ praised it for supporting a fellow League member.401  The most relevant 
contribution came from Thomas Utley, a future Daily Telegraph correspondent.  His letter discussed 
the strategic changes that had taken place in Europe since 1935, arguing that the situation had 
swung in favour of Germany, thereby annulling the aims of the Franco-Soviet pact.402  Not all letter 
writers favoured the Soviet position.  R. R. Hoare, (the regional director of the Economic League), 
and Colonel Grierson, both pointed to the military weakness of the Soviet Union.  Given the known 
political allegiances of some correspondents, a tentative conclusion would be that the divisions 
reflected the national divide.403 
 
 
In the aftermath of the Munich agreement, all three geographical areas showed similar tendencies in 
terms of the opinions expressed.  The general feelings to emerge were: relief at avoiding war, 
gratitude to Chamberlain for his efforts, unease about the future, and concern about the state of 
British defences.  Conservatives were particularly keen to stress Chamberlain’s efforts in the public 
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domain but largely avoided comment on the actual agreement.  Meanwhile, Chamberlain’s 
opponents acknowledged the efforts he had made but rightly expressed concerns about the future.  
In the two London boroughs, there was a brief concern for the humanitarian cost, coupled with 
discussion about the Soviet Union.  This subject received greater attention in Bolton but not in 
Bedfordshire, because the Left was not as well established. 
 
 
One overlooked feature of the crisis is its impact on the number of people attending church.  Susan 
Goodman and Alan Wilkinson argue that attending church was a way of bringing the nation 
together.404  This process began prior to the Berchtesgaden meeting, when the Archbishop of 
Canterbury issued a call for people to attend a day of prayer that coming Sunday.  The Free Churches 
repeated this call.405  However, the ‘London Man’s Diary’ in the Bolton Evening News argued that 
people did not need an invitation, seeing that the churches in central London were already busier 
than normal at lunchtimes.406  The paper also published details of local services for peace that were 
taking place.  This enabled the churches to undertake their moral responsibility for the welfare of 
the people, a responsibility that they themselves had recognised.  The meeting records for Trinity 
Congregational and Methodist Church in Farnworth, and St Andrew’s Presbyterian Church in 
Hammersmith, refer to discussions about opening the church during the crisis so that people could 
pray.407 
 
To assess the claim about increased church attendances, an analysis of Anglican Church service 
registers in the geographical areas was undertaken.  The registers record the number of 
communicants for each service, which is a good indication of the overall attendance.  Table 1 is a 
sample of 16 churches out of 50 overall taken from across the geographical areas for the two 
Sundays either side of the Munich agreement.  Overall, attendance was relatively steady, though 
there were dramatic swings on the Sunday immediately after the agreement.  Part of the 
explanation for this increase lies in the fact that this Sunday was Harvest Festival, a service that 
traditionally attracted greater numbers.  The sense of relief did the rest.   
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Table 1: Church attendance during the Munich crisis408 
Church Location 18/9/38 25/9/38 2/10/38 9/10/38 
St Andrew’s Luton 82 69 173 65 
St Peter’s Luton 30 81 61 43 
St Paul’s Luton 45 23 80 48 
St Christopher’s Luton 74 77 127 49 
Christchurch Bedford 48 16 94 11 
Holy Trinity Bedford 53 36 169  
St Andrew’s Bedford 62 76 122 51 
St Cuthbert’s Bedford 68 49 116 21 
St Andrew’s Fulham 53 42 100 32 
All Saints Fulham 235 106 328 95 
Christchurch Fulham 35 69 163 31 
St Dionis Fulham 113 154 114 110 
St Thomas’s Bolton 47 99 252 81 
Bolton Parish  Bolton 41 28 197 19 
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All Souls Bolton 42 45 37 56 
 St George’s Bolton 31 42 192 18 
 
Newspapers in Bedfordshire reported this phenomenon widely.  On 6 October, the Luton News 
reported that the main parish church, St Mary’s (figures not available for 2 October), had closed its 
doors fifteen minutes prior to the start of the service, leading to another service to be held later in 
the day.  The paper also reported increases for the churches listed in Table 1.409   Increases also took 
place in Bedford.  A similar scene to the one in Luton occurred at the main parish church, St Paul’s.  
The large congregation displayed a genuine thankfulness for peace, despite some murmurings about 
the price paid.410  The other two geographical areas reported similar occurrences but in much less 
detail than in Bedfordshire.  One exception to this was the Horwich and Westhoughton Journal and 
Guardian, which covered part of the area surrounding Bolton.  On 7 October, three reports appeared 
about church services, two of which mentioned large congregations for the thanksgiving services.411   
However, as J. W. Huxley-Williams – the Vicar of Christ Church in Fulham – noted ‘the time when the 
nation came flocking back to the house of prayer’ did not last, as the figures for 9 October 
demonstrate.  The nation slipped back into its comfortable pre-crisis state.412 
 
 
The church services following the Munich agreement were one of the ways that the public 
demonstrated their relief at the maintenance of peace.  Indirectly related to this is the impact of the 
Munich crisis on remembrance.  Before the crisis occurred, the annual British Legion services in July 
– which only appeared to have occurred in Bedfordshire – took place.  The Beds and Herts Evening 
Telegraph reported on 18 July that attendance had been the largest for several years.  One of the 
joint organising secretaries, R. D. Wadlock, appreciated this in a letter to the Luton News, stating 
that ‘it was gratifying to know that the memory of our comrades remains strong’.413  July’s crowds in 
Luton appeared again on Armistice Day, with reports and letters published in the Luton News 
attributing this to the recent crisis.414  However, reports from other parts of the county were 
contradictory as both the Bedfordshire Standard and the Bedford and District Daily Circular reported 
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a lack of interest in the day.415  There was another perceived impact of the crisis on the crowds that 
gathered, namely that all ages stood shoulder to shoulder, leading the Dunstable School Magazine to 
suggest that the crisis had been a call to service for the youth of the nation.416   This image was a 
contrast to a year earlier, when letters were appearing asking the young to tolerate the old who 
wished to remember.  Events had since provided a sense of meaning to the young. 
 
 
Honouring the dead so soon after the crisis was a theme touched on by Reverend Morris from 
Askew Road Wesleyan Chapel, as part of his address to the main Armistice Day gathering in 
Hammersmith.417  Sentiments of this nature featured in reports in the Fulham Chronicle.418  The 
reports noted the presence of organisations, particularly youth ones such as the Scouts and Guides.  
However, Mrs E. Batten did not share these sentiments.  Addressing a PSA Brotherhood419 meeting, 
she argued that children should receive instruction about living heroes rather than those who had 
sacrificed their lives.  This was just one example of her anti-war stance, for in an earlier speech she 
had argued against the amount spent on rearmament as it diverted money away from improving 
social conditions,420 a point that George Tomlinson had made during the Farnworth by-election 
campaign discussed in the previous chapter.   
 
Bolton greeted Armistice Day with a greater sense of poignancy following the Munich crisis, a view 
reinforced by the Bolton Evening News editorial on 11 November.  It spoke of a large poppy-wearing 
crowd that fell silent when the time came to pay their respects.421  Compared with the previous year, 
the evidence available for Bolton is not to the same level of depth since no records appear to exist 
for this day in the M-O records.  Similar scenes occurred in Horwich, where Reverend Lynch had 
written in the parish magazine that Armistice Day would ‘have a deeper significance due to recent 
events’.422   The verdicts expressed by these opinion leaders was not shared by P. Hicks, a resident of 
Kearsley, and ‘Woogle’, as they wrote to protest against its continuation, an attitude condemned by 
‘One of the forgotten ex-servicemen’.423    
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The increased poignancy on Armistice Day continued a trend that had emerged over the previous 
few years.  This, as in other areas of the country such as the City and East End of London, stemmed 
partly from the crisis.  There was reference to the increased attendance of the young amongst those 
who gathered to remember the fallen which, - based upon newspaper reports – was a marked step 
change compared to previous years.  Despite the increased reverence, some people continued to 
advocate the abolition of Armistice Day, though their numbers were down on the previous year.   
 
 
 
The months between the Anschluss and Armistice Day witnessed various shifts in the public mood: 
uninterested, under-informed, relieved, divided, and united.  These themes emerge from the 
records at the time, M-O’s particularly.  The records provide scholars with the closest they can get to 
grassroots opinion.   
 
Until the Munich crisis, the public were largely uninterested or indifferent towards foreign affairs, 
since they did not directly affect their daily lives.  The limited discussion of the May crisis outside the 
national ‘informed’ elite is testament to this.  However, it was Chamberlain’s intervention in mid-
September that provided a clear signal that the situation was dangerous.  This led to a rise in public 
discussion and interest, even though most people lacked background information about the 
situation.  The crowds that assembled in London and Bolton reflected this interest, and in Bolton 
they were hungry for news.  There is no evidence of such a desire in the other two geographical 
areas.   
 
The crowds’ lack of information was partly their own fault.  The Bolton Evening News and the Beds 
and Herts Evening Telegraph had been publishing information about the situation on Czechoslovakia 
on an almost daily basis over the summer.  Reading these reports would have provided readers with 
some background information.  The information situation worsened due to the lack of official 
information, which became a feature of the crisis.  Therefore, the two daily evening papers 
cautioned readers about what they said, but did not prevent the publication of letters about the 
situation.  These letters were a way of informing people about the various viewpoints that existed in 
a divided Britain. 
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The divisions witnessed at the time of Eden’s resignation and the Anschluss had continued at a 
national and local level.  Conservative MPs, Associations and their supporters, along with National 
Liberals, were clear in their support for Chamberlain’s policy.  This was to seek a peaceful resolution 
to the situation in Czechoslovakia.  Opponents agreed with this aim but disagreed about the 
methods.  The Left remained critical about the move away from a League-based foreign policy and 
the principle of collective security.  Such criticism was voiced in all three geographical areas but 
mainly in Fulham, Hammersmith and Bolton.  The first two were Labour dominated, so it was to be 
expected.  The Left did not have such a strong presence in Bolton, but the work of M-O and the 
breadth of opinion published in the Bolton Evening News provide evidence of this opposition. 
 
Public interest began to stir at the end of August, when an M-O directive about war and peace found 
that many respondents hoped for the maintenance of peace, a hope shared by the leaders of female 
opinion in Luton.  This hope was an underlying one that united the nation.  Local level opinion began 
to emerge in mid-September.  M-O surveys in Fulham indicated a hope for peace but revealed a 
growing dislike for Hitler.  Meanwhile, M-O evidence from Bolton demonstrated some public 
appreciation of the seriousness of the situation.  At this point, Chamberlain’s visit to Germany 
captured the imagination of the nation and led to praise in all three geographical areas.  People in 
Fulham expressed admiration.  However, divisions quickly began to emerge, a situation not helped 
by the lack of official information.  Letters, articles, and replies to M-O surveys showed a hardening 
of opinion in favour of standing by Czechoslovakia but hoping to avoid war even if this meant paying 
a high price. 
 
Opinion continued to harden during the weekend following the Godesberg meeting.  Labour were 
particularly active, organising meetings across the country, including Bedfordshire and Fulham, to 
promote the need to stand firm.  There is no mention of such a rally in Bolton.  Chamberlain still had 
his supporters, mainly Conservatives, who were quick to attack those who criticised him.  Once 
again, hopes for a peaceful solution remained despite the increasing tensions.  News of the Munich 
conference provided a hopeful signal to the nation that war would be averted.   
 
The mood swings recorded in the geographic locations during the latter part of September confirm 
the existing historiography of public reaction to the crisis and that the assertion made by Halifax in 
his telegram to the Godesberg delegation is correct.  The great mass of the ‘public mood’ was 
changing.  Mood is a more relevant term than opinion as it was difficult to form an informed opinion 
due to the lack of information.  Missing from these swings were references to Churchill, though his 
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absence from discussion in the three localities may not be representative of the whole country. 
 
From a country divided about the most appropriate course of action, came a collective sigh of relief 
at the avoidance of war.  Opinion leaders and ordinary people expressed their gratitude at the 
efforts that Chamberlain had made for peace.  Conservative MPs and their associations particularly 
praised their leader, whilst avoiding public comment on the actual contents of the agreement.  
Further evidence of the national relief is available in the Anglican communicant figures on the 
Sunday following the agreement, despite it also being Harvest Festival.  The difference between the 
geographical areas in this instance was the level of detail reported in the local newspapers.  The 
‘united’ feeling of relief accompanied continuing divisions.  Opponents of the agreement in Fulham 
initially focussed on the humanitarian cost, a point of difference compared to the other two areas.  
With the passage of time, expressions of mistrust about future German intentions became the 
dominant theme, especially in Fulham and Bolton, thereby continuing a trend that was evident in 
the M-O information collected during the crisis.  The October BIPO poll confirmed this, since 93% of 
respondents did not believe Hitler’s claim about having no further territorial ambitions.424   
 
Another division occurred over the Soviet Union and the need for Britain to have closer relations.  
Discussion of this topic principally occurred in the Bolton Evening News, with contributions from 
both sides of the argument.  The Left were strongly in favour of closer relations, a characteristic 
shared with Fulham and Hammersmith, where the topic received a passing mention.  No such 
discussion took place in Bedfordshire, which is not surprising given the lack of an established Left 
wing in the country.  Most surprising is that there was not more discussion in the London boroughs, 
given their Labour domination.   
The subject of gender is not one that features heavily in this chapter.  The reference made to 
individuals or organisations highlight women’s desire for peace, their involvement in defence 
preparations, and their support for Chamberlain’s efforts.  Julie Gottlieb’s recently published work 
‘Guilty Women’, Foreign Policy and Appeasement in Inter-War Britain takes a gendered analysis to a 
much greater depth.  Whilst her findings agree with the main points, she enhances the debate by 
arguing that female expressions of opinion provided some of the psychological framework used by 
Chamberlain during the crisis, which many writers have ignored.425 
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Compared to November 1937, Armistice Day 1938 was perceived to show an increased sense of 
unity and reverence.  Some of this is attributable to the crisis, as it awakened the younger 
generation to the potential dangers and horrors of war.  As reports noted, young and older stood 
shoulder to shoulder in a way that based on evidence from the previous year, they had not done.  
This was noticeable in all three geographical case studies, thereby suggesting the growth of a sense 
of unity of purpose.  However, this would require further areas case studies to confirm that this 
applied in a general sense to the whole nation.   
 
Regarding the questions posed in the introduction to this thesis, chapter 2 does demonstrate some 
differences between national and local discussion of events.  The May crisis is the best example of 
this as local level discussion was limited compared to national ‘elite and informed’ discussion.  The 
same applies to the Sudeten crisis until the end of August.  After this time, there was little 
differential between the timing of national and local discussion of events, since the crisis began to 
impact upon the lives of ordinary people.  The impact on and views of local people is in greatest 
evidence where M-O was active.  In the case of both Bolton and Fulham, there were clear tensions 
between support for Chamberlain’s visit to Germany, the growing dislike of Hitler, and the desire to 
avoid war.  A similar conclusion is possible from published opinion in these areas and Bedfordshire.  
The published opinion in local newspapers attempted to guide local opinion, as well as reflect it, a 
task that was not always possible.  For example, the Bolton Evening News had been consistently 
critical of Chamberlain’s policy, but recognised that local people did not want war.  The crisis did 
have an impact on the public mood in terms of how the public viewed Hitler and defence 
preparations, as discussed in later chapters.  Drawing this chapter and the findings of those chapters 
together is an essential part of understanding the impact of the crisis on reactive and residual 
opinion.  Taken together, they provide evidence of how the crisis acted as a turning point in the 
mood of the British people.   
In conclusion, the local evidence of the ‘public mood’ supports the existing historical writing on 
these months and does not include any references to the ‘buying time for rearmament’ argument 
that would emerge in 1939.  The findings of this chapter are aptly summarised by the editorial in the 
Bolton Evening News on 5 October, which stated:426 
‘The PM’s attachment to the cause of peace is shared by the nation and the other is that 
nobody feels comfortable with the Munich agreement…. the crisis caught the country 
unprepared and not just in a military sense’. 
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Chapter 3: Broken Times, November 1938 – March 1939 
 
‘Broken times’ is an accurate description of the period between November 1938 and March 1939.  It 
began with Kristallnacht on 9/10 November following the murder of the German diplomat, Ernst von 
Rath, in Paris by a Polish Jew, Herschel Grynszpan.  This provided the pretext for an orgy of violence 
against the Jews in Germany, with synagogues burnt, shops looted and people beaten or 
imprisoned.  The result was widespread condemnation of Germany, highlighting the increasing need 
to aid the persecuted German Jewish community.  Further mistrust of German intentions emerged 
in the early months of 1939, as rumours circulated about where Germany would strike next.  
Switzerland and Holland were two of the potential targets discussed by the Cabinet at the start of 
February.  They agreed that an attack on either would be a casus belli.427  The answer to the 
question came on 15 March, when Germany invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia, thereby 
breaking the Munich agreement.  This resulted in the coming to the fore of a process that had begun 
privately prior to the Munich agreement, namely the hardening of public opinion towards Germany 
and a reorientation in British policy towards resistance, though the rhetoric used during this period 
had already signalled this.428   
 
This chapter will argue that Kristallnacht acted as a major catalyst for the hardening of the ‘public 
mood’ towards Germany, due to the moral outrage it caused.  However, this did not translate into a 
willingness to assist, as an examination of British attitudes towards the Jews from the Anschluss to 
the declaration of war will highlight.  Kristallnacht was one of the ways that the public learned more 
about the German regime, a process assisted by information about new library books and talks.  
Germany was not the only subject under consideration – references to the Soviet Union also began 
to increase, though a fuller discussion would occur after the German invasion of Czechoslovakia.  
Here, Conservatives were wary, whilst the Left recognised the need to include the Soviet Union in 
any serious challenge to Germany.  Although not directly mentioned in this chapter, the Arab revolt 
in Palestine that occurred between 1936 and 1939 must be borne in mind when considering British 
policy towards the Jews during this period.  Details of the rebellion, especially the second phase are 
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well covered by Norris,429 whilst Cohen provides a detailed examination of the background 
negotiations that led to the White Paper on Palestine in May 1939.430  This process revealed that it 
would be very difficult to find a solution as the usual process of diplomatic compromise did not 
apply in the case of Palestine.  British policy also tended to favour the Arab population due to the 
wider strategic situation, Britain needed the support of the neighbouring Arab states. 
 
 
British attitudes towards the Jews in the 1930s partly stemmed from the Great War when 
xenophobia had been able to develop in Britain.  Germans resident in Britain and Jews from Eastern 
Europe had been targets for this, with the latter regarded as not doing their bit for the war effort.431    
Following the cessation of hostilities, anti-Semitism did not find fertile ground in Britain, due in part 
to the efforts of Jewish leaders to encourage cultural assimilation.  This assimilation continued into 
the 1930s, but masked divisions within the Jewish community: generation, place of birth, political 
and religious belief.432 
 
Hitler’s rise to power and the implementation of Nazi racial policies increased Jewish emigration 
from Germany.  In the early days of the Nazi regime, reports appeared in a range of newspapers 
about concentration camps where political prisoners and ‘enemies’ of the regime were sent.  At this 
point, the camps did not have the same meaning that they would acquire later.  Andrew Sharf 
described the British response as one of sympathy and a desire to help, whilst preventing Britain 
from becoming the chosen place of refuge.433  Initially, the numbers coming to Britain were quite 
small, thereby allowing the British Jewish community to provide the guarantee of support required 
by the government.434  Aside from guaranteeing the new arrivals, divisions existed about how to 
respond to German actions.  Giesela Lebzelter discusses the early resistance, which included a 
boycott of German goods.  The Board of Deputies (BOD) did not adopt this measure until 1934, an 
inaction that led to the formation of the Jewish People’s Council (JPC), which argued for an active 
resistance to fascism.  The BOD, which asked The Times and the BBC not to report on the JPC’s 
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activities, did not support its actions.435   
 
British expressions of sympathy for the victims of Nazi persecution continued, particularly amongst 
Christian leaders.  The Archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Lang, and the future Archbishop, William 
Temple,436 were amongst those to draw attention to the plight of the Jews.  However, British 
government policy remained unchanged.  Louise London has argued that British policy was to 
contain the problem on the European continent and only admit ‘desirable’ refugees.437  The flow of 
refugees increased substantially after the Anschluss with one letter writer to the Manchester 
Guardian, describing the situation as meaning that ‘it was no longer possible to be a Jew in 
Austria’.438  Jews were not the only Nazi targets, as Catholics and Social Democrats also suffered.  
The increasing numbers prompted a discussion about what to do.  One suggestion was to find a 
place of refuge within the British Empire, such as Australia or Palestine.  The major obstacle was the 
increased economic burden on the host country, which might intensify anti-Semitism.  This 
concerned the relevant authorities.  Prior to the Anschluss, most Jews seeking refuge came from the 
desirable professional classes.  This was less true of Austrian Jews, as noted by J. A. Eagleton, a 
member of the Aliens branch of the Home Office.  He believed that most of the Austrian Jews 
seeking refuge would be difficult to absorb as they came from the shopkeeper and small business 
class.439  Even the professional classes did not find it easy, as there were frequent objections from 
the medical profession.440  Restrictions on Austrian doctors were the subject of Parliamentary 
questions in July 1938 by Edith Summerskill and five other MPs.441  On 14, 20, and 25 July, they asked 
the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, several questions on the matter.  His answers stressed the 
need to balance the competing demands of providing refuge whilst avoiding flooding the labour 
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market.442 
 
 
The plight of the Jews received little coverage in local sources with only snippets appearing before 
Kristallnacht.  The only reference in Bedfordshire comes from the diary of D. H. Oliver, an employee 
of Laporte Chemicals.  His notes for the interwar period refer to work colleagues disliking Jews, 
which they attributed to the Jews’ panicked departure from the East End of London following air 
raids during the Great War.  This reinforced the idea of them not ‘doing their bit’.443 
The lack of references in Bedfordshire was mirrored in Fulham and Hammersmith.  The first 
references to the subject occurred on 22 May 1938 with a reference to ‘enemy aliens flooding the 
labour market’.444  This reflected concerns about the economic impact of refugees.  The next 
reference came on 22 July in an editorial criticising the British and German governments.  The 
editorial urged the British government to be more welcoming and the German government to make 
it easier for Jews to depart.445     
Bolton displayed a similar lack of interest.  The mentions that did occur came in March 1938.  The 
first two instances were reports of talks to church groups.  M-O data collected about some of the 
men’s social activities at St Simon and St Jude’s on 10 March noted that the largest attendance (65) 
had been for a talk by a German refugee about church and state.  The precise details of the talk did 
not appear in the report.446  Four days later, another church meeting took place at St Barnabas.  The 
M-O observer in attendance described the vicar leading the meeting as ‘a proper fascist and anti-
Jew’.447  The hostility displayed by the vicar also existed amongst ordinary people.  An M-O observer 
deliberately raised the question in conversation with two other people.  From this, the observer 
concluded that there was a hidden anti-Semitism, often related to money.448 
 
 
Prior to Kristallnacht, there was very little discussion at a local level, as none of the three 
geographical areas had a large Jewish population.  The weeks following the Munich agreement 
marked the start of a new wave of migration, as countries on Germany’s eastern border increased 
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their anti-Jewish activities.  Germany signalled its intention of increasing the pressure on the Jewish 
community by deporting 20,000 Jews of Polish origin.  Amongst the deportees were the family of 
Herschel Grynszpan, who responded by murdering Ernst von Rath.  The murder provided a 
convenient excuse for the authorities in Germany to unleash an orgy of violence against the Jewish 
community.  The Nazis mobilised quickly as they had gathered for their traditional 9 November 
meeting, which honoured their fallen comrades from the 1923 putsch.  The violence that followed 
‘had powerful repercussions around the world’.449  
 
 
The violence triggered an anti-German response in the British press.  Letters to The Times and 
Manchester Guardian expressed their moral revulsion,450 as did letters from Christian churches to 
local synagogues.  One example of this was the letter sent by All Saints Parish Church in Fulham.451  
Opinion poll findings support the content of the letters.  The November BIPO poll revealed that 73% 
of respondents said that Germany’s treatment of the Jews prevented good relations between the 
two countries.452  This only added to the increasing mistrust of Germany.  The question of what 
Britain could do to help followed the expressions of revulsion.  Parliamentary discussion covered 
several areas: which countries were prepared to assist, delays in processing asylum applications, and 
how to prevent the refugees from becoming an economic burden to Britain.453  These themes 
reflected the discussions taking place in the geographical areas.  Data collected by M-O as part of 
research on anti-Semitism revealed a highly secretive anti-Semitism amongst respondents, often 
through a fear of a threat to British jobs.454  However, some respondents did acknowledge that some 
immigration was economically beneficial to Britain.455  This reflected the balance that the authorities 
were trying to maintain.  
 
 
The response to Kristallnacht in Luton generated a rare occurrence, somebody who did not condemn 
it.  A. Shaw, in a letter to the Luton News, argued that Britain had no right to criticise Germany given 
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Britain’s record in Ireland.456  ‘British Jew’, a resident of Luton, challenged Shaw’s minority opinion, 
highlighting that the persecution had been ongoing since 1933.457  This was the start of several 
letters between the pair published in the paper.  A couple of letters condemned Kristallnacht.  
William Church, a resident of Tennyson Road in Luton, wrote to provide details of a resolution 
passed by the Dallow Road Adult School, which condemned the ‘organised collective brutality; and 
call on people to unite to condemn the attack’.  A. W. Merry, a resident of Luton, agreed with the 
resolution and added to it by calling for people to assist with the provision of humanitarian relief. 458  
 
 
Reactions in Fulham and Hammersmith mirrored Bedfordshire.  The attack on the Jewish community 
was condemned.  On 25 November, the West London Observer published a letter from T. Funston, a 
resident of West Kensington.  Funston argued that the situation had received less attention than it 
had deserved and that the persecution was a deliberate attempt to distract the German people.459  
Funston’s letter joined several others published by the paper expressing revulsion at events.460  
However, ‘Another Peace-Lover’ was unsympathetic, arguing that evidence from both sides was 
required before passing judgment.461  This view was criticised by ‘X.Y.Z.’ and ‘Peace-Lover’, both of 
whom expressed the view that the German foreign ministry had inspired some recent letters.462   
 
 
In Bolton, Kristallnacht was condemned across the political spectrum.  The Bolton Evening News 
editorial on 15 November stated that all parties were deeply shocked and that it believed that the 
public was not in the mood for negotiations.463  Six days later, the editorial expressed the hope that 
these events would force Chamberlain to change course in foreign policy.464  These arguments 
continued the paper’s opposition to Chamberlain’s policy, which had begun following Eden’s 
resignation in February.  Political unity in condemning the attacks also occurred in the neighbouring 
Farnworth constituency.  The Labour and Liberal commentators in the Farnworth Weekly Journal 
condemned the attack and questioned the motives behind it.465  These expressions of horror did not 
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go far enough for Left Book Club founder, Victor Gollancz.  Speaking at a meeting in Bolton, he called 
for a large meeting to protest about Germany’s actions.466 
 
The published local reactions were condemnatory in all three geographic areas.  Following on from 
this, people asked how they could assist in the provision of relief.  Nationally, the Lord Baldwin fund 
was set up and began collecting in January 1939.  There was also a change in emphasis after 
Kristallnacht, with priority given to the rescue of children.  The Kindertransports and other rescue 
efforts produced some striking individual stories. 
 
 
One such story was that of Heinrich Schwarz, a blind Polish Jew brought to Britain by Mr Kerran.  The 
Luton News published Schwarz’s story on 2 February 1939.  The article described the horrors of 
Kristallnacht, and the rescuing of the family, who were now living safely in Luton and trying to learn 
English to become useful to their host community.467  Schwarz’s son, Walter, provided a more 
detailed version of the story in an interview for the Imperial War Museum.  Walter described what 
life in Germany was like for the Jews and how the family had decided to leave Germany following his 
father’s arrest as part of Germany’s expulsion of 20,000 Polish Jews in October 1938.  Mr Barnett, a 
Quaker who later became a driver for a prospective Labour MP (presumably Kerran), assisted them 
in departing from Germany.  They arrived in Britain on 31 December 1938.  After initial stays in 
London and Radlett, they eventually came to Luton, where his father found work at a nearby 
Institute for the Blind making baskets.  He soon became disillusioned as they kept moving him to the 
lowest paid jobs.  Eventually, after much difficulty, his father found work in a plastics factory.468  Two 
more examples of relief provision in Bedfordshire occurred in April and May 1939.  In April, the 
Bedford and District Daily Circular reported that a refugee council was in the process of being set up 
to assist new arrivals in Bedford.  This announcement was part of a talk given by a Viennese doctor, 
who described conditions in Central Europe.  The report, whilst stating that the talk was interesting, 
noted concerns about the potential impact upon British employment.469  Provision of economic 
assistance came in the form of training people prior to re-emigration.  For example, the Bedfordshire 
Times reported on 5 May that a group of local business people had purchased Manor Farm in 
Tingrith, a village eight miles north of Luton, for providing agricultural training.470   
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Although the above examples did not threaten British employment, fears about the impact on 
British jobs continued to appear.  On 12 January 1939, A. Shaw – in a typical letter from him – cited a 
circular from the Jewish Board of Guardians offering incentives to firms to employ Jews.471  Rabbi 
Livingstone’s talk to Luton Rotary Club challenged this, claiming that the refugee influx had created 
15,000 jobs.472  Reports of relief efforts in Bedfordshire were minimal, which may be an indication of 
a lack of public interest in the subject.  The economic impact was the main discussion point within 
the mentions made. 
 
 
Relief efforts received an earlier mention in Fulham and Hammersmith than in Bedfordshire.  Within 
a few days of Kristallnacht, Mr Boroda, in a letter to the Board of Management at the Hammersmith 
and West Kensington Synagogue, reported that he had approached Miss Bishop, the headmistress of 
Latymer Girls School, with a view to finding accommodation.473  There is no record of how she 
responded.  Another suggestion was to help the Jews establish a country of their own.  Palestine was 
the obvious choice for this but the government were unwilling to consider it.  However, this did not 
prevent Mr Pritt, the Labour MP for North Hammersmith, from supporting the Committee for Jewish 
Immigration to Palestine.474 
 
The major concern in the two London boroughs was the impact on British employment.  Letters from 
P. Mason and ‘X.Y.Z.’ highlighted that Jewish businesses were replacing non-Jewish workers with 
Jews,475 while others bemoaned the diverting of relief funds away from those who needed 
assistance in Britain.476  Hanns Cemach, a resident of Boscombe Road, and P. Brent, a resident of 
Acton, countered the concerns about employment by highlighting the benefits to the country such 
as the addition of essential skills, stating that refugees could only work if given permission to do so 
by the Home Office as part of their terms of entry.477  H. Chilton, a resident of Ruislip, and A. F. 
Johnson, appealed to both sides to allow refugees the chance to prove themselves before drawing 
any definite conclusions.478  
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Similar points were evident in Bolton.  Appeals for humanitarian assistance began a few days after 
Kristallnacht.  J. Oliver Holdsworth, writing on behalf of the local branch of the Society of Friends, 
asked for offers of hospitality and donations.479  Appeals of this nature received a sympathetic 
reception in the Church.  The meeting minutes of Park Street Wesleyan Circuit and Chorley Old Road 
Methodist Church both refer to offers of assistance.480  Appeals for support met with a mixed 
response.  On 10 January 1939, A. Booth argued that there were non-Jewish people in Bolton who 
needed support first.  E. Greenhalgh, a resident of Wigan Road in Bolton supported this view481  
‘Reader’, who did not think that people would stay away from the cinema just because money 
collected on behalf of the Lord Baldwin Fund482, went abroad, challenged both views.483  Following 
this brief spurt of discussion, very few mentions were made of this subject prior to the declaration of 
war.  Those that did occur referred to meetings that raised awareness of Jewish suffering in 
Germany, the difficulties in gaining access to Britain484 and the potential impact on the British labour 
market.  The last point generated mixed views, highlighting fears as well as the longer-term benefit 
to the country in terms of skills.485     
 
 
The British public displayed a mixed attitude towards the suffering of the Jews during this period.  At 
a national level, and in a more limited way at a local level, there was a desire amongst all opinion 
levels to provide some form of humanitarian relief and raise awareness about the suffering of the 
Jewish population in Germany.  This occurred alongside concerns about the impact of immigration 
on the British labour market, except on Bedfordshire, where local newspapers published both sides 
of this debate.  These concerns result from the perceived impact on the individual.  The longer-term 
benefits, which countered these were also published as part of the press coverage.   
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Kristallnacht increased suspicion towards Germany, thereby reinforcing a trend that had been 
developing.  The government’s foreign policy was also under suspicion in letters written to the 
Manchester Guardian.486  One such letter called for the holding of a meeting to make the strength of 
opposition known.487  Letter writers such as F. H. Finch, a British citizen in Argentina, were the type 
that W. W. Paine, a letter writer to The Times from Reigate, criticised, as they did not make 
constructive suggestions.488 
Opinion polls during this period contained several questions about foreign affairs.  In November 73% 
of respondents believed that Kristallnacht had prevented better relations with Germany.  
Chamberlain’s approval rating was 47%, which climbed to 52% in December, a month that saw 
85%489 of respondents indicate that they would prefer to see the Soviet Union victorious in a war 
with Germany, though there was no mention of any allies.  Evidence of support for the ideals of the 
Soviet Union continued in January 1939, when respondents indicated that they preferred 
communism to fascism, while in March 76% wanted an improvement in relations between Britain 
and the Soviet Union.490  Opinion poll data indicated increasing support for the Soviet Union, a 
development that the government were not keen to pursue.  Amongst the questions asked by BIPO 
was a specific one regarding how people would best describe Chamberlain’s policy.  Of the 
respondents, 28% thought that appeasement would lead to an enduring peace, 46% that it was 
buying time to rearm, and 24% believed that it was bringing war closer due to its effect on the 
dictators.491 
 
 
The government continued to receive support from Bedfordshire Conservatives.  At the annual 
meeting of the Bedford Conservative Association, Lord Melchett, the Association President, argued 
that Chamberlain’s policy had bought the country extra time to prepare (an argument not used in 
October 1938).  Sir Richard Wells joined Melchett, though both failed to comment on the actual 
terms of the Munich agreement and its implementation.492  Labour shared the Conservative view 
that the nation needed to prepare.  Sir Stafford Cripps, who was on the Left of the Labour Party, 
launched a campaign to establish a ‘united front’ that was not supported by the leadership.  During 
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his campaign, he spoke to an audience of more than 600 at Bedford.  Forty-seven minutes of his 
speech attacked the government’s foreign policy.  Cripps’s visit coincided with a series of letters in 
the Bedfordshire Times debating the merits of his ideas.  G. H. Moore, an assistant secretary of the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union, recognised that the labour movement would have to form the 
nucleus of a ‘united front’.  However, this did not mean an alliance between Labour and the 
Liberals.493  Ewan Martell, a member of Ampthill Liberals, suggested that they field a joint candidate 
at the next election.494  Electoral alliances of this nature had been used in the by-elections following 
Munich.  References to foreign affairs continued into February as Liberal speakers, Thomas Lodge 
and Mr Martell criticised the government’s foreign policy.  A report on 3 February noted that Lodge 
believed that Chamberlain was beginning to doubt the wisdom of his own policy, whilst Martell 
argued that had Britain stood firm then there would have been no surrender at Munich.495   
 
 
The winter months were similar in Fulham and Hammersmith.  Following a lack of reports at the end 
of 1938, 1939 began with Conservative speakers defending Chamberlain.  One of these defences 
came at the annual meeting of the Conservatives of St Matthew’s ward.  Councillor Raynor, the ward 
chair, spoke about the need for unity and continued faith in Chamberlain’s policy.496  A few weeks 
later, John Busby and Dame Beatrice Lyall, a former Conservative councillor in Fulham, added to the 
defence.  The latter was particularly angry with those who criticised Chamberlain.497  This criticism 
came largely from the Left.  At the start of February, Summerskill accused Chamberlain of not 
representing the interests of the British people, a view that a Chamberlain-supporting letter writer 
to the Hornsey Journal felt that she had no right to express.498  The Liberals shared Labour’s 
opposition.  Addressing a meeting of Fulham Liberals, Miss Lakeman, argued that appeasement was 
wrong and that Britain must be prepared to resist.  She deemed that the League was the best means 
of doing this.499  
 
Campaign groups were active in Fulham during this period.  At a half-full meeting of the Kensington 
and West Fulham PPU branch in January, Bouthrone Wilson, the chair, expressed his view that the 
time of the dictators was ending.  It would have been interesting to know the speaker’s rationale for 
this claim.  At the same meeting, Preston Benson, stated that he was not prepared to have anything 
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to do with the next war and that negotiations must provide the solution.500  The PPU were not the 
only group at work.  The LNU held a meeting at Fulham Central Library in March, where the opposing 
sides expressed their views.  Summerskill argued that the current ‘peace’ was the result of yielding 
to the dictators.  By contrast, William Astor continued to defend the Munich agreement arguing that 
only justice and fair frontiers could form the basis of peace. 501    
 
Bolton’s discussion of foreign affairs ebbed and flowed over the winter months in the letters column 
of the Bolton Evening News.  The editorials continued to mistrust the government.  Therefore, ‘Tory’ 
and ‘Anno’ accused the editor of only presenting one side of the story.502  In response, the editor 
argued that the editorial was the only part of the paper where political preferences came to the 
fore.  Regular columnist ‘Politicus’ shared the editor’s concerns and on 16 December attacked the 
overall policy of the government, but acknowledged that at the time of Munich Chamberlain had 
pursued the only feasible course.  ‘He knows me’ and ‘Salad’ supported this qualified defence.503  
Politicians in Farnworth shared the concerns expressed.  The town’s MP, George Tomlinson, argued 
for the need to find out what the government stood for, while the prospective Liberal candidate, 
William Ledsom, argued that some Conservatives supported the foreign policy advocated by the 
Liberals.504  
 
This pattern of opinion continued into 1939, despite a shift in the letters column of the Bolton 
Evening News towards discussion of Spain.  Editorial criticism of Chamberlain’s policy continued but 
it did acknowledge that there was no realistic alternative at Munich.  It also continued to urge the 
country to prepare, a process not helped by the loss of Czech arms production.505  Critical remarks 
also appeared in the Farnworth Weekly Journal on 13 January, when the Liberal columnist argued 
that a considerable body of opinion existed that demanded no more concessions.506  The Labour 
columnist echoed this sentiment, urging the creation of a ‘united front’ to drive the government 
from office.507  The Bolton Evening News on 30 January criticised a Chamberlain speech that outlined 
Britain’s desire for peace508 but two days later criticised the section of Hitler’s Reichstag speech 
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about peace.  The editorial asked why, if Germany desired peace, arms production was increasing. 509  
Britain’s response to the same question would have been that it was making good any deficiencies.  
Rearmament was both a deterrent and an insurance policy.  H. K. Holt (a resident of Atherton), 
Austin Kavanagh (of Moor Edge in Bolton) and ‘Realist’ challenged the editorial criticism of 
Chamberlain.510  Kavanagh and ‘Realist’ argued that the editorial criticism of Chamberlain was unfair, 
with ‘Realist’ stating that the lack of arms was not Chamberlain’s fault but that of his predecessors, a 
stance that ignored Chamberlain’s time as Chancellor.  The editor responded to these criticisms 
stating this very point and making clear that he was attacking Chamberlain’s policy rather than the 
man himself.  This exchange continued when Kavanagh asked the editor for an alternative policy.  
The response was a mixture of full rearmament and appeasement, though specific details were 
lacking.511  J. B. O’Hara did not welcome the paper’s response to Kavanagh’s question.  He attacked 
the capitalist press and class for only being interested in stopping the spread of socialism rather than 
the national interest.512  This did not stop the editorials from continuing their criticism.  On 16 
February, an editorial argued that the government would only deserve the support of the people 
once it had demonstrated that ‘it was putting the national house in order’, though it again 
acknowledged that as more became known about British weaknesses, it became clear that the policy 
pursed at Munich was the only viable one.513  However, the constant editorial criticism did not 
prevent the paper from publishing articles about support for Chamberlain.  Apart from Kavanagh’s 
letters, Conservatives continued to express their support.  John Haslam was one of those supporting 
Chamberlain.  Fred Howard, the chair of the Farnworth Conservative Association joined him, 
emphasising that under Chamberlain, Britain had stood for the removal of enmities between nations 
thereby enabling the pursuit of peaceful co-existence.514   
 
The long-running editorial criticism abated at the start of March for a few weeks.  However, the left-
wing criticism revived.  Marion Jessop from Leeds, speaking at a meeting of the Bolton Communist 
Party, criticised Chamberlain’s policy for preventing the diplomatic defeat of Hitler.515  Criticism 
continued when Labour’s A. V. Alexander spoke at Spinner’s Hall, calling for the government’s 
removal from office and the implementation of a constructive peace policy.  However, as on 
previous occasions, no details were forthcoming about what this would entail.516  The President of 
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Bolton Women’s Liberal Association, Miss M. Bromily, expressed a different view.  She used her re-
election address to stress that Chamberlain was doing his best to avoid war, an aim supported by the 
Liberals.517  All three of these views appeared in the week leading up to the next crisis, the German 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, which would bring the change in the public mood to the fore. 
 
The winter months were a time of continued criticism by the Bolton Evening News editorial of British 
foreign policy rather than of Chamberlain personally.  Chamberlain continued to have supporters in 
the Bolton area for what he was trying to achieve.  Likewise, the Liberals and Labour shared this goal 
albeit via different methods.  Labour made its disapproval of government policy clear but did not 
provide any details about an alternative policy that would maintain peace.  In summary, the divisions 
between the parties about how to achieve peace remained as firmly entrenched as in the first three 
months of 1938. 
 
 
The previous chapter briefly discussed the Soviet Union.  Discussion of its role continued during the 
winter months but not in much detail.  In Bolton, two letters appeared in the Bolton Evening News, a 
few days before Christmas.  ‘J.E.R.’ and ‘Domini’ were critical of the Munich agreement.  The former 
urged Chamberlain to fly to Moscow to obtain allies, while the latter predicted that unless matters 
changed, an alliance between fascism and communism might occur.518 
 
 
A slightly higher level of coverage occurred in the West London Observer during the first two months 
of 1939.  Albert Maple accused Stalin of being one of the terrible men, who could ‘set the world 
ablaze with war’s useless cruelty’.519  In response, Frank Raymond, a Fulham resident, argued that 
the Soviet Union did not want to fight anyone and that the press never printed any positive articles 
about the country.520 Nonetheless, the stream of criticism continued.  Douglas Cooke, the 
Conservative MP for Hammersmith South, argued that the main aim of communism was to take over 
other countries.521   Albert Maple returned to the attack on 24 February, questioning the democratic 
credentials of the Soviet Union.522  This attack produced a rebuke from Pat Sloan, the author of 
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Soviet Democracy and Russia Without Illusions,523 who referred to the many positive aspects of the 
Soviet Union.  ‘W.M.’, a local trade union member agreed.524  The main letters appearing in the 
paper were hostile to the Soviet Union, a surprise given the strength of the Left in the area.   
 
 
References to the Soviet Union in Bedfordshire were limited, partly because the Left was weak 
within the county.  The only mention in the local papers during this period came on 4 March.  The 
Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph detailed a speech given by the Dean of Canterbury, the Very 
Reverend Hewlett Johnson, which praised the Soviet system.  Significantly, the other speaker at the 
meeting was Victor Gollancz.  He called for an alliance with the Soviet Union but recognised that this 
was unlikely given Chamberlain’s hatred of socialism.525  News of Chamberlain’s visit to the Soviet 
embassy would therefore have been a surprise for Gollancz.  The West London Observer interpreted 
this as Britain finally making a bid for Soviet support.526 
The Left in all geographical areas indicated support for an association with the Soviet Union to meet 
the challenge of fascism.  This would be difficult to achieve whilst Chamberlain remained hostile to 
the Soviet Union, an attitude that is outlined in The Chamberlain-Hitler Collusion,527 and traces of 
which can be found in Chamberlain’s letters to his sisters.528  This hostility prevented the formation 
of a united front by the political parties within Britain. 
 
 
Newspaper articles, editorials and letters were one of the major sources of information for local 
people in relation to international affairs.  This had been evident at the time of Munich.  People also 
sought other sources of information including talks, radio news and reading books.   
 
One example of a talk was held by Bedford Rotary Club and aimed at the under thirties following a 
series of newspaper articles in The Spectator suggesting that this age group were disillusioned.  The 
Club’s weekly newsletter reported that the unnamed speaker, identified by the Bedfordshire Times 
as Reverend Leonard Towers, spoke to an audience of more than 200 on a range of issues.  Those 
attending were described as keen, patriotic, and knowledgeable, especially in relation to the 
questions that the audience asked.  The specific details of the questions did not feature in the report 
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or in the newspaper report.529 
 
 
Talks by prominent politicians were a regular event in Bolton, though predominantly from Labour 
leaders.  However, in November 1938, Viscount Cecil, a Conservative and one of the founders of the 
LNU, spoke on about international law and order.  He argued that those who had gathered for the 
1919 peace conference had forgotten the principles for which they had fought.  The result was that 
respect for the League had declined following the abandonment of international law and order.  On 
collective security, Cecil believed that the preservation of this principle had been possible at the time 
of Munich but that there had been a lack of political will to do so.  The Bolton Evening News report 
did not report the basis for this view.530  Cecil’s talk occurred three days after one given by Mr Ridley 
to the Bolton branch of the Railway Clerks Association, where he argued that the Munich agreement 
was the result of a fear of communism.531  In addition to these talks, people could attend or read 
reports of Oxford University extension lectures.  These dealt with the current state of Europe.  The 
first covered the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland, which given later events, was when 
Britain and France should have challenged Germany.532  The second lecture examined the change in 
Hitler’s attitude.  Until this occurred, the ‘official’ mind had not objected to the return of colonies, 
even though BIPO polls indicated that a wider section of the British public did. 533    
 
 
Another way to become informed was by reading books.  Library data from M-O and local 
authorities are of limited use here as the data focuses on the number of loans in various categories.  
However, the librarian’s annual report is useful.  In Luton, the annual report for 1938-9 commented 
that the demand for books on contemporary political history had increased during each crisis.  Mein 
Kampf was particularly in demand during the Munich crisis, even though no official English 
translation existed.534  Bedford’s librarian reported a similar occurrence.535  In addition to the annual 
report, Luton’s deputy librarian drew attention to several books that people might be interested in 
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following the German invasion of Czechoslovakia.536  These were Danubian Destiny537  and I saw the 
Cruxifixion. 538   
 
 
The demand for Mein Kampf was evident in Bolton, with several copies of an abridged translation 
borrowed within minutes of them becoming available on the shelves.  New library book reports 
were a feature of local newspapers in the Bolton area.  During the winter of 1938-9, the Bolton 
Evening News and the Westhoughton Journal and Guardian recommended some titles for people 
who wished to improve their knowledge about international affairs.  Amongst the titles 
recommended, were Inside Europe,539 I Knew Hitler,540 Britain Looks at Germany,541 and The House 
that Hitler Built.542  These titles would have provided some understanding of the international 
situation and the dynamics of the Nazi regime.  These recommendations were part of an effort to 
educate the British public about the challenges that they were facing.  The lack of loan statistics for 
each title prevents any more detailed analysis about the impact of newspaper recommendations. 
 
In this period, Britain by Mass Observation was published, which detailed the organisation’s work in 
1938.  Large sections of the book were devoted to the changing mood in ‘Metrop’ (Fulham) and 
‘Worktown’ (Bolton) during the Munich crisis.  The Times Literary Supplement (TLS) described the 
book as providing an indictment of the popular press and the BBC for not providing the full story or 
explaining it.  The reviewer was also critical of the variety of data collection methods used by M-O. 543  
 
 
Books and talks appealed to a minority.  Radio appealed to, and reached, a wider audience.  Radio 
news bulletins were one way of keeping up to date.  The BBC Home News at 9pm contained various 
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reports about international affairs during January and February, some of which were rumours.  This 
led to letters to The Times on the subject.  Listeners felt that when they went to bed that war was 
coming.  However, it did act as a means of preventing the country from being surprised again.544  The 
letters provide an indication of how radio could affect public opinion but not necessarily the working 
class, as they were not the type of person to write to The Times. 
 
 
One of the strategic implications of the Munich agreement was that it made Czechoslovakia militarily 
indefensible.  Germany took advantage of this on 15 March and duly provided a clear demonstration 
to the public that Germany would break any agreement that it signed.  This brought to the surface 
the ‘public mood’ that had been building over the past year.  Chamberlain’s reaction in Parliament 
was cautious, as he did not have all the details to hand.  On 17 March, he spoke in Birmingham, 
where he condemned German aggression and called for resistance to further acts of aggression.545  
One of the first steps was to obtain the opinion of other governments, including the Soviet Union.  
The Soviets suggested a conference, an idea that Britain rejected.  Britain’s first step on the road to 
resistance appeared at the end of March with the announcements of a doubling of the size of the 
Territorial Army (TA) and the guarantee to Poland.546  The guarantee was welcomed but left open 
the question of the precise definition of ‘Polish independence’.  Anna Cienciala took this to mean 
that an adjustment of the frontiers could occur, providing it did not impede the independence of 
thought and action by the Polish government.547  This was the first of several guarantees, as 
Romania, Greece and Turkey, also received them over the next couple of months.  However, the 
government remained reluctant to pursue an alliance with the Soviet Union. 
 
 
The existing historiography identifies March 1939 as the major turning point for British elite opinion.  
as David Astor (a one-time friend of the Rhodes Scholar, Adam von Trott), and Sir Geoffrey Cox (a 
former foreign correspondent with the Daily Express) argue, it made people fully aware of the 
danger.548  Responding to international developments, M-O issued a directive asking what they 
thought Hitler would do next.  Out of 850 respondents, 313 (37%) can be classified as indicating that 
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people thought that Hitler would attack a close neighbour, thereby revealing an understanding of 
Germany’s aggressive nature.  The next most popular answer was that he would do nothing for a 
couple of months.  The textual comments accompanying the answers indicate a belief that the time 
had come to prevent Germany from making any more aggressive moves, though a desire to avoid 
war remained.  The comments included ‘we have to deal with Hitler sooner or later’;549 ‘I am 
convinced that Poland will fight for her territory’;550 and ‘impressed by Chamberlain speech and see 
no other way but war to deal with Germany’.551 
 
 
The national recognition of the need to meet the German challenge occurred at a local level.  The 
Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph editorial on 15 March urged Britain to put its house in order, to 
meet this challenge.552  Two days later the paper conducted a small survey of local opinion on 
Germany’s actions.  The survey represented a mixture of opinion levels.  Councillor Roberts, chair of 
the Luton Labour Party, argued in favour of an alliance with other countries as the only way of 
preventing further aggression.  Mr Pocock, chair of the Old Contemptibles, expressed a similar view, 
adding that Hitler would not stop at Czechoslovakia.  Joining these informed opinions were several 
from the less well informed.  One unemployed man believed that Britain had to stop Hitler but did 
not want war, whilst another expressed a similar view, calling for an alliance with the Soviet Union.  
However, not everyone believed in stopping Hitler by force.  A British Legion member, who favoured 
Chamberlain, expressed the opinion that anything that led the country to war would be a disaster.  
Others, such as Alderman Hart, the secretary of Luton Conservative Association, and a bus conductor 
referred to the need to introduce conscription soon.  Overall, a small number of people asked 
recognised the need for measures designed to deter Germany, thereby continuing the hardening of 
opinion that had been ongoing since before the Munich crisis.553 
 
Distinct from the Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph, the Bedfordshire Standard thanked Hitler for 
‘arousing the moral indignation of most nations’.554  However, the editorial continued to express 
support for the Munich agreement, as did Lennox-Boyd.  Speaking at the AGMs of the Mid Beds 
Conservation Association and its women’s branch, he argued that Chamberlain had correctly 
interpreted the public mood at the time of Munich.  He then added that although the future 
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remained uncertain, rearmament meant that the country was in a stronger position.555  The 
newspaper reports do not express clearly that Lennox-Boyd was moving towards a policy of 
resistance, a point highlighted by his biographer, Philip Murphy.556  Prior to Lennox-Boyd’s speech, 
the Association had unanimously passed a resolution stating ‘that this Association congratulates the 
Prime Minister on his handling of the foreign situation and wishes him every success in the 
future’.557  This resolution further reinforces the existing evidence that Conservative Associations 
were behind the efforts of the leader.  However, the resolution once again avoided comment on the 
details of the policy.  Rearmament allowed the adoption of a firm attitude, one reinforced by Leslie 
Burgin in a speech to the Luton branch of the British Legion.  He stated that Britain would not submit 
to force of any kind, an attitude that received a loud cheer from those present.558  G. F. Symonds 
joined Burgin and Lennox-Boyd in supporting this stance, arguing that the extra time gained at 
Munich was ensuring that the country was prepared.559  The extra time argument was not present in 
the county or the country at the time of Munich and according to Herman Morris, did not develop in 
the historiography of Munich until after the German invasion of Czechoslovakia.560  This adds to the 
evidence for this argument, though evidence from the BIPO poll in February suggests that it was 
beginning to develop. 
 
The Liberals and Labour continued to express opposition to the government’s policy.  Thomas Lodge 
abandoned the caution that he had shown previously.  In a speech to the Bedford Women’s Liberal 
Association, he questioned Chamberlain’s supposed reversal of policy towards one of ‘collective 
security’.  He expanded on this argument in a letter to the Bedfordshire Times, stating that it was 
impossible for Chamberlain to advocate a policy that he had previously rejected.561  Lodge was not 
the only person to question the government’s sincerity.  Norman Mickle voiced a similar concern 
whilst speaking about the guarantee to Poland.  He described the response as tardy and questioned 
whether they would maintain it.562  E. A. Richards called on the local MPs to step down, to help unite 
the country.563  
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Initial condemnation of Germany’s actions also occurred in Fulham and Hammersmith.  The West 
London Observer’s editorial on 17 March reported that ‘public opinion was shocked by a further 
show of force from Germany’.564  The paper continued a week later, arguing that Britain needed to 
rely on her own strength.  However, it defended the Munich agreement as the only possible solution 
at the time.565  This was not the only defence of Munich amongst ‘informed’ opinion.  Leonard 
Caplan, the prospective Conservative candidate for North Hammersmith, defended the agreement 
by saying that it had served its purpose, namely preventing Britain from being blamed for not trying 
to keep the peace.566  However, William Astor did not defend the Munich agreement but referred to 
the indignation in Britain about German actions and the improvements in British defences.  This 
continued the theme of rearmament.  Labour, who adopted a ‘we told you so’ tone in the East 
Fulham Citizen, did not share the local Conservative support for the government’s position.567  
Joining Labour’s criticism was A. F. Johnson, a resident of Shepherd’s Bush.  In a letter to the West 
London Observer, he accused Britain of breaking her word to defend Czechoslovakia and only being 
prepared to fight to defend its national interest.568  Following the initial reaction, discussion turned 
to consider the British response.  Henry Meulen welcomed the adoption of a form of collective 
security, arguing that its earlier adoption might have led to a different outcome.  He urged the 
people of Hammersmith to support the work of the LNU, who were advocating a policy of 
resistance.569  ‘Peace Front’ questioned the government’s adoption of this policy given recent Nazi 
triumphs including the annexation of Czechoslovakia and the return of Memel.  He, like others 
previously, urged an alliance with the Soviet Union.570  
 
M-O returned to Fulham in March 1939 to undertake some further research, asking respondents 
three questions: whether they were for or against Chamberlain’s foreign policy, whether home or 
foreign affairs were more important, and whether they thought war was likely.  In response to the 
first question, people over 45 from both genders supported Chamberlain’s policy more than did 
those under 45.  However, 55% of respondents who offered no opinion on this question were 
women.  This represented an overall increase of 15% on a year earlier and reinforced the continuing 
precedence in the public mind of home affairs over foreign affairs.  The file report on this work 
indicated that whilst a small minority were taking a greater interest, most were employing 
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psychological defences as a coping mechanism. 571  In response to the final question, men believed 
that war was likely, whilst women again tended to offer no opinion.  Those that did answer believed 
that war was likely to occur. 572  The additional comments accompanying the answers were not as 
wide ranging as previously, though there was a general impression that ‘there was a need to stop 
Hitler’. 573   The previous September had seen similar comments but the numbers holding this view 
had increased to the point that it had become the dominant opinion.  M-O offer no opinion within 
the file report as to why women did not or were not prepared to offer an opinion.  However, based 
on evidence from around the time of the West Fulham by-election in March 1938, women tended to 
be more interested in domestic affairs as these had a more direct impact upon their daily lives.   
 
The political attitudes displayed in Fulham and Hammersmith showed a continuing divide between 
the main political parties with the Conservatives developing the buying time argument.  The shift in 
the government’s policy towards one of resistance did not carry enough conviction for Labour and 
some letter writers to the West London Observer.  To do so would require an alliance with the Soviet 
Union. 
 
 
Prior to the crisis, the Bolton Evening News editorial commented upon Sir Samuel Hoare’s speech 
about a five-power, five-year plan to restore confidence.  It was critical, as this was unlikely given the 
attitude of two of the powers, but viewed it as significant that the Soviet Union was included.  Even 
Churchill had been converted to this view.574  The editorial on 14 March referred to Churchill.  The 
context was Chamberlain’s rebuttal of Churchill’s suggestion that the Czech state was unlikely to 
have a future.  The editorial gleefully noted that Churchill had been correct,575 as it became reality 
the following day, thereby allowing the editorial to state that Churchill was justified in adopting an ‘I 
told you so’ attitude.  The editorial called upon Chamberlain to take the public into his confidence, as 
they were not fools and called for the realities of the situation to be realised.576  On 16 March, an 
interview with John Tillotson (a member of the family that owned the Bolton Evening News) 
appeared in the paper and a day later in the Bolton Journal and Guardian.  He described his 
impressions of a recent trip to Central Europe.  He had spoken to a Czech man just prior to the 
invasion, who did not think it would happen.  He had also formed the impression that the countries 
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surrounding Germany had developed a deep mistrust and hatred of Germany.577 
 
Mr S Gordon shared the editorial’s concerns in relation to future British policy, when he addressed a 
meeting of the Bolton Central Labour Guild.  He recommended an alliance with the United States but 
made no mention of the Soviet Union.578  Walter Atkinson, a resident of Bolton, also suggested this 
course of action, urging that whatever action was required should be undertaken urgently.579  
Developments over the weekend concerning Romania only added to this urgency.  The editorial on 
20 March concentrated on the need to persuade Poland to turn away from the Axis as a way of 
helping to preserve Romania.  Britain had to either undertake this or accept German control of 
Eastern Europe.580 
 
In common with their counterparts in the other two geographical areas, Bolton’s Conservative MPs 
continued to support Chamberlain.  Prior to his address, the Bolton Evening News581 challenged Cyril 
Entwistle to provide answers to electors who were nervous about Chamberlain’s policy.  The 
editorial argued that a strong condemnation of Hitler would reflect badly on Entwistle’s own 
judgement for supporting Chamberlain.  In response, he reaffirmed his support and dismissed the 
argument that Chamberlain’s policy had caused the situation.  Entwistle expressed doubts about 
Russia and confessed that he had never trusted Hitler.582  The editorial responded by questioning 
what Chamberlain had achieved at Munich and suggesting that it was unfair to cast doubts on the 
reliability of the Soviet Union.583  ‘Realist’, who hoped that people did not think that the Soviet Union 
was democratic, joined the debate.  Like Mr Gordon, ‘Realist’ advocated an alliance of the 
democracies.584       
 
M-O observers in Bolton recorded comments reacting to Chamberlain’s speech in Birmingham on 17 
March.  The comments were once again a mixture of praise for Chamberlain and anger at Hitler, a 
theme that had grown in prominence over the year since the Anschluss:585 
 
 Working class man, 50 – Chamberlain doesn’t want bloodshed, I don’t want bloodshed, but 
he (Hitler) is shiting on us and rubbing the shite in. 
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 Town hall clerk, 30 – a good deal of discussion; people liked it. 
 Hairdresser – everyone talking about Chamberlain’s speech.  A real fighting speech, and very 
good.  Doesn’t want war though. 
 Girl, 25 – but why doesn’t some murderer, someone who has been convicted, go out and 
shoot Hitler.  Though I suppose that would be as bad. 
 Man, 50 – no, but I’ve read all the reports.  It’s only what I expected all along.  Hitler will 
never keep his word. 
 Youth, 20 – no, but I’ve read the summary of it.  He’s found out 6 months too late that Hitler 
can’t be trusted.  
 
 
 
The response to the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in all three areas was that the time had 
come to resist further aggression.  In letters, and especially street comments, there was a definite 
mood for stopping Hitler, though reluctance for a potential conflict remained.  However, comments 
recorded in Fulham confirmed that people accepted the idea that war was coming and that it would 
be against Germany.   
 
 
The response to the March 1939 crisis was different from that to the Munich crisis in terms of 
church attendance, which was notably down.  As the impact on the individual was less in March 
1939, a comparison to the Sunday after the Anschluss is more appropriate.  The outcome is a 
mixture.  Attendance in Bedfordshire fluctuated, whilst in Fulham and Hammersmith, attendance 
remained similar or had increased.  In Bolton, there was a general rise in terms of four churches in 
Table 2, though this is part of a wider sample.  Overall, the Munich crisis had the most impact on 
attendance at church, mainly because of its potential impact on the individual having been greater.   
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Table 2: Church attendance following a crisis586 
  
13/03/1938 02/10/1938 19/03/1939 
St Andrew's Luton 80 173 67 
St Peter's Luton 53 61 52 
St Christopher's Luton 60 127 75 
Christchurch Luton 105 245 130 
St Peter  Bedford 46 140 74 
St Paul's Bedford 174 224 142 
St Martin Bedford 81 133 55 
St Mary's Bedford 111 174 104 
St Andrews Fulham 49 100 47 
All Saints Fulham 135 328 198 
Christchurch Fulham 54 163 87 
St Mary's Fulham n/a 187 95 
St Mary's Bolton 37 99 64 
Bolton Parish Church Bolton 40 197 45 
St Barts Bolton 29 150 173 
St George's Bolton 23 192 38 
     
 
 
The period covered by this chapter witnessed an increasing mistrust of future German intentions, 
coupled with a growing feeling about the need to resist Hitler.  This continued a trend that is 
traceable back to February 1938.  Kristallnacht was a major catalyst in this process, as it produced a 
moral revulsion against, and indignation at the attack on the Jewish community in Germany but 
changed little in relation to British foreign policy.  Moral revulsion was the dominant expression of 
those who commented at local level.  However, it is notable that a handful of people were prepared 
to defend German actions, despite vilification from fellow letter writers.  Associated with 
Kristallnacht is the wider attitude of the British people towards the Jews.  Here, M-O found that 
there was a hidden level of anti-Semitic feeling, some of which is detectable in local newspapers.  
The recurring concern in all three geographical areas was the perceived impact on British jobs, 
though correspondents highlighted that immigrants had restrictions placed on them that limited 
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their ability to work.  This did not prevent A. Shaw in Bedfordshire from highlighting the supposed 
practice of laying off British workers to take on Jews.  The ‘threat’ to jobs was only one side of the 
argument, as Rabbi Livingstone reminded his audience.  Jews were also creating jobs for British 
workers.  A defence of this nature appeared in Fulham and Hammersmith but not in Bolton.  
Concerns about employment did not prevent people desiring to assist, with stories in all three areas 
about relief efforts.  Much of the relief work was collecting money, which drew complaints in Fulham 
and Bolton about the diverting of funds away from those who needed relief in Britain.  The 
conflicting attitudes, as in the case of the Munich crisis, are traceable to the potential impact upon 
the individual.  The lack of a substantial Jewish population in any of the three areas prevents a more 
detailed investigation. 
 
The attack on the Jewish community added substantially to the sense of mistrust towards Germany. 
Actual evidence of this during the winter months is lacking at a local level with the debate focussing 
on British foreign policy.  Here, Conservatives continued to defend Chamberlain, arguing that his 
actions had preserved peace and allowed time for rearmament, an argument that only began to 
come to the fore in March 1939.  This confirms the findings of Morris.587  Labour and the Liberals 
remained critical, with similar arguments used in all three areas, and references made to collective 
security following events in March 1939.  Both parties cautiously welcomed the apparent change in 
government policy but neither trusted the government, especially Chamberlain to keep his word.  
However, political parties were not the main local critics of the government.  This task fell to the 
Bolton Evening News, whose editorials during the winter months constantly questioned government 
policy and advocated the need for resistance.  Therefore, all of them felt justified in March 1939 
when it became a case of ‘we told you so’. 
 
Disagreements between the political parties also occurred over the Soviet Union.  The Left generally 
supported an alliance, though this call was virtually non-existent in Bedfordshire compared to the 
other two areas.  Conservatives questioned the Left’s support for an alliance, as they did not 
consider the Soviet Union to be a reliable ally.  Letter writers to local newspapers aired similar 
concerns, suggesting that an alternative course would be an alliance between the democracies.  This 
was evident in Fulham and Bolton.  The question of the Soviet Union would receive increased 
attention between April and August 1939. 
 
One interesting argument that emerged during the chapter, especially in relation to Bolton and the 
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Bolton Evening News, is that the policy pursued at Munich was the only viable one.  Given the 
paper’s constant criticism of Chamberlain’s policy, this is a revealing admission.  There was further 
evidence of critics changing their mind in Bedfordshire, as evidence emerged about the state of the 
nation’s defences.  This conclusion was in keeping with the views of politicians such as Robert Page-
Croft, who recognised that Britain’s inability to prevent a military invasion meant that it had no 
choice.  He added to this view by arguing that Chamberlain’s actions had been a victory as they 
helped to change people’s attitudes and weaken the psychology of defeat.588  Croft’s point of view is 
open to interpretation but the argument does have its merits, as British attitudes did become more 
resolute about confronting Hitler and, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, helped to 
encourage participation in defence preparations.  However, a direct link is difficult to establish, given 
the reaction to the events of Kristallnacht. 
 
The attitudes displayed in the three geographical areas in the months following the Munich 
agreement were remarkably similar with little divergence.  Any divergence tended to be in terms of 
coverage of a subject by local newspapers.  The example of the Bolton Evening News and criticism of 
Chamberlain’s policy is a case in point.  The presence of M-O also had an impact on the level of 
detail in the coverage.  The organisation recorded comments made in the streets of Bolton and 
Fulham that are not available from other sources.  These combined with survey data confirm that 
attitudes in these two areas were hardening and there were increasing demands for Hitler to be 
stopped.  However, a desire to avoid war remained.   
 
In conclusion, the winter of 1939 was not a turning point but there was an increasing uniformity of 
opinion in the three geographical areas about the need to resist Hitler.  This found increased support 
due to Kristallnacht and the breaking of the Munich agreement.  The German invasion of Prague did 
not mark a sea change in British opinion but rather the coming to the fore of forces that had been 
building for the better part of a year.  This period and the months following it had shown an 
increasing interest in relations with the Soviet Union, and these would be a key aspect of the 
remaining months of peace before the war that many now agreed was likely finally arrived.589  
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Chapter 4: Let Battle Commence, April – September 1939 
 
The British guarantee to Poland and the doubling of the TA were the first steps towards a policy of 
active resistance to Germany.  Further guarantees to and alliances with Romania, Greece and Turkey 
added to this.  However, to make these effective, Britain needed to seek an alliance with the Soviet 
Union, a step that many within the leadership of the Conservative Party were reluctant to pursue 
with any meaningful intent.  This was part of a long-standing mistrust of the Soviet Union, as Soviet 
ideology went against the principles of the ruling elites in Britain.590  This meant that interwar 
relations were lukewarm, partly resulting from the policy of each country being at odds with the 
other.  British policy aimed to prevent the spread of communism.  This attitude had several 
manifestations including the refusal to join any pact of mutual assistance that the Soviet Union was 
part of, a stance that contributed to the failure of the League’s collective security ideal.591  Adding to 
this was Chamberlain’s belief that communism posed the longer-term threat to Europe.592  This has 
led Clement Leibovitz and Alvin Finkel to argue that Chamberlain deliberately tried to turn Hitler 
eastwards,593 an argument that has a degree of plausibility given similar comments by Sally Marks 
and Andrew Rothstein.594  The arguments of Leibovitz and Finkel gain further credence when 
evidence used by Geoffrey Roberts is included.  Roberts refers to a letter on 4 April from Litvinov, 
the then Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London.  In 
the letter, Litvinov feared that Chamberlain was directing Hitler towards the Soviet Union, thereby 
leading to the Soviet-German clash he wanted.595  The British leadership also had doubts about the 
military value of the Soviet Union.  In a 2013 article, Martin Kahn provides a good summary of 
existing work on this topic indicating that British leaders portrayed the Soviet Union as being 
militarily worthless without revealing the precise basis for this conclusion.  Part of this was down to 
Chamberlain.596  With this attitude, the fear that countries bordering the Soviet Union had of it, and 
despite public support, it is no surprise that Britain only made a half-hearted effort to obtain an 
alliance.  The British government did eventually open talks with the Soviet Union but in addition the 
Soviet Union began secret talks with Germany.  To Britain’s amazement, this resulted in the Nazi-
Soviet Pact, which Germany had hoped would weaken British resolve to resist but had the opposite 
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effect.  It marked the beginning of the final chain of events that would lead to the British declaration 
of war on Sunday 3 September.   
 
 
This chapter moves away from the emphasis thus far, which has been on British attitudes to 
Germany.  This step is necessary to take into consideration the wider context of British foreign policy 
during 1939.  The chapter examines the level of ‘public’ support for an alliance with the Soviet 
Union, using a range of sources and highlights some of the concerns of those who did not wish to 
rush blindly into an alliance.  These people normally had some connection with the Conservative 
Party, thus reinforcing much of the existing historiography, which highlights the party leadership’s 
reluctance to purse alliance negotiations with any meaningful intent.  In addition to considering the 
call for a Soviet alliance, the chapter will highlight the continuation of two themes that have already 
established themselves in the previous chapters: the growing dislike of Hitler amongst the British 
public and the continuing desire to avoid war coupled with a growing acceptance that it might be 
necessary.  The culmination of these two forces would be a reluctant declaration of war combined 
with a determination to see the conflict through to a conclusion.   
 
 
 
Britain’s reluctance to engage with the Soviet Union continued for a few days after the German 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, when it rejected a Soviet suggestion of a meeting to establish a ‘peace 
front’.  Britain believed that the suggestion was premature, but it would not be long before Britain 
increased its efforts to obtain an alliance, as the Soviet Union was important in terms of manpower, 
raw materials, and potential assistance with an economic blockade of Germany.  The government’s 
reluctance was clear in its responses to Parliamentary questions between mid-March and the end of 
May.  Rather than commit to a definite course of action, the government preferred to say that the 
situation was under review, though Ministers stressed that they were not prepared to consider using 
the League. 
 
During this time, the government, Chamberlain particularly, came under pressure from a range of 
quarters to open negotiations, including from within the Cabinet.597  Opinion polls, which had little 
influence on Chamberlain, indicated that the majority of respondents favoured an alliance with the 
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Soviet Union.  Responses to questions in March, April and June indicated over 80% in favour.598   
Eventually, Chamberlain bowed to pressure and agreed to the opening of negotiations, though the 
government continued to remain tight lipped in Parliament, despite several Parliamentary questions, 
as it did not want to jeopardise the negotiations.599  This represented a continuation of the attitude 
displayed during the Munich crisis, with a further reason provided in a letter from Chamberlain to his 
sister, Ida, on 21 May.  He wrote: 
 
‘I have had a very tiresome week over the Russians, whose method of conducting 
negotiations includes the publication in the press of all their dispatches and continuous close 
communication with the Opposition and Winston.  They may just be simple, straightforward 
people but I cannot rid myself of the suspicion that they are chiefly concerned with seeing 
the capitalist powers tear each other to pieces while they stay out themselves’. 600       
Chamberlain was not alone in expressing concerns, as mistrust of the Soviet Union was widespread 
amongst conservative elites.  Leaders of the Christian churches wrote to Halifax urging him to use his 
influence to stop the negotiations.  James Walsh, editor of the Catholic Times, wrote of his concern 
about being forced to choose between ‘duty to God and fighting for the advocate of the anti-God.601  
Political leaders from the Dominions joined church leaders in Britain, as Canada and South Africa 
objected to the opening of talks, though Australia and New Zealand cautiously welcomed them.602  
The government attempted to allay some of the Dominions’ fears by suggesting to the Soviet Union 
that any agreement should be compatible with the League Covenant.  Molotov, the new Soviet 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, rejected this, as he was worried that it would prevent any agreement.  
To speed up the negotiations, the Foreign Office official William Strang went to Moscow.  The move, 
whilst welcomed, led to criticism that Halifax himself should have gone as the negotiations 
continued to drag on.  Around this time, rumours began to circulate about talks between Germany 
and the Soviet Union, though Chamberlain still did not believe that ‘a real alliance between Germany 
and Russia was possible’.603   
 
Given the government’s initial reluctance to open negotiations and a continued Parliamentary 
silence when negotiations did commence, some MPs, notably Philip Noel-Baker (Labour MP for 
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Derby), Hugh Dalton (Labour’s spokesman on foreign affairs) and Geoffrey Mander (Liberal MP for 
Wolverhampton East), became increasingly concerned about the lack of progress.  Noel-Baker 
referred to the public anxiety about the lack of an agreement and requested publication of the 
details so that Parliament and the public could make up their own minds about where the blame lay.  
Chamberlain responded that this step would impede the negotiations.604  MPs were not alone in 
questioning the government’s commitment.  Following events in March, Otto Berkelbach published 
an article in the May issue of the journal Nineteenth Century and After, which ended with the 
question ‘what about the Russians?’.  He argued that by ignoring them, Britain was likely to suffer.605 
 
Within the correspondence columns of the two national newspapers used for this study, there was 
active discussion.  This occurred principally over two subjects: the Soviet Union and the need to 
broaden the government.  Coverage by The Times and the Manchester Guardian of the Soviet Union 
followed a similar pattern to their coverage of the Moscow show trials, a subject examined by Peter 
Deli.  He found that The Times was not interested in the trials whereas letters in the Manchester 
Guardian covered both sides of the debate.606  In the letters column of The Times, in contrast, 
coverage focussed on Germany.  Here, writers such as Duff Cooper and Viscount Cranborne objected 
to any further appeasement of Germany, which reflected the change in The Times’s editorial 
position.607  The silence on the Soviet Union was occasionally broken, however.  Edwyn Bevan, a 
member of the Athenaeum Club on Pall Mall, and the Conservative MP for Hitchin, Sir Arnold 
Wilson, noted the mistrust of countries bordering the Soviet Union towards it and that any alliance 
would be at the expense of the goodwill of these states.608  By contrast, the Manchester Guardian 
columns were much more active.  The letters published between March and May favoured an 
alliance but recognised that this would be difficult to achieve.  Amongst the letters was one from A. L 
Rowse, the Oxford historian and Labour candidate for Penryn and Falmouth, who warned that it 
would be difficult to blame the Russians, as previous appeasing acts gave the impression that the 
government was anti-Russian.609  Part of this stemmed from the belief that each country would act 
in its own national interest.     
 
The second major theme in both papers was the need to broaden the government to include 
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Churchill and Eden.  In The Times, J. A. Spender and Harold MacMillan were amongst the supporters 
of this idea,610 whilst in the Manchester Guardian letters appeared from M. F. Matthews, a resident 
of Silverdale, and Phullis Bottome, a resident of Lexham Gardens in London.611  The rationale behind 
such a move was that it would improve the government’s trustworthiness and send a clear signal of 
British intentions.  Letter writers were not the only supporters of the idea of including Churchill.  The 
BIPO opinion poll for May indicated that 56% of those questioned supported the idea,612 leading 
William Rock to conclude that the public backed the Soviet alliance negotiations.613 
 
 
At the local level, newspaper coverage in Bedfordshire highlighted various parties support for the 
need to conclude a Soviet alliance quickly.  Councillor Roberts, chair of the Luton Labour Party, and 
Hugh Cumberland, ruling councillor of the Luton Habitation of the Primrose League,614 were just two 
of the supporters of this view.  The latter declared that such an agreement would ‘make the 
dictators think twice’.615   Declarations of support continued in May and alongside these declarations 
came criticisms of government policy.  George Matthews, the prospective Labour candidate for Mid-
Bedfordshire, attacked Lennox-Boyd for being anti-Communist,616 and Councillor Skelton, a Labour 
councillor in Luton, advocated an alliance with the Soviet Union and blamed the government for the 
situation during a talk to the Luton Youth Group of the LNU.617 Similarly, in June, Thomas Lodge 
criticised Chamberlain for the lack of an arrangement with the Soviet Union despite the Liberals 
having no love for that country.  Lodge supported an alliance as the Soviet Union stood for peace.618   
Lodge also accused Lennox-Boyd of continually changing his attitude towards collective security.  
This had gone from being favourable in 1935 to against in 1938 and favourable again in 1939 as he 
moved to supporting resistance to Hitler.619  However, by 1939 League collective security was no 
longer a policy opinion.  In contrast, the county’s two Conservative MPs continued to support 
Chamberlain’s policy.  Sir Richard Wells acknowledged that people desired an alliance with the 
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Soviet Union but felt that it was too soon.620  He argued that Chamberlain was not prepared to force 
the strength of the Soviets on to others.621  The two Conservative MPs accepted the need for allies, 
but doubted the value and reliability of the Soviet Union. 
 
In July, the annual British Legion services took place within the county.  Reports on these services 
noted that the crowds were larger than in previous years, with several thousand gathering in 
Luton.622   The theme chosen by speakers giving the address was national unity, an aim that ‘the 
spread of a quiet determination to resist further acts of aggression’ was achieving.623  ‘Ex-
servicemen’ hoped this would prevent a conflict.624  The theme of national unity also featured when 
the Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, and Leslie Burgin spoke at events in the county, the latter 
stressing that the point of ‘this far and no further’ had been reached.625  Yet mistrust of Chamberlain 
and the government hampered such appeals.  George Matthews echoed the concerns voiced in the 
national press about the Parliamentary recess.  On 11 August, the Bedfordshire Times reported his 
suspicion that Chamberlain did not want the House to remain in session as he was intending to do a 
super-Munich type deal.  W. M. Howell, President of Luton Trades Council, shared this concern in his 
annual report for 1939.626  It was in this atmosphere that the final developments on the road to war 
occurred. 
 
By the time of George Matthews’s speech on 11 August, the Free City of Danzig had become the 
focus of attention.  Coverage of this story had been ongoing throughout July and August with regular 
references to it in the Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph editorials.  At the start of July, the editorial 
viewed Germany’s designs on Danzig as sinister but felt that the option to negotiate a peaceful 
resolution remained.627  The emphasis on finding a peaceful resolution was a feature of editorial 
coverage during these last two months but with a clear emphasis that a settlement depended upon 
Hitler,628 for as the editorial on 22 July stated, ‘he started the European tension and only he can end 
it’.629  Given the reports and editorials that appeared in the paper following this comment, it was 
clear that a major crisis was coming.  Germany blamed Britain, arguing that Germany would have 
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settled matters had it not been for Britain and France’s support for Poland.630  However, given 
previous experience, Britain stood firm.  The dynamics of the situation changed with the signing of 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which came as a surprise to many and created a situation ‘that many deemed 
impossible’.  Nonetheless, the paper continued to urge that the option of a negotiated settlement 
remained.631  This hope continued for the next few days, during which time the editorial moved to 
stressing that in its opinion, Britain had united behind the government and that the country would 
continue to support Poland.  Reinforcing this point were the words used to finish the editorial, ‘while 
we hope for the best, as a united nation, we face the future calmly and determinedly prepared for 
any eventuality of duty in the cause of world liberty and freedom’.632  The paper’s editorials in the 
months leading up to the German invasion of Poland on 1 September had provided a clear message 
to readers, that whilst Britain hoped for a peaceful resolution, the country would do its duty and 
resist the threat posed by Nazi Germany. 
 
Danzig and the Nazi-Soviet Pact also received coverage in the paper’s news columns.  Following the 
signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Thomas Lodge argued that Hitler was likely to reject any deal over 
Danzig.633  However, the front page of the Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph on 26 August referred 
to the pacifist and former Labour leader, George Lansbury.  He hoped that the government would 
examine Hitler’s proposals with an open mind and considered that to preserve peace Britain would 
need to make sacrifices on the scale that she had compelled Czechoslovakia to accept the previous 
year.  Lansbury’s appeal came at a garden party held by the Luton Labour Party.634  
 
In summary, for the first time in Bedfordshire, the government’s opponents led the way, as 
previously government supporters had had the largest say in the local newspapers.  Labour and the 
Liberals both supported an alliance with the Soviet Union.  Opponents of the government welcomed 
the adoption of a collective-security policy but expressed concerns about whether the government 
would stick to it, due to its general hostility towards the Soviet Union.  The county’s National 
Government MPs were clear supporters of Chamberlain and the policy that he was pursuing, though 
they recognised the potential value of the Soviet Union.  However, they were not keen supporters of 
an alliance.   
 
The campaign in Bedfordshire for an alliance with the Soviet Union had come from the Left, a 
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situation replicated in Fulham and Hammersmith.  Thus, the West London Post appealed for the 
ignoring of ideological differences so that Britain could obtain access to the strength of the Soviet 
Union.635  S. A. Cook, a resident of Silchester Road, agreed with this and argued that by doing so it 
would make itself stronger but the Cabinet’s class bias prevented this from happening.636  Edith 
Summerskill agreed, arguing that Chamberlain was doing his utmost to avoid an alliance.637  
Similarly, Denis Pritt warned at several meetings that building an alliance with the Soviet Union 
would be difficult due to the government’s hostility, and that the Soviet Union would act in its own 
interests.  In contrast, Pritt argued that the nature of the Soviet regime was not a problem for the 
Labour Party, as for the party the most important thing was that the Soviet Union desired peace.638 
 
Chamberlain’s critics did not have it all their own way.  J. Douglas Cooke, in an address to the South 
Hammersmith Conservative Associations AGM, defended the Prime Minister, and the meeting sent a 
resolution to Chamberlain, thanking him for his continuing efforts for peace while making no 
mention of a potential alliance with the Soviet Union.639  Criticism of those who favoured an alliance 
came from Richard Rice, a resident of Chiswick, who argued that the Soviets were worse than the 
Germans and that their chief aim was to destroy the British Empire.640  Conservatives in Fulham 
likewise maintained a silence on the question of a Soviet alliance, as neither Colonel Van Den Bergh, 
the President of the East Fulham Conservative Association, not William Astor mentioned it in 
speeches to the Association in April.641 
 
The Left and the supporters of a Soviet alliance continued their campaign into June, when J. Boam, a 
resident of Wallingford Avenue, wrote to the West London Observer pondering why the ruling 
classes were refusing to make a pact.  Given past behaviour, he believed that the Soviets had every 
right to be suspicious of Britain.642  A week later at a meeting of the Fulham Left Book Club, Victor 
Gollancz argued that an alliance was essential to counterbalance the Axis powers,643 a challenge that 
Michael Stewart, the prospective Labour candidate for East Fulham, believed to be the most 
important facing the country.644  Similarly, in August, ‘Hammersmith Worker’ alleged that 
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Chamberlain had more in common with Hitler than Stalin did.645     
 
By contrast, Conservatives continued to show their support for the government.  Deputising for their 
son, William Astor, who was away on national service, Lord and Lady Astor spoke at a large meeting 
at Fulham Town Hall.  Lord Astor outlined the main differences between Munich and now, arguing 
that Britain was in a better state defensively.  This lends credence to Herman Morris’s argument that 
the ‘buying time’ defence of Munich only developed after March 1939.646  Lord Astor’s reference to 
the Soviet negotiations however, provoked cries of ‘shame’ from the audience, but Lady Astor 
attacked Chamberlain’s opponents for criticising him as it gave the impression of divisions within 
Britain (and given the disagreements about a Soviet alliance, there probably were).647 
 
The two subjects largely missing from local coverage were Churchill and Danzig, as in Bedfordshire.  
Regular letter writer Bernard Jolivard, raised the question of Danzig at the end of July, arguing for its 
return to Germany as it had a majority German population unlike Czechoslovakia and that such a 
move would not threaten Britain.648  On the same day, a letter from ‘X.Y.Z.’ voiced suspicions that 
Germany was preparing for peace on Germany’s terms and that Hitler had to have been convinced 
that Britain was determined to prevent him or ‘he would have undoubtedly marched into Danzig by 
now’.  This letter suggested that things were coming to a head but that the German people also 
desired peace.649  The discussion in the West London Observer then subsided until 18 August, when 
Jolivard maintained that ‘Danzig and the Corridor are as German as Manchester is English’ and that 
Germany should have them.  However, P. Brent challenged Jolivard’s earlier claims about the 
population of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, acknowledging the Danzig figure but insisting that the 
residents of the Corridor were 95% Polish.650 
 
The alignment of opinion in the London boroughs had similarities to that in Bedfordshire, with a 
divide between the political parties.  The Left and a selection of letter writers supported an alliance 
with the Soviet Union, primarily because it would increase the military strength available to Britain 
with which to contain Germany.  The other attraction of the Soviet Union to the Left, especially 
Labour, was that it wanted peace, through collective action if necessary.  The collective security 
approach had been a central plinth of Labour’s alternative policy, though mention of it had 
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diminished during 1939.  The Left also displayed realism by acknowledging that an alliance would be 
difficult to achieve due to the government’s attitude towards the Soviet Union.  Based on the 
evidence from Fulham and Hammersmith, such lack of trust in the government was justified.  
Conservative speakers made very few references to the Soviet Union.  Instead, they framed their 
defence of Chamberlain in terms of rearmament and the time bought at Munich, meaning that 
Britain was in a better position to fight.  On the question of Churchill, both sides remained silent. 
 
 
Discussion in Bolton of the question of a Soviet alliance began following the announcement of the 
guarantee to Poland.  The lack of Soviet participation in the guarantee concerned the Bolton Evening 
News editorial on 5 April, as without it there was a lack of military and strategic strength.651  The 
announcement of further guarantees to Greece and Romania brought further disappointment for 
the editorial as again no mention was made of the Soviet Union, thereby creating the impression of 
hostility towards it.652  A letter from C. N. Green, a resident of Tonge Moor, reinforced the suspicions 
of hostility towards the Soviet Union voiced by the paper.  Green’s letter quoted a selection of 
statistics about pig iron exports, which were required for rearmament.  The statistics showed that 
Britain’s exports to Germany had risen from 2,332 tonnes between March and August 1938 to 
39,203 tonnes in the six months between September 1938 and February 1939.  Belgium and France 
had also increased their exports to Germany, a shocking revelation now that Britain was resisting 
further German aggression.653 
 
The Bolton Evening News editorials were not the only ones to voice criticisms of the government.  
The local Labour and Liberal parties also made criticisms.  Alderman J. P. Taylor, speaking at the 
Bolton Liberal Association AGM, asserted that other nations did not believe that Britain’s word could 
be trusted.654  The political column in the Farnworth Weekly Journal, written from the Liberal 
perspective, argued that there was now a chance to make collective security a reality and criticised 
the government for having previously rejected a policy based on the League.655  However, these two 
Liberal comments did not refer directly to the Soviet Union and neither did Labour.  In a 5 May 
resolution, Labour merely protested about the introduction of conscription and called upon the 
government to seek agreements with others to meet the fascist challenge.656  The lack of advocacy 
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from the local Labour Party is surprising, although direct references to the Soviet Union came from 
letter writers to the Bolton Evening News.  There, Robert Davies, a local Communist supporter, 
argued that the Soviet Union desired peace and was crucial to resolving the situation.657  ‘H.T.’ joined 
Davies in supporting an alliance that bridged the ideological divide, as this was required to prevent 
war.658  In contrast, ‘T.W.D.’ urged those favouring an alliance to show caution and carefully consider 
the Soviet Union as an ally.  ‘T.W.D.’ believed that any victory would result in Eastern Europe coming 
under communist rule.659  His letter resulted in a request from ‘H.T.’ to suggest an alternative means 
of obtaining collective security that included the Soviet Union.660  This exchange contrasted with the 
previous situation in which Chamberlain’s supporters had challenged opponents for an alternative 
policy.  Yet, ‘T.W.D.’ was not alone in questioning the need for an alliance.  Alf Gillett, responding to 
Robert Davies, stated that ‘if Chamberlain’s pro-fascist policy avoids war then it is good’.661  In 
general, clear statements in favour of, or against an alliance with the Soviet Union were lacking in 
Bolton, though there was support for a broader collective security arrangement with other countries 
including the Soviet Union. 
 
Discussion about the Soviet Union continued in the Bolton Evening News for the remaining months 
of peace.  On 1 June, ‘A London Man’s Diary’ noted that the Soviet Union was struggling to believe 
Britain’s resolve to resist.  This reinforced the warning given in April that Britain would struggle due 
to its previous attitude.  However, another article on the same day placed the blame on Molotov, 
though it did note that Britain was not able to dictate terms, due to its greater need for an 
alliance.662  The articles indicated a hint of mistrust of the government and suggested that Britain 
was not being sincere in its dealings with the Soviet Union.  One way to overcome these doubts 
would be for Chamberlain to visit Moscow.663  Similarly, an editorial on 23 June voiced suspicions 
about the British attitude and Chamberlain’s particularly.  It feared that he hoped not to conclude a 
deal with the Soviet Union, either that or Stalin was hoodwinking Chamberlain.664  T. Hoban, who 
opposed an agreement, shared such suspicions about Stalin’s motives.665 
 
Mistrust of the government, particularly Chamberlain, was a common theme across the three 
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geographical areas as the negotiations dragged on.  Chamberlain was criticised in The Times by J. A. 
Spender, which ‘Domini’ referred to in a letter to the Bolton Evening News.  ‘Domini’ argued that it 
appeared that criticism of Chamberlain had become a crime and asked that if, as Chamberlain said, 
members of other parties agreed with him, why not broaden the government to include Eden and 
Churchill?  ‘Domini’ believed that their inclusion would allay some of the Left’s suspicions.666  ‘Mons 
Wallah’ furthered this argument on 24 July by referring to a report from Moscow that detailed the 
ideal British Cabinet in Soviet eyes.  This included Churchill as Prime Minister, Eden as Foreign 
Secretary, and Duff Cooper at the Admiralty.  This line-up would provide reassurance to the Soviet 
Union of Britain’s determination.667  The suggestion to include Churchill in the Cabinet was part of a 
wider national campaign.  The Bolton Evening News editorial on 4 July supported this, as events had 
vindicated Churchill’s attitude and it would be a signal of Britain’s determination, thereby providing 
reassurance to those who doubted Britain’s word.668  However, ‘Think Twice’ rejected the idea of 
including Churchill, arguing that Hitler would react badly to this move, whilst ‘T.H.’ believed that 
Churchill’s inclusion would not strengthen the country but bring about Chamberlain’s downfall.669  
These two letters received responses from ‘Think again’, ‘W.S.’ and William Schober, a resident of 
Salford.670  The latter was particularly critical of Chamberlain.  He believed that Britain had been 
close to war and supported the Soviet Union, as unlike Germany, it had not tried to take over 
Europe. 
 
Mistrust of the government and Chamberlain came to the fore during the debate about the 
Parliamentary recess.  The Bolton Evening News editorial on 3 August stated that Chamberlain had 
taken this as a personal attack, though it believed that the opposition represented the views of the 
public.671  Chamberlain’s fellow Conservatives continued to be angered by attacks on him, as the 
political column in the Farnworth Weekly Journal noted on 11 August (the column was rarely written 
by a Conservative).  The writer went on to argue the usual Opposition points about the move away 
from the League, which had been a prevalent reason for Labour and Liberal opposition to 
Chamberlain’s policy.672 
 
The subject of Danzig was largely missing from discussion in Bolton during July and August 1939.  As 
in Bedfordshire, most of the comment came in the form of editorials.  On 11 July, the Bolton Evening 
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News editorial reiterated Chamberlain’s message that Britain was determined to protect Polish 
independence.673  Discussion then went quiet for about a month before the paper published a letter 
from R. R. Stokes, the Labour MP for Ipswich, which called for a five-power conference.  ‘W.B.’ 
rejected this suggestion on the basis that it was not possible to negotiate with the totalitarian states, 
as the fate of the Munich agreement had demonstrated.674  The lack of discussion in the letters 
column of the paper is surprising given the previous levels of discussion during times of international 
crises.  There is no obvious reason for this differential. 
 
 
The months prior to the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact saw much discussion about the British 
attitude towards the Soviet Union.  Opinion in all three geographical areas showed divisions along 
political lines about the merits of an alliance with the Soviet Union.  The Left broadly supported an 
alliance.  Conservatives were much more cautious, urging caution about such a step.  This caution 
was prevalent amongst senior party leaders, and given the attitude of Chamberlain, added to the 
sense of unease about the sincerity of Britain’s intentions.  The appeals for caution were less obvious 
in Fulham and Hammersmith, mainly due to the absence of William Astor, who was away with the 
Fleet Reserve on national service.  Some impatience with Chamberlain amongst Conservatives was 
detectable, however.  Those in favour of concluding an alliance wanted to do so quickly to send a 
clear message to Germany regarding Britain’s resolve.  Another way of achieving this would have 
been to bring Churchill into the Cabinet.  National newspapers and the Bolton Evening News, alone 
out of the local newspapers used in this study, advocated this step.  This was another method used 
by the paper to further its opposition to Chamberlain’s policy and represented the main difference 
between the geographical areas prior to mid-August.  Overall, opinion was moving towards a sense 
of unity about the need to resist further German aggression but divisions remained about how to 
achieve this.   
 
 
The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact came as a shock, despite rumours and warnings that had been 
circulating since January.  The pact ended British alliance efforts and secretly carved out spheres of 
influence in Eastern Europe.  Prior to the signing of the pact, tension had been building over Danzig 
and there were warnings in the British press that there would be war in August because Germany 
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willed it.675   All of this occurred prior to, or during the Parliamentary recess, which had been highly 
controversial, as Arthur Greenwood for Labour argued that the country wanted ‘the watchdogs to 
be on duty’.676   Before Parliament rose, MPs had agreed to a recall if the international situation 
deteriorated, and it duly met following the pact, in what Eden described as ‘a sober mood of 
resolution’.677  The government signed a formal alliance with Poland on 25 August, just as Germany 
again began to increase the pressure.  In the days that followed, attempts at a diplomatic solution 
and war preparations continued.  With the likelihood of war increasing, the signal came for the 
commencement of Operation Pied Piper, the evacuation of children from major cities.  Evacuation 
duly began on 1 September as Germany invaded Poland.  The invasion should have triggered an 
automatic declaration of war.  No declaration was forthcoming, a state of affairs that continued into 
the evening of 2 September when Parliament met and Leo Amery urged Arthur Greenwood to 
‘speak for England’.678  When no declaration was forthcoming, a Cabinet revolt led by the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Sir John Simon and Leslie Burgin, occurred.679  This finally convinced Chamberlain 
that he would have to declare war.  At 9am the next morning, Britain delivered to Germany an 
ultimatum stating that if Germany did not respond by 11am, a state of war would exist.  No 
communication came and a reluctant Britain declared war.   
 
The British public could keep up with developments to some extent via the cinema newsreels.  The 
British Gaumont newsreel on 28 August provided an overview of British policy and a brief history of 
Danzig including information about the dispute.  It also mentioned evacuation plans and the need 
for viewers to play a role in the civil defence forces.680  Three days later the message was that Britain 
was ready for war and the people had united behind its leaders.681  The reiteration of Britain’s 
determination continued following the declaration of war, with a 14 September newsreel showing 
the efforts made to ensure that the country was adequately prepared.682  The newsreel message was 
one of resolution and determination, but how did people feel during the last few days of peace?  In 
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response to the crisis, M-O had asked its panel to begin keeping a diary.  Examination of the 
responses reveals several points:683 
 People were busy with ARP preparations including obtaining material to meet the blackout 
requirements.  Some found that little material was available in the shops.  This included 38% 
of people surveyed in Bolton, who had not done anything due to cost. 
 A sense that Chamberlain was keeping the people in the dark. 
 People were uneasy but hopeful of avoiding war. 
 International affairs were a feature of conversations.  Although war was not wanted, people 
recognised the need to stop Hitler. 
 The announcement of evacuation made people realise that the situation was serious. 
 
The above provides a clear picture of a Britain preparing for a war that it still hoped to avoid.  
Crucially however, people were prepared to accept the need to fight, as events had demonstrated 
that Hitler needed stopping. 
 
 
How to avoid war remained contentious.  Just before the Nazi-Soviet Pact, R. R. Stokes had written 
to the Bedfordshire Times expressing the view that the government needed to take the lead in order 
to get out of the current situation.684  This presumably meant finding a peaceful solution, as the Beds 
and Herts Evening Telegraph stressed on the day that the Nazi-Soviet Pact became public 
knowledge.685   The pact served as a way of strengthening British resolve as it was clear, according to 
Thomas Lodge, that whilst force remained the professed creed, there was a requirement for 
strength to meet it.686  Part of this strength came from being prepared.  Local officials continued to 
reassure people that efforts to resolve the crisis were ongoing, whilst at the same time arranging to 
protect the public, many of whom had not taken any safety measures.687  Owen Hardisty, a worker 
at the Vauxhall factory in Luton, was one such person.  He recorded in his diary at the end of August 
that he was still only planning to dig an air raid shelter in the garden.688  This is a classic case of what 
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one Mass Observer had said back in April 1938, namely that ‘the workers won’t move until it 
comes’,689 a point that Tom Harrisson also made in Living Through the Blitz.690 
 
Regarding the actual declaration of war, the local newspapers in Bedfordshire made little comment.  
The Luton News editorial on 7 September provided a succinct summary, saying that the reaction was 
different from 1914 and there was a determination to see the war through to a conclusion.  As the 
paper put it, there was an underlying sense that ‘these devils must be destroyed’, a reference to the 
Nazis and not to the German people who followed them.691  The calmness described in the Luton 
News is also evident in the book Dunstable and District at War.  P. Underwood described an 
awareness of a shadow over the country during 1939 and heard the declaration with an acceptance 
that the public would just have to get on with it.  However, others had the opposite reaction.  
Christina Scott’s father broke down saying ‘I can’t take this again, we only just got over 1914-18’.  His 
reaction had similarities that to Joyce Smith’s mother, who fainted at the news.692  The book 
contains several other examples like this, which differed from the reports in local newspapers. 
 
 
The fortnight prior to the declaration of war witnessed few expressions of opinion in Bedfordshire.  
Historians know more about Fulham due to four M-O surveys carried out between 22 and 30 August.  
These revealed a rising level of bewilderment from 40% to 55% as the crisis progressed.  The 
explanation provided by M-O for this rise was that the nearer an event such as war came, the less 
likely people were to admit that it was going to occur.  These findings correlated with the Munich 
crisis.  On 22 August, those questioned indicated that 41% believed that the pact had increased the 
chances of war, whilst 39% did not know.  More men than women believed war was likely, whilst 
more women answered, ‘do not know’. 693    Additionally, 59% of men questioned, as against 42% 
overall, stated that more could have been done to prevent the pact, thus implying that Britain was in 
some way to blame.694  The second survey produced comparable results.695  The surveys on 29 and 
30 August included additional questions of news sources and ARP.  By this time, 57% of men and 
73% of women questioned did not believe that war would be shortly forthcoming.  This indicated 
that hopes for peace remained and mirrored the Munich crisis when more people also believed that 
                                                          
689 M-O A: DS602, 'Crisis' (War). 
690 Harrisson, Living through the Blitz: 27. 
691 Luton News, 7 September 1939. 
692 J. Yates and S. King, Dunstable and District at War: From Eyewitness Accounts (Dunstable, 2006): 61, 99 and 
130. 
693 SxMOA: 1/2/25/5/DF, Synopsis, 12 August 1939. 
694 SxMOA: 1/2/66/7/F, Russia Survey, 22 August 1939. 
695 SxMOA: 1/2/66/7/F, Russia Survey, 23 August 1939. 
139 
 
war would not come as the crisis came towards a conclusion. 696   However, both genders were in 
favour of getting any war over with rather than delaying it, a feature of some of the comments made 
to M-O observers.  The comments also show a continuing disdain for Hitler.  Examples include:697 
 Male, 60 – if he touches Poland, we will have to go to war. 
 Male, 30 – the prestige of Britain has sunk since Munich and it will sink again. 
 Male, 50 – if you give him Danzig he’s not satisfied.  He’ll want the corridor.  He’ll do the 
same as he did with the Czechs, take some and then get the lot. 
 Woman, 60 – I’ve just been talking about the subject.  We can’t give Germany all they want.  
We don’t want war but if we let them have what they want, it’ll be worse in the long run. 
 Woman, 45 – have a smack at Hitler and bump him off.  That’s the best thing that could 
happen. 
Surveys were only part of M-O’s work during this period.  It also noted street conversations.  On 27 
August, an observer noted down two conversations that indicate an awareness of the potentially 
dangerous nature of the international situation.  The first occurred between two men aged around 
35 who were watching an aeroplane passing overhead.  One said ‘it’s all right mate, it’s one of ours’ 
to which the other laughed and responded, ‘fucking good job too’.  Another street conversation 
between two men took a very different line.  The 40-year-old man commented ‘you stay at home 
and look after the women’.  The 50-year-old responded ‘fuck the women, I’ve too much with one.  I 
used to run after them but now I am fucking running away from home.  I’d sooner fight the jerry’.698   
 
M-O observers noted the reactions of people around Fulham to the declaration of war on 3 
September.  Two of the people spoken to were a barman at the Castle pub and the proprietor of the 
Roma cafe: 699 
 Barman, 30  –  ay.  It’s started now.  It’s funny isn’t it? He’s a terrible man, isn’t he? He 
should have been put out years ago.  Yes, it is a terrible business.  You don’t know, once it’s 
started, where it will stop. 
 Café proprietor, a Jew of 55 – that man should have been crushed ages ago.  The spirit of the 
country is not what it was in 1914.  We were divided then.  Some were anti-British, some 
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pro-British.  But we are all united now.  He’s got to be crushed. 
 
Alongside these comments was a description of reactions to the first air raid siren of the war.  In a 
café, police advised people to take cover and they began to run frantically.  This reaction contrasted 
to Holland Park where ‘people move quickly to shelter but there is no panic.  Most of the people not 
worried by the raid.  Just take it in their stride’.  The observer continued by noting that the wardens 
did not seem acquainted with the situation. 700  The differing reactions are hard to explain, though 
there appear to have only been a limited number of ARP practices within the borough. 
  
The local newspapers provided a different angle from the evidence collected by M-O.  On 1 and 8 
September, the Fulham Chronicle reported on the speeding up of ARP work around the borough.  
There were reports on line painting, ARP classes to provide basic training, and the work of wardens 
to enforce the blackout.  Reports about the first air raid siren referred to the sense of calm amongst 
people and church services terminating as per the regulations.701  The West London and 
Hammersmith Gazette echoed the sense of calm evident in these reports.  Indeed, on 1 September 
the paper commented on the difference compared to the Munich crisis, when people had cheered 
and booed at the cinema newsreel.  Now people watched in complete silence and there was no rush 
to stock up on goods at the shops.702 
 
The West London Observer made similar points regarding ARP and evacuation but also contained 
comments about British policy.  The editorial on 25 August took heart from the fact that the British 
people had backed the policy of the government and that on 1 September considered that the 
British people had made up their minds about which policy to pursue.703  Even so, the government’s 
policy came in for criticism from Michael Stewart.  He blamed the government for failing to conclude 
an agreement with the Soviet Union, though nonetheless he would be joining up.  He stressed that 
this did not mean that he supported government policy.704  A letter from G. Athelstan Newell, a 
resident of Richmond, echoed the editorial and political comments on the complacent acceptance of 
war that had been apparent in the previous few days.705  Yet although some of the comments 
appearing in the paper went against the idea of a united nation, even those of Michael Stewart 
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showed the people were prepared to fight, an important change compared to a year earlier.   
 
The reaction in Bolton to the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact was one of dismay, as it struck a blow 
against the hopes of forming a peace front against Germany.  The Bolton Evening News questioned 
whether Britain had been the victim of Soviet duplicity and feared that the pact might have a sinister 
meaning for Poland.706  The paper welcomed the recall of Parliament and the passing of an 
emergency powers bill, saying that ‘the almost unanimous support of the House is a reflection of the 
people’.  The paper believed that people now understood that they would not be fighting for some 
city but for the principle of liberty itself.  This made it acceptable to them.707 
The population in Bolton remained calm and optimistic about avoiding war during the last days of 
August.  During this time, M-O surveyed 100 people on three separate days about whether they 
thought there would be war.  
Table 3: ‘Will there be war?’ Response in Worktown, August 1939708 
 War No war Don’t know 
28 August 1939 24 37 39 
29 August 1939 13 39 48 
31 August 1939 18 34 48 
 
Survey respondents in ‘Worktown’ were not as confident as in ‘Metrop’.  Nonetheless, many 
indicated that Hitler had to be stopped otherwise he would want something else.  The mood was 
well summarised by one comment, ‘think we should stop him this time but don’t think there will be 
war.  Think Chamberlain has a bigger following than last year but nobody could stand another 
Munich’.709  This comment reflected the determination to stop Hitler and the need to prevent 
Chamberlain from carrying out another Munich, thereby confirming the mistrust of the Prime 
Minister that had been present in the preceding months. 
 
The German invasion of Poland should have triggered an immediate declaration of war.  To the 
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Bolton Evening News, the course was now clear and Britain would enter the conflict a united nation 
determined to re-establish the rule of law.  People continued to remain calm and placed the blame 
for the situation on Hitler.  One woman told an M-O observer that she hoped that ‘the hell was 
knocked out of him (Hitler)’, whilst a group of builders believed that Hitler was the villain.  Two other 
women were discussing how they would like to torture Hitler.710  If nothing else, there was a unity of 
attitude towards the German leader.  Calmness ensued on 2 September with people anxious to get 
away on their holidays despite the crisis.  However, it had a knock-on effect as military call-ups 
resulted in a shortage of drivers.711     
 
The declaration of war occurred at a time when people were in church or listening to the radio.  
Church attendance was certainly in evidence in Bolton and came at the end of a week when 
churches had been open to enable people to pray for peace.712  The Bolton Evening News described 
these services as well attended,713 a claim that is difficult to verify using the parish registers as 
communion is unlikely to have taken place during these services.  A further example of the calmness 
in Bolton comes from the testimony of Gerald Openshaw, who was working in the telephone 
exchange.  He had purchased a radio so that he could listen to developments and heard the 
declaration of war from the top of a ladder.  However, he and his colleagues continued their work.714   
 
 
The last six months of peace marked a change in the residual public mood to become one that was 
intent on resisting further German aggression.  The catalyst for the emergence of this mood was the 
German invasion of the remainder of Czechoslovakia, which in all three geographical areas was 
condemned.  The existing historiography is therefore correct in identifying March 1939 as a major 
turning point, but it needs acknowledging that this was the culmination of a process that had been 
developing since 1938 rather than the universal change that A. J. P. Taylor claimed it to be in English 
History 1914-1945.715  The German invasion also increased demands, mainly from the Left, for an 
alliance with the Soviet Union, a step that the government was reluctant to take.  This added to the 
existing public mistrust of the government, particularly Chamberlain.  Bedfordshire and the two 
London boroughs displayed elements of this attitude but it was in Bolton that criticism of 
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Chamberlain was strongest, thanks to the Bolton Evening News.  The paper’s editorial column 
remained suspicious of Chamberlain’s policy.  Despite the continuing calls for an alliance, 
government supporters urged caution as they mistrusted the Soviet Union.   
 
An alliance with the Soviet Union would have provided an indication of British resolve to meet the 
German challenge.  A further indication would have been the inclusion of Churchill in the Cabinet, a 
step that Chamberlain resisted fiercely.  Bolton was the only one of the geographical areas to feature 
discussion of this issue, thanks mainly to the letters column in the Bolton Evening News.  The paper 
favoured including Churchill but opponents argued that such a move would antagonise Hitler.  
Chamberlain was keen to avoid this, thereby continuing his pursuit of some form of appeasement. 
 
The question of Danzig in August 1939 was one discussed only briefly in each of the three 
geographical areas, mainly in the form of newspaper editorials such as those in the Beds and Herts 
Evening Telegraph.  The most active discussion came in the West London Observer, albeit among 
regular letter writers to the paper.  Even here, only a handful of letters examined the dispute in 
detail, assessing the merits of the case.  The lack of active discussion is surprising given the previous 
international crises that had occurred and that developments resulting from them had made war 
even more likely.  One can only speculate as to the reasons why there was a lack of discussion.  
Firstly, the British public had come to accept that war was likely, possibly from a better 
understanding of the international situation and the preparations that had been ongoing for many 
months.  The second possible explanation is that this crisis occurred in August, a month when people 
were on holiday and did not want to discuss international problems.  The evidence from the summer 
of 1938, which saw a reduction in discussion of international affairs, supports this argument.   
 
One of the continuing themes throughout this and previous chapters has been the active role played 
by the Bolton Evening News in guiding opinion in Bolton and acting as a vehicle for facilitating 
discussion of international affairs.  The paper remained critical of the foreign policy pursued by 
Chamberlain for much of the period covered by this chapter but it did support the efforts made to 
resist German demands as it deemed this to be in the best interests of the people that it served.  
Despite coming in for criticism from some readers about its stance, the editorial column remained 
the only one used by the paper to express political views and it continued to publish letters from 
those presenting an alternative viewpoint, thereby reflecting opinion in the area that the paper 
served.  The local newspapers in the other geographical locations played a similar but much less 
obvious role in facilitating discussion of international affairs.   
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The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact came as a shock to Britain but did little to change the British 
determination to resist Germany, which by this time was the residual ‘public mood’.  This was 
despite the support that many in Britain had indicated for an alliance with the Soviet Union.  The 
impact of the signing of the pact on the public mood is likely to have been limited due to the time 
lapse required to make a meaningful change in the public mood.  The newspapers in all three 
geographical areas emphasised British resolve and the acceleration of ARP preparations as the 
country made its final preparations for war.  Despite this, the public in Bolton and Fulham remained 
confused about the international situation and continued to hope for the avoidance of war.  
Throughout, the public reportedly showed a great calmness and acceptance that any conflict would 
be for the greater good, which might go some way to explaining the lack of impact on the public 
mood of the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  The acceptance of the need for war was a complete 
contrast to September 1938 when people had panicked as the air defences were in a poor state and 
people took to panic buying.  By September 1939, improvements had occurred and the public were 
confident that the country would eventually prevail.  Also by this time, Hitler had shown that he was 
not a man to be trusted, which featured strongly in the evidence collected from Fulham as part of 
M-O’s work.  Even the Chief of Staff, Sir Henry Pownall recorded in his diary that ‘the Hitler regime 
must go.  The nation is united as never before, not even in 1914’.716  Whilst true of the aim, it was 
certainly not true of how to achieve that aim, as this and previous chapters have demonstrated. 
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Chapter 5: Air Raid Precautions, November 1937 – September 1939 
 
The previous chapters have examined events chronologically in relation to foreign affairs.  The 
emphasis now changes to British passive (civil) defence preparations, which helped the nation 
psychologically prepare for war.  This chapter examines the largest part of these, ARP, the 
foundations of which grew out of the Great War.  This destroyed the myth of Britain as an island 
fortress.  Various parts of the country suffered from Zeppelin and Gotha raids, which highlighted the 
defencelessness of many towns and led to demands for adequate protection.  The result was the 
introduction in 1917 of a system that would form the blueprint of defensive preparations in the 
1930s.  The raids themselves killed 1,239 and injured 2,886 civilians, over half of whom were women 
and children.  This, and the books published during the interwar period gave people an indication of 
what could happen.717  London was not the only one of the geographical areas to suffer from aerial 
bombardment during the Great War.  Bolton suffered a Zeppelin raid.  The Zeppelin appeared over 
the Haliwell side of the town and circled before bombing a depot owned by the council.  It missed 
the major cotton factories but killed several people and caused damage.  The extent of the damage 
caused by bomb splinters and debris surprised a Bolton Evening News reporter.  Attendance at the 
funerals of the victims was high, with even the Mayor attending.  The raid created a mood of 
defiance.718 
Bolton’s experience provided only a glimpse of the potential devastation.  The destructive nature of 
aerial attack was a feature of the war genre of the interwar period.  Christopher Simer has 
summarised this well.  He found that until the late 1930s, nightmare scenarios dominated, a 
conclusion reinforced by the work of Miles and Powers.719  Powers refers to books that warned 
Britain about the need to prepare and the potential impact on the civilian population.  H. G. Wells’s 
1908 novel, The War in the Air is a good example.720  A 1936 film version allowed cinema audiences 
to gain some insight into what to expect.  By this time, the question of air defence was under 
consideration by the government. 
 
Terence O’Brien examined the setting up of the ARP service in the official history of civil defence, 
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which emphasised the impact of the Munich crisis on the willingness of the public to take 
precautions.721  Uri Bialer furthered this discussion, highlighting the conflicting arguments affecting 
government policy,722 one of which was the lack of reliable intelligence on German air strengths.723  
Bialer also refers to the contrasting public views of aerial defence, a subject that Brett Holman has 
added to considerably using newspapers to gauge reaction to the air panic of 1935 caused by 
German rearmament.724  His recent book, The Next War in the Air, confirms many of the findings of 
Simer’s thesis regarding the idea of the knockout blow.  The source material included newspaper 
editorials, letters to the editor, and M-O.725  Holman was not the first to tackle this subject as 
Eleanor Eddy conducted a brief study using letters in The Times.  She concluded that there was very 
little interest in the subject until after the Munich crisis.726  A recent contribution to the literature 
comes from Michele Haapamaki, who examines the reactions of left-wing intellectuals.  Their main 
evidence came from the Spanish Civil War, which they believed offered them a unique insight into 
the problem.  They argued that the government had a moral duty to provide deep shelters, as they 
were the only adequate form of protection.  This argument failed to convince the government, 
which adopted a policy that it believed was more in line with the private nature of the English 
character.727   No review would be complete without mentioning Robert Woolven’s examination of 
the development of ARP in London.  His thesis provides a good overview, highlighting the main 
points of concern: finance, public apathy, and shelter provision.728  The thesis confirms the 
contemporary finding of N. MacRoberts that London was continually behind the rest of the country.  
Some of the blame for this rested with individuals, but it was mainly due to the nature of local 
government in London.729 
 
The chapter has three sections: planning, recruitment, and shelters.  The first section summarises 
the general interwar history, including the early work undertaken in each of the geographical areas.  
After the first call for volunteers following the Anschluss, each new crisis brought a rise in 
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recruitment.  This was especially the case with the Munich crisis, which proved to the catalyst for the 
rapid development of ARP and associated measures.  The final part examines the increasing demand 
for shelter provision following the Munich crisis.  The use of different geographical cases studies 
builds on existing writing about ARP, which has concentrated on the national level or case studies of 
specific cities.  It draws on a range of council records and local newspapers to provide details of 
practices, the progress of recruitment, and the public reaction.  Therefore, it will broaden the 
national synthesis within the existing historiography.   
 
 
Planning 
Government planning began in 1923 when a secret committee chaired by Sir John Anderson 
considered the subject.  Their work remained secret until the 1935 announcement that an ARP 
department would become part of the Home Office.  Shortly afterwards, the first circular was issued 
and an invitation made to local authorities to begin discussing precautions and educating the public.  
Work continued and in March 1937, the Home Secretary, Sir John Simon, received permission from 
the Cabinet to prepare a bill to place ARP work on a statutory basis.  The bill came before Parliament 
in November 1937, despite the question of funding remaining unresolved.  The general attitude of 
Labour local authorities was to accept the need for ARP but not the financing method.730  This is 
summarised in a statement from Fulham council:731 
 
‘It is obvious that compliance with the suggestion of the ARP department will necessitate 
considerable expenditure, the greater portion of which cannot be regarded as arising out of 
the statutory duties of local authorities.  We urge the MBJSC to impress upon the Home 
Office, the necessity of ARP being borne by national funds’.   
 
In addition to the question of funding, the government would also have to deal with public apathy.  
The BIPO poll for December 1937 found that 92.5% had not taken any precautions against air raids 
and believed that somehow, they would get protection from the authorities.732   
 
The financing delay did not prevent work occurring.  Bedfordshire’s ARP work began in 1935 with 
initial discussions covering the whole county.  However, Bedford and Luton soon began to develop 
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their own schemes due to the strategic targets located within their vicinity.  In November 1936, 
Luton’s Chief Constable, George Scott, presented a draft plan to the council.  This raised the question 
of recruitment.  Suggestions included the British Legion, which was confirmed in March 1937.733  
Recruitment problems continued to hamper the development of plans, leading to the public 
perception that no work was occurring.734  For example, in February 1938, Geo H. Hopkinson, a 
resident of Bedford, wrote to the Bedfordshire Times to criticise the lack of a ‘public’ plan for 
Bedford.  H. B. Salmond, Bedford’s ARP Officer, responded by reassuring Hopkinson, that work had 
been ongoing for three years and that plans were still being finalised prior to an announcement.735   
 
Public indifference was the biggest challenge facing local authorities.  Evidence of this emerged in 
Bedford and Harpenden but not Luton in November 1937, when the gas van visited all three 
locations.  The visit to the Drill Hall in Luton attracted 145 people, forcing Major Atkinson to cancel 
her accompanying lecture due to the level of demand for people wanting to try the gas van.736  The 
visit to Bedford attracted 80 people, a reasonable attendance, though the Bedfordshire Standard 
considered it disappointing.737  By contrast, the visit to Harpenden, a small town about five miles 
from Luton, was a disaster as nobody turned up.738  Part of the public indifference was due to the 
lack of information available, a situation that Luton addressed with a series of public lectures during 
March and April 1938.739  These aimed to raise awareness and encourage recruitment.  Bedford took 
a different approach, writing to all householders just prior to the Anschluss.740   
 
 
Labour controlled Fulham did not match Bedfordshire’s early work, resulting in a visit by Wing 
Commander Steele Perkins from the Home Office to discuss the lack of progress.  The council’s 
attitude was that ARP was ‘futile and ineffective’.741  Hammersmith’s initial response was different 
as it quickly set up an ARP committee to begin drafting a scheme, a rate of progress that it did not 
maintain, as the Munich crisis revealed.  A partial explanation for this may be due to the borough 
becoming Labour controlled in November 1937.  Both boroughs agreed that the government should 
                                                          
733 BA: Bor.L/CA/1/2a, Local Air Raid Precautions Scheme, 23 November 1936; BA: Bor.L/CA/1/15, E. G. Breed 
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734 BA: Bor.L/CA/1/2a, Chief Constable Scott to C. G .Welch, 21 August 1937. 
735 Bedfordshire Times, 18 and 25 February 1938. 
736 Evening Telegraph, 10 November 1937. 
737 Bedfordshire Standard, 12 November 1937. 
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740 BA: X854/4, If War Should Come, 15 March 1938. 
741 L. Hasker, The Place Which Is Called Fulanham: An Outline History of Fulham from Roman Times until the 
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bear the cost, a view not shared by William Astor, who voted against the Labour amendments to the 
ARP bill stipulating this.742  The passing of the ARP Act forced both councils to reconvene their ARP 
committees.  The reformation of the committee did not prevent criticism from appearing in the local 
paper.  Mr Beale from the Empire Air League, in an address to a meeting of the Waltham Ward 
Women’s Conservative Association, argued that any local authority that failed to take adequate 
measures was betraying the trust of the local people.  Despite failing to specify, the speaker’s 
implied target was Fulham council.743 
 
Fulham’s lack of progress continued into 1938.  In February, the West London and Fulham Gazette 
highlighted a report in an unspecified evening newspaper about Fulham council’s silence, stating 
that ‘Fulham would be caught without any preparations that would mitigate the damage’.744  The 
paper urged everyone to learn about ARP.  London’s two-tier system of government influenced the 
lack of publicly available information, as it impeded the production of a united plan.  A meeting at 
the Home Office on 24 February discussed this problem.  Representatives agreed that the boroughs 
would be responsible for recruitment, training and the provision of advice, whereas the LCC would 
be responsible for fire and evacuation.745   The boroughs received notification of these decisions but 
Fulham failed to respond.746  The lack of official information did not prevent interested individuals 
from seeking it out.  In January 1938, the West Fulham Conservative Association staged a screening 
of ‘The Gap’, which depicted a fictional air raid on London.  The audience consisted of quite a few 
young people.747 
 
 
The contrast between the Labour controlled London boroughs and Conservative controlled Bolton is 
striking.  As in Bedfordshire, local discussions began on 1935 and by April 1937, the Mayor was able 
to issue an appeal for volunteers.748  November 1937 saw a further appeal, as the number of special 
constables needed to double due to ARP work.749  Soon afterwards, the Bolton Chamber of Trade 
announced its own scheme for those aged over 30 to form a section of the special constables.750   
                                                          
742 HFA: Minutes of Proceedings of an Ordinary Meeting of Metropolitan Borough of Hammersmith Council, 24 
November 1937; East Fulham Citizen, November 1937 andFebruary 1938. 
743 Fulham Chronicle, 3 December 1937. 
744 West London and Fulham Gazette, 18 February 1938. 
745 LMA: LCC/CL/CD/01/152, Organisation of A.R.P in the County Area of London; R. E. Woolven, 'The London 
Experience of Regional Government, 1938-1945', London Journal, 25, 2  (2000): 61. 
746 LMA: LCC/CL/CD/01/152, Honorary Clerk to Sir George Gater, 12 March 1938. 
747 West London and Fulham Gazette, 14 January 1938. 
748 BLHC: ABZ/46/3, Mayor's Appeal for Volunteers, 17 April 1937. 
749 Bolton Journal and Guardian, 26 November 1937. 
750 Bolton Standard, 3 December 1937. 
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Publication of the results of these appeals occurred when the Bolton Journal and Guardian published 
the end of year figures. 
 
Table 4: Bolton ARP recruitment, 31 December 1937751 
Service Number recruited Target 
Special constables 250 500 
Wardens 350 650 
Firemen 110 440 
Total 710 1590 
 
Following Bolton’s initial success, the ARP committee recommended the appointment of the Chief 
Constable as the ARP Officer.752  This provoked controversy, mainly due to the additional salary that 
the Chief Constable would receive.  The Bolton Labour Party duly asked where the money was 
coming from.753  Further resentment was felt because of the level of unemployment and the council 
was appealing for unpaid volunteers.754  ‘Candidus’ a local Labourite columnist, argued that there 
were no precautions for the Chief Constable to take charge of.755   Letter writers to the Bolton 
Evening News added to this criticism.  However, the editor allowed one final letter as ‘Fair Play’ 
wrote to support the decision and questioned whether critics had considered the potential 
alternatives.756  
 
 
The early preparatory work varied.  Bolton and Bedfordshire’s early start meant that they were soon 
able to submit a scheme to the Home Office following the passing of the ARP Act.  This work 
occurred away from the public realm leading some to question the rate of progress.  This was the 
case with the two London boroughs.  By contrast, the early work carried out in Bolton meant that it 
was in an acceptable position when the first international crisis occurred.  
 
                                                          
751 Bolton Journal and Guardian, 31 December 1937. 
752 BLHC: ABZ/46/3, Air Raid Precautions: General Report on the Progress of the Council's Scheme, 17 February 
1938. 
753 M-O A: Worktown 7C: Labour Party, Bolton Citizen, March 1938. 
754 Bolton Evening News, 25 and February 1938 and 1 March 1938. 
755 M-O A: Worktown 7C: Labour Party, Bolton Citizen, March 1938. 
756 Bolton Evening News, 4 March 1938. 
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Volunteers 
Recruitment was a duty of local authorities under the ARP Act.  However, confronting them was 
public indifference, an attitude that would last until after the declaration of war.  The best solution 
was an international crisis and it is around these that this section of the chapter is organised: March 
to August 1938, September 1938 to March 1939, and March to September 1939. 
 
 
March to August 1938 
The Anschluss coincided with a broadcast by the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare for one million 
volunteers for ARP work.  This broadcast had been several months in the planning and was one that 
the BBC was keen to undertake as a way of educating the public, whilst avoiding party political 
debate on the subject.757  In the broadcast, Hoare acknowledged that it was a terrible subject to 
speak about.  He argued that England needed to be prepared and this meant that people would have 
to learn the basis of ARP in peacetime.758  Therefore, it was a timely broadcast. 
 
 
Bedford began its appeal prior to Hoare’s broadcast by writing to all households in the town.  Only 
200 had replied when the Anschluss occurred.  This had risen to 847 when the ARP committee met 
on 23 March.759  The Bedfordshire Times published updates as well, reporting 447 replies on 18 
March and over 1,000 a week later.  However, the figures in Table 5, though the published figures, 
do not correspond with the claims in the report.760 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
757 BBC WAC: R51/13/1, William Eady to Sir John Reith, 26 January 1938; BBC WAC: R51/13/1, Air Raid 
Precautions, 26 January 1938. 
758 BBC WAC: R51/13/1, The Citizen and Air Raids, 5 March 1938. 
759 BA: BorBB30/2/6, Meeting of Air Raid Precautions Committee, 23 March 1938. 
760 Bedfordshire Times, 18 March 1938; Bedfordshire Times, 25 March 1938. 
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Table 5: Bedford ARP recruits in March 1938 
Service 18 March 1938 25 March 1938 
Ambulance 22 73 
Demolition 15 37 
Decontamination 15 42 
Fire Brigade 20 45 
Messengers 58 42 
First Aid 16 164 
Wardens 206 362 
Any type of work 18 21 
Rescue   41 
Unable to assist  153 
Total 370 980 
 
The postal campaign and international events stimulated Bedford’s recruitment.  The Bedfordshire 
Times assisted the council by offering to provide a certain amount of free space to promote ARP.761   
This followed a similar offer by the Luton News to Luton’s committee, at a time when Luton was 
commencing a series of public lectures.  Over 200 people attended the first lecture, with 1,200 
attending over the series.  This resulted in 693 volunteers, which the Chief Constable deemed a 
success and proposed another series in the autumn.762  Discussions about ARP took place elsewhere 
as well, with a joint discussion between the Workers Education Association and Luton Youth Group.  
They agreed that it was common sense to take precautions,763 a view not supported by all groups as 
the Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph had previously reported that an unnamed group had 
distributed leaflets opposing ARP.  Based on a letter in The Times, this was likely to have been the 
                                                          
761 BA: BorBB30/2/6, Meeting of Air Raid Precautions Committee, 29 April 1938. 
762 BA: Bor.L/CA/1/3, Borough of Luton Air Raid Precautions Scheme, 8 April 1938; Luton News, 5 May 1938. 
763 Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph, 7 May 1938. 
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PPU.764  
 
Despite the relative success of the recruitment campaigns, the number of volunteers remained short 
of the target.  By the end of May, Luton had only recruited 750 out of 2,750, a situation replicated in 
Bedford where recruitment rates had slowed since the initial rush in March.765  For example, the 
Bedfordshire Standard reported on 27 May that Bedford only had 28 out of the required 1,250 
auxiliary fire fighters.766  A further report in the Bedford and District Daily Circular in July found that 
one ward still needed 120 wardens.767   Both papers duly reminded readers that the precautions 
benefited all.  Despite these problems, a demonstration of the county’s overall progress took place 
in May 1938 at Stewartby, which is located to the west of Bedford.  The leader of Bedfordshire 
County Council, Sir Thomas Keens described the display as ‘realistic’ and included a commentary to 
ensure that people knew what was happening.  At the end of the display, Keens said that he hoped 
that the demonstration had made people realise the necessity of ARP.768 Following the Stewartby 
demonstration, Luton staged two relatively successful blackouts.  Some people did not comply, with 
wives leaving lights on whilst waiting for their husbands to come home.769  The trials, along with 
warning siren tests, acted as a way of reassuring the public about the progress of precautions.   
 
 
Recruitment in Fulham and Hammersmith was slower than in Bedfordshire.  The weeks following the 
broadcast coincided with the West Fulham by-election.  The campaign featured only a few 
references to ARP, with the main criticisms coming from East Fulham MP, William Astor, following a 
visit to the town hall.  Here, he witnessed several people ask questions about volunteering that staff 
were unable to answer.770  This left an impression of inaction by the council, an inaction not 
reflected by the council minutes, which stated that the ARP committee were working on a 
scheme.771  The confusion was part of a slow response as only 125 had volunteered by 25 March,772  
a figure that had increased to 363 in early May when Astor wrote to his constituents to appeal for 
more volunteers.  Later in the month, he referred to the continuing problems that people were 
                                                          
764 The Times, 11 April 1938. 
765 Luton News, 26 May 1938. 
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768 Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph, 23 May 1938; Bedford and District Daily Circular, 24 May 1938; 
Bedfordshire Standard, 27 May 1938. 
769 Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph, 8 August 1938. 
770 Fulham Chronicle, 25 March 1938. 
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experiencing with registering to volunteer.773  The continuing lack of volunteers concerned the West 
London and Hammersmith Gazette editorial, which blamed the council for a lack of enthusiasm.774  
Astor’s and the paper’s concerns were shared by the paper’s readers, who wrote a week later to 
bemoan the inadequate state of preparations and an associated lack of information.  By this time, 
the editorial believed that Fulham’s recruitment was the lowest in London.775  With public concern 
mounting, May’s recruitment figures would have brought some relief.  These showed an increase of 
over 500 on the previous month.  This slowed down again over the summer months, though the 
numbers attending lectures was encouraging.   
 
Table 6:   ARP recruitment in Fulham: April-September 1938776 
Month Number 
required 
Number 
enrolled 
Men Women % of 
required 
number 
Lecture 
attendance 
April 1938 2,500 363   14.5  
May 1938 3,150 903   28.7  
June 1938 3,564 1,056   29.6  
July 1938 3,564 1,151 908 243 32.3 1,377 
September 
1938 
3,564 1,250 982 268 35.1 1,451 
 
Fulham council’s public engagement began to increase as its attitude towards ARP changed.  In early 
July, the council organised a well-attended non-political meeting about ARP.  However, this did not 
prevent Councillor De Palma and Edith Summerskill from criticising the government’s foreign policy.  
Both blamed the ‘situation’ on the need for ARP.  The Mayor avoided political references, stating 
that ‘I feel, as various other members of the borough council feel, that it is our duty to give our 
                                                          
773 West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 6 May 1938; Fulham Chronicle, 13 May 1938. 
774 West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 6 May 1938. 
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citizens every help in preparing for whatever may happen in the near future’.777  The local 
newspapers made little editorial comment on the meeting, though on 12 August an editorial advised 
the council to stay in contact with the local population.778 
 
Hammersmith’s scheme was also embryonic.  Councillor Adams, the chair of the ARP sub-
committee, described ARP as offering only a small degree of protection, an opinion that Councillor 
Glenister found disturbing.  However, Councillor Bartlett believed that Glenister had misunderstood 
and that Adams was right to say it was inadequate.779  Like Fulham, Hammersmith struggled to 
attract volunteers.  The council tried to do so by placing a large advert in the West London Observer 
and take a stand at the Ideal Home Exhibition.780  It was not exactly an awe-inspiring advertisement 
(Fig.13).   Both measures had limited success.  The first figures showed that 200 out of the 490 
required had volunteered.781  This figure was presumably for wardens, as the overall figure was 
3,503.  However, these numbers would grow in the coming months.   
 
Table 7: ARP recruitment in Hammersmith: April-September 1938782 
Month Number 
required 
Number 
enrolled 
Men Women % of required 
number 
April 1938 3,503 200   5.7 
July 1938 3,503 503 307 196 14.4 
September 
1938 
3,503 573 352 221 16.4 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
777 West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 15 July 1938; LSE: Summerskill 4/1, Air Raid Precautions: Lively 
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Figure 13: Hammersmith ARP Advertisement, West London Observer 8 April 1938 
 
 
The two London boroughs contrasted sharply with Bolton.  Hoare’s broadcast and the Anschluss 
quickly made the ARP department one of the council’s busiest, prompting the town clerk to 
recommend relocating it to a central building.783  The volunteer influx led to a recruitment estimate 
of 500 wardens and 270 auxiliary fire fighters appearing in the Bolton Evening News.784  However, 
this did not prevent ‘Anxious’ writing to encourage people to volunteer.785  The paper published the 
official requirements on 7 April as 2,000 wardens, 2,000 for casualty services, 650 auxiliary fire 
                                                          
783 BLHC: AB/8/1 (12), Meeting of the General Purposes Committee, 4 April 1938. 
784 Bolton Evening News, 16 March 1938; Bolton Standard, 25 March 1938. 
785 Bolton Evening News, 18 March 1938. 
157 
 
fighters and 600 special constables.  It acknowledged that some people would only become 
interested when war came.786  The recruitment effort received assistance from trade organisations.  
The Federation of Master Spinners, supported by the Co-Operative Cotton Spinners, produced a 
scheme for use by cotton mills.  The latter stressed to its members that participation was 
voluntary.787   The Co-Operative Society undertook a similar effort with a film about ARP followed by 
a talk from Third Officer Davies of the Bolton Fire Service.  Over 100 who attended the meeting 
volunteered.  Talks about ARP also took place at other group meetings in Bolton.788  Both the Bolton 
Women’s Conservative Association and their Liberal counterparts held meetings on the subject with 
good attendance but there was no direct link between these talks and recruitment.789      
The efforts made in Bolton resulted in a relatively acceptable rate of recruitment.  The Manchester 
Evening News, in an article entitled ‘What’s wrong with ARP?’, praised the work of the Chief 
Constable and the co-operation between council departments.  The article contained recruitment 
figures, some of which varied from the official requirements published in the Bolton Evening News 
on 7 April. 
 
Table 8: ARP recruitment in Bolton, Manchester Evening News, 27 May 1938790 
Service Number required Number recruited % of total recruited 
Wardens 2000 900 45 
Casualty 2000 800 (300 trained and a 
further 500 expected) 
40 
Fire 300 250 84 
 
Despite the above, Bolton continued to expand its recruitment efforts.  This included the Chief 
Constable recommending reserving a stand at the borough’s centenary celebration in September. 791   
Prior to the exhibition, information provision continued via other means, including home visits to 
find out gas masks requirements and a BBC radio interview featuring Mr Barker, an ordinary ARP 
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worker in the town.  He spoke from the perspective of the ordinary person and one of the first 
people in Bolton to sign-up.  The ‘Town Topics’ column in the Bolton Evening News recommended 
that people tuned in to find out more.792  Accompanying the provision of information was an 
accidental activation on 8 June of the air raid siren.  The Bolton Evening News in its report pointed 
out that it tested the siren’s efficiency.793 
 
 
To sum up, ARP recruitment increased slowly during this period.  Nonetheless, it was a cause for 
concern, especially in the two London boroughs.  In Fulham, the blame rested with the council, as it 
did not actively engage with the public until July and made it difficult for them to volunteer.  By 
contrast, Bedfordshire and Bolton actively engaged their communities using different methods: 
public lectures, talks to interested parties, co-operation with trade organizations, and active support 
from the local newspapers.  Co-operation with trade organizations only occurred in Bolton, and 
helped to advance the state of preparations.  In numerical terms, comparison between the 
geographical areas is difficult due to the lack of standardised statistical reporting.  However, on a 
percentage basis, Bolton far exceeded the two London boroughs. 
 
 
September 1938 – March 1939 
The second period was one of rapid recruitment, thanks largely to the Munich crisis.  Wing 
Commander Hodsoll from the Home Office described the crisis as a ‘godsend’, as it produced an 
estimated 250,000 volunteers and the consensus that ARP was necessary.794  The crisis achieved a 
consensus as it exposed the poor state of defensive preparations, which G. G. Lee argues was the 
main reason why Britain signed the agreement.795  This argument appears contentious at first.  
However, taking account of Steven Lobell’s strategic balancing argument, it is plausible.796  William 
Eady, undersecretary of the ARP department, highlighted Britain’s defensive failings in a speech to 
the Royal United Services Institute.  He admitted that the revelations did not surprise the Home 
Office.  He went on to outline the duties of local authorities, thereby ensuring that his audience 
understood why the country was unprepared.  These included providing advice and instructions, 
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794 Hansard, HC Debs. Volume 340, Columns 14-7 (1st November 1938); Woolven, 'Civil Defence in London, 
1935-1945':7.   
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threat posed by Germany, Italy and Japan.  In the case of Germany, it was the threat from the air. 
159 
 
organization of the warden service, shelter provision, recruitment and training of volunteers, and 
the transfer of the civilian population.  He argued that the local governing classes needed to become 
involved, as their non-participation was hindering progress.797  Eady’s explanation was only one of 
the explanations as to why Britain was unprepared.  J. B. S. Haldane’s book A.R.P. provided another.  
Haldane argued that the government’s piecemeal approach had prevented the formulation and 
implementation of a comprehensive scheme that included deep shelters.798  Haldane’s argument has 
been criticised by Joseph Meisel for failing to place ARP within the wider context of the competition 
for scarce economic resources, which also reinforces part of the argument made by Lobell.799 
 
Examples of unpreparedness occurred throughout the crisis.  They included the lack of an official 
householder’s handbook.  M-O records from September 1938 reveal a mixed state of affairs:800 
 
 25-year-old male clerk from London - 29/9 spoke with air raid warden at lunch.  He had 
visited and fitted all masks in his area at the end of June…..Agreed that public apathy had 
been extreme and that the country had been totally unprepared. 
 Female clerk from Kent – have heard many people say they wish they had gone in for ARP 
training….Most people agree that ARP arrangements are a muddle. 
 72-year-old male from Midlothian -  only by continued appeals in the newspapers has it 
been possible to rouse public interest in the distribution of gas masks. 
 
The above are just a few of the examples of the indifference shown by the public for ARP, as well as 
flagging the lack of preparation undertaken by local authorities.  Arthur Reynolds summarised this in 
a letter to The Times, urging: 801  
 
‘We must not only arm ourselves against attack but we must also be forearmed with 
protection for the non-combatant.  In my opinion, permanent shelters and defences against 
attack from the air are as important as battleships.’  
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The aftermath of the crisis produced suggestions for improvements: classification of the country into 
danger zones, greater effort by local authorities, and the collection of information about people who 
would be of use.802  The government undertook these steps during the winter months of 1938-9 and 
by February 1939 reported that the number of volunteers totalled 1.25m.  Sir John Anderson 
referred to this figure and developments in a speech on 1 March that Herbert Morrison viewed as a 
sign of progress.803  However, despite the progress reported, public apathy and concern remained, as 
demonstrated by opinion polls during this period.  A February 1939 poll found that only 21% of those 
questioned were satisfied with the government’s ARP plans, while a further 70% supported deep 
shelters.804 
 
 
The Scout motto ‘Be Prepared’ was the biggest lesson of the crisis.  Wing Commander Hodsoll 
referred to this need in mid-September.  He warned that ‘people who had done nothing about ARP 
would find themselves in difficulties in the early stages’.805  This message was relevant to Luton, as 
only 800 people had volunteered for ARP work.  Those who had received their training staged an 
early evening demonstration in the town centre.  A. R. Hammond, a resident of Denbigh Road in 
Luton, blamed the council for the poor attendance at this demonstration, arguing that effective 
shelter provision was required before people would be more willing to volunteer.806  Similarly, 
Bedford’s ARP meeting on 28 September revealed that many more volunteers were still required to 
become wardens or auxiliary fire fighters, as Bedford had less than 50% of its total complement.807   
By the time Hodsoll’s warning appeared on 12 September, the international situation was 
deteriorating.  With the threat of war increasing, the Home Office issued instructions to begin the 
distribution of gas masks.  This presented a challenge to Bedford and Luton, as volunteers were 
required to assemble them.  In Luton, hat makers, housewives and volunteers from the surrounding 
villages came to assist.  The Luton News described them as ‘working in the atmosphere of a church 
bazaar’.808  Amongst the volunteers were the Scouts, whose 1938 annual report stated that good 
work had occurred despite local schemes being underdeveloped. 809 
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Local opinion leaders, whether assembling gas masks or digging trenches, appreciated the efforts of 
the volunteers.  Sir Thomas Keens, in an unpublished letter of thanks to the Luton News, stated:810 
   
'It is difficult to conceive what would have happened with the limited number of volunteers 
at the disposal of the air raid precautions organisation in many districts had there not been 
such a spontaneous response.  ARP is a great humanitarian service in which individuals can 
help their neighbours and towns or villages in which they live at times of emergency.  The 
government is anxious to impress upon the country that there must be no slackening in air 
raid precautions’. 
The paper refused to publish the letter for reasons explained on 6 October.  The editor arguing that 
proprietors had explained to the government that: 811 
 
‘a policy, which expected proprietors to allow their publications to be used without charge 
as vehicles for propaganda, that in the opinion of those newspaper proprietors ought to be 
paid for, is unlikely to command editorial sympathy from those proprietors but rather 
antagonise them’. 
 
The paper viewed sections of Keens’ letter as propaganda.  Newspaper attitudes had changed 
following Treasury rejection of a scheme that included money for advertising, as ‘they were certainly 
not going to pay for advertising in newspapers, when they could get all the publicity they wanted for 
free in the editorial column’. 812  After these comments, proprietors adopted a policy of vigilance, 
thereby sending a clear message to the authorities that they should not rely on the goodwill of the 
press to campaign on their behalf.   
 
The crisis substantially increased the number of volunteers.  Luton reported an increase from 792 to 
1,407,813  while the report to the county council in November noted an increase from 2,591 to 5,292, 
which was close to the total number required.814  However, despite welcoming the increase the 
county council was also critical, stating that ‘their service would have been all the more valuable had 
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they been fully trained’.815  Percy Bone expressed similar sentiments in a letter to the Luton News on 
6 October.  He paid tribute to those trained prior to the crisis and hoped that recent events would 
encourage people to volunteer.816  These criticisms may seem harsh but they followed previous 
public apathy in the county. 
 
Critical comments about volunteers were not the only ones made.  Following the crisis, Luton Trades 
Council wrote to request a place on the ARP committee to ensure that the council reached the very 
people that they were trying to protect.817  Luton’s committee decided to defer discussion of the 
request until November’s meeting.818  The records give no indication of the outcome.  More 
worrying from the point of view of ordinary people was the lack of lectures and gas masks in some 
Bedfordshire villages.819   
 
At the end of 1938, it was clear that preparations were progressing in Bedfordshire.  In January 1939, 
the government launched a voluntary national service campaign.  The initial impact of the campaign 
on ARP volunteers is difficult to assess, as the only figures published were in the Luton News. 
 
Table 9: Luton ARP recruitment, February 1939820 
Date reported Number 
required 
Number 
enrolled 
Men Women % of 
required 
number 
2 February 
1939 
1,841 1,457 1,118 339 79.1 
23 February 
1939 
1,841 1,549   84.1 
 
Figures on 2 February revealed the number of women enrolled.  Out of 339, only one was a warden, 
though Luton was required to have 210.  The Chief Constable, George Scott was to blame for this, as 
                                                          
815 Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph, 25 November 1938. 
816 Luton News, 6 October 1938. 
817 BA: Bor.L/CA/1/2b, William J. Lane to Luton Town Council, 2 October 1938;BA: Bor.L/CA/1/2b, William J. 
Lane to W. H. Robinson, 11 October 1938. 
818 BA: Bor.LM29, Report of the Air Raids Precautions Committee, 14 October 1938. 
819 Bedfordshire Times, 4 November 1938. 
820 Luton News, 2 and 23 February 1939. 
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from the outset he had taken the view that women were more suited to casualty services.  This 
report featured an interview with the warden, Irene Joan Bentley, an 18-year-old resident of Holly 
Bush Lane in Luton, who urged more young people to become involved.821  The slow increase in 
volunteers also occurred in the county’s scheme with the actual requirements for the county 
published in the Bedford and District Daily Circular on 28 January 1939.  There was also a 
requirement for a 25% or 50% reserve depending upon the category.  The actual state of 
recruitment, including the reserve, was published a month later in the Bedfordshire Times.   
 
Table 10: Required ARP recruitment for Bedfordshire, January 1939 822 
 
Service Total required Men  Women  
Wardens 2,690 2,150 538 
First Aid parties 
and posts 
955 459 496 
Drivers 487  487 
Rescue 220 220  
Decontamination 140 140  
Report centres 211 82 129 
Messengers 171 171  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
821 Luton News, 9 March 1939. 
822 Bedford and District Daily Circular, 28 January 1939. 
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Table 11: Bedfordshire ARP recruitment, February 1939823 
Service Total 
required 
including 
reserve 
Men 
Enrolled 
Women 
enrolled 
% recruited 
Wardens 3,363 2,553 107 79 
Casualty 1,915 1,241 1,759 156 
Rescue 540 687  127 
Other 487 526 366 183 
 
With ever-increasing numbers, trained volunteers began practice drills, which newspapers reported 
on.  One of these occurred in Bedford’s Cauldwell ward during January.  The Bedfordshire Times 
reported that the drill was not particularly successful.  Despite this, the head warden, Mr S Wright, 
said ‘I am convinced that the only way to understand practical work is for the wardens themselves to 
get some practical experience’.824  The drill was repeated a couple of weeks later, by which time, the 
wardens were viewed as becoming more proficient.825  Practice drills allowed for the identification of 
weaknesses.  One Luton ARP warden, Mr Gilles, a member of the Luton Communist Party, revealed 
that Luton’s scheme had several in a speech at the Luton Corn Exchange.  His removal as a warden 
resulted in a parliamentary question about the resignation from William Gallacher, the Communist 
MP for West Fife,826 though Hansard provides no indication that a reply was given.  The Chief 
Constable deemed Gilles’s conduct to be unacceptable, as mechanisms existed that allowed 
wardens to raise concerns privately.  He did not dispute that they had the right to do so.  Luton’s 
ARP committee discussed the matter in January 1939 after Luton Trades Council requested further 
information, following a resolution by 25 unions and Mr Gilles’s resignation.827  The Chief Constable 
and Alderman Dillingham agreed that such criticisms represented a lack of confidence in the 
scheme, thereby making Gilles’s position as a warden untenable.  Councillor Roberts did not dissent 
                                                          
823 Bedfordshire Times, 24 February 1939. 
824 Bedfordshire Times, 20 January 1939. 
825 Bedfordshire Times, 3 February 1939. 
826 Luton News, 3 November 1938. 
827 BA: Bor.L/CA/1/15, J. C. Price to W. H. Robinson, 31 December 1938. 
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but expressed concern about the impact on freedom of expression.828  Gilles would not be the last 
warden to criticise schemes in Bedfordshire publicly.   
 
The Munich period tested outline schemes in Bedfordshire, which proved to be reasonably 
successful given the shortage of trained volunteers.  These problems began to resolve themselves 
following the crisis as the public accepted the necessity of ARP.  The content of local criticisms did 
not cause controversy but as in the Gilles case, the method of criticism did.   
 
 
Fulham and Hammersmith demonstrated similarities to and differences from Bedfordshire.  In the 
weeks leading up to the Munich crisis, Fulham council prepared an ARP exhibition.  Local 
newspapers provided details about the exhibition in early September, with the West London and 
Hammersmith Gazette publishing full details the week before the exhibition opened.  This included 
the Mayor, Michael Cox’s, foreword to the exhibition programme, which stated:829 
 
‘If an emergency arises it will come like a freak storm in summer and if the storm finds 
Fulham in a state of unpreparedness, it will be due to the apathy of the community.  If 
adequate steps are taken in time of peace there need be no cause for panic should an 
emergency arise.  I believe it is the duty of all citizens to help with preparations’. 
This message echoed sentiments in Bedfordshire and placed a strong emphasis on the need to 
volunteer, which public indifference hindered.  However, the Mayor’s statement ignored the delays 
created by the council, such as not holding public meetings until July 1938.  The exhibition opened 
on Monday 26 September as the crisis intensified, prompting attendance by anxious people.830 
 
The onset of crisis week triggered an avalanche of work including trench digging and gas mask 
assembly, which required volunteers.  In Hammersmith, workers from local firms with appropriate 
skills undertook this task.  The efforts of both boroughs resulted in 90% distribution of masks by 28 
September, though people queued in the rain to obtain them.831  The local Scouts were among the 
volunteers as they delivered ARP leaflets in Fulham.  This aided the council and enabled Mr Colbert 
                                                          
828 Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph, 1 February 1939; Luton News, 2 February 1939; BA: Air Raid Wardens, 7 
February 1939. 
829 LSE: Summerskill 4/2, A.R.P. Exhibition at Town Hall. 
830 Fulham Chronicle, 30 September 1938. 
831  Fulham Chronicle, 30 September 1938; HFA: Minutes of Proceedings of an Ordinary Meeting of 
Metropolitan Borough of Fulham Council, 26 October 1938; HFA: Minutes of Proceedings of an Ordinary 
Meeting of Metropolitan Borough of Hammersmith Council, 26 October 1938. 
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to report the establishment of excellent relations at the next district meeting.  Fulham Scouts were 
encouraged to prepare for a possible conflict by undertaking signals work.832  This form of 
communication might prove useful during an air raid and was just one part of the national effort by 
the Scouting movement. 
 
The crisis stimulated recruitment and public interest, thereby overcoming some of the public 
indifference. 
 
Table 12: Fulham ARP recruitment, September to November 1938833 
Reporting 
month 
Number 
required 
Number 
enrolled 
Men Women % of 
required 
number 
Lecture 
attendance 
September 
1938 
3,564 1,250 982 268 35.1 1451 
October 1938 3,564 2,185 1,542 643 63.1 1217 
November 
1938 
3,564 2,286 1,560 726 64.1 3924 
 
 
The recruitment figures masked some large underlying gaps, namely the lack of auxiliary fire 
fighters, with only 50 out of 500 recruited.  This problem was London-wide, prompting Herbert 
Morrison to issue an appeal for 30,000 volunteers, of whom 1,180 were required in Fulham.  This 
figure was higher than previously stated, as revisions to local schemes in the aftermath of the crisis 
raised the overall volunteer requirement to 4,489 by January 1939.834  The numbers attending 
lectures continued to increase.  A further aid to recruitment was the starting of practical ARP 
demonstrations around the borough.  The ARP Officer, Mr Whitely, described these as having ‘great 
recruiting value’ as they attracted a crowd that was interested in finding out more.835  Added to this 
                                                          
832 HFA: DD/1050/98, Minutes of the 100th Meeting of the Scout Committee, 19 September 1938; HFA: 
DD/1050/57, 19th Annual General Meeting, 25 October 1938; HFA: DD/1050/149, Monthly Bulletin, December 
1938. 
833 HFA: Minutes of Proceedings of an Ordinary Meeting of Metropolitan Borough of Fulham Council, 28 
September, 26 October and 30 November 1938. 
834 Fulham Chronicle, 7 October 1938; HFA: Minutes of Proceedings of an Ordinary Meeting of Metropolitan 
Borough of Fulham Council, 18 January 1939. 
835 West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 2 December 1938. 
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were wardens’ house-to-house visits to check gas mask details.  During these visits, they provided 
information and enrolment forms, efforts that the council hindered by their failure to train 
volunteers quickly, as illustrated in Table 13.  The numbers in the brackets are the actual number of 
people trained, which are below the overall number of volunteers. 
 
Table 13: Fulham ARP recruitment, December 1938 to March 1939836 
Date reported Number 
required 
Number 
enrolled 
Men Women % of 
required 
number 
Lecture 
attendance 
21 December 
1938 
3,564 2,350 1,591 759 66 627 
18 January 
1939 
4,449 2,380 1,596 
(1,009) 
784 (634) 53 1,007 
15 February 
1939 
4,449 2,484 1,665 
(873) 
819 (480) 56 1,008 
15 March 
1939  
4,449 2,623 1,768 
(940) 
855 (514) 59 1,289 
 
By comparison, Hammersmith had done very little in the lead up to the crisis, an impression 
reinforced by the lack of recruitment figures.  The council minutes following the crisis noted that 
revisions to the scheme were taking place and that a recruitment campaign would begin upon 
completion.  The council hoped that local preachers could be encouraged to refer to the campaign in 
their sermons.837  The revised scheme increased the number of volunteers required, leading the 
council to send out 40,000 letters to encourage recruitment.  The response rate was disappointing, 
when compared with Bedford’s campaign in 1938, with only 600 replies by the end of January 1939.  
However, the council deemed it to be successful838  but then proceeded to hinder itself by refusing to 
accept offers of assistance from voluntary organisations like the Women’s Voluntary Service (WVS).  
                                                          
836 HFA: Minutes of Proceedings of an Ordinary Meeting of Metropolitan Borough of Fulham Council, 21 
December 1938, 18 January, 15 February and 15 March 1939. 
837 HFA: Minutes of Proceedings of an Ordinary Meeting of Metropolitan Borough of Hammersmith Council, 26 
October and 23 November 1938. 
838 West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 27 January 1939. 
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The council refused their offer as it viewed the WVS as a political organisation, a move considered 
surprising by the West London and Hammersmith Gazette.  The paper urged the council to 
reconsider due to the state of preparations.839 
 
The example cited above provides an indication of the political games that occurred in relation to 
ARP.  Local MPs and councillors accused other political parties of failures instead of working with 
them to find resolutions.  Astor and Busby both criticised Fulham council for failing to take 
precautions in time, a valid criticism given the words of the Mayor in the ARP exhibition programme, 
thereby indicating that not all criticisms involved political manoeuvring.840  They were not alone in 
criticising Fulham’s preparations.  W. B. Padger, a resident of Fulham, wrote to the West London and 
Hammersmith Gazette to blame Councillor De Palma, the chair of the ARP committee, for this state 
of affairs.841  De Palma did not respond to Padger, even though others in his position in the other 
two geographical areas had responded to letters to the local paper, but did to Astor by suggesting 
that he should have come to see him privately.  In Hammersmith, the political games occurred when 
Councillor Glenister accused the ARP committee of playing politics over the appointment of a head 
warden for the Starch Green ward.  Glenister believed that despite there being candidates with 
excellent credentials, no appointment occurred because none had the same political leanings as the 
committee.  The committee chair denied this accusation.842 
 
Both boroughs’ lack of progress prior to the crisis proved to be expensive.  During the crisis, Fulham 
spent £18,890 compared to Hammersmith’s £48,000.843  According to the West London and 
Hammersmith Gazette, Hammersmith had previously spent only £150, thereby earning it the title of 
the most unprepared borough in London.844  Faced with these bills, both boroughs returned to the 
argument that the costs should be borne by central government, a view supported by the Fulham 
Ratepayers Association and Fulham Chamber of Commerce.845    
 
The situation that both boroughs found themselves in was repeated in other Left-wing boroughs in 
London, such as West Ham and Stepney, both of which fell short of their targets.846   The main 
                                                          
839 West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 30 December 1938. 
840 Fulham Chronicle, 28 October 1938. 
841 Fulham Chronicle, 28 October 1938. 
842 West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 3 March 1939. 
843 West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 28 October 1938.  
844 West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 28 October 1938.  
845 HFA: Minutes of Proceedings of an Ordinary Meeting of Metropolitan Borough of Fulham Council, 30 
November 1938; West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 2 December 1938. 
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problem was the lack of volunteers due to public indifference, though in Fulham a lack of active 
public engagement added to this.  The Munich crisis partly solved the recruitment problem as 
volunteering continued at a steady rate during the winter months. 
 
 
Bolton’s ARP scheme was ahead of the other two geographical areas but still did not impress Tom 
Binks, as he felt that ARP was undemocratic, as ‘the wardens were not elected and they are to be 
the leaders that people never wished for’.847  A. Booth joined Binks in opposing ARP on these 
grounds but Booth, unlike Binks, was not prepared to trust Hitler’s word and accepted the necessity 
for precautions.848  The development of the crisis reinforced this.  One of the first precautionary 
steps was the issuing of gas masks.  The Bolton Evening News reported on 19 September about the 
plans to distribute the masks within 12 hours of receipt.849  Delivery of the masks occurred on 22-3 
September, revealing a flaw in Bolton’s plan, namely that there was a requirement for volunteers to 
assemble them.  Appeals made via the Bolton Evening News, trade associations, and influential 
people in the town resulted in a public response that allowed for assembly and distribution to 
progress rapidly.850  Distribution occurred at locations used for voting, a process that was enhanced 
by the decision to close the town’s schools.  This allowed distribution to be staggered over three 
days.851 
 
The appeal for volunteers added 1,570 to the overall total.  This included 940 wardens, 430 special 
constables and 200 auxiliary fire fighters, though the figures published by the Bolton Standard were 
lower.  It is likely that people dropped out in the intervening months for unexplained reasons.852  
Those responding to the appeal included a woman who could not drive but indicated, when asked, 
that she was willing to learn, thereby providing further evidence that the nation was prepared to 
answer the call when it came.853  The Bolton Evening News published post-crisis volunteer figures on 
18 October.  The biggest difference between these and those cited earlier in the chapter concerned 
auxiliary fire service numbers. 
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Table 14: Bolton ARP recruitment, October 1938 854 
Service Number required Number recruited % of total recruited 
Wardens 1,860 1,400 (500) 75.3 
Casualty 2,000 1,200 (900) 60 
Fire Unknown 300 (0) Unknown 
Special Constables 600 600 (200) 100 
Rescue 100 100 (100) 100 
Repair 200 200 (100) 100 
Decontamination 150 150 (70) 100 
 
Following the crisis 3,950 out of 5,210 volunteers had come forward.855  Local officials and the Bolton 
Evening News praised those who assisted during the crisis.  A. Booth recognised the value of the 
local organisation and praised officials for how well people were treated.  He continued by appealing 
for interested people to attend a meeting at Victoria Hall on 7 October with the aim of building on 
the momentum that the crisis had established.856  Bolton council were particularly keen for women 
to volunteer for services provided by the WVS, with an appeal made at the Women’s Conservative 
Association meeting on 11 October.  The appeal attracted enough interest to prompt a letter to 
Inspector Gledhill to suggest an education meeting.  Meetings took place on 25 November and 5 
December, attracting interest from 44 organisations.  The discussions included the idea of holding a 
mass meeting to encourage women to volunteer and add to the 1,006 who had already done so.857  
This process continued in 1939, when the Home Office informed the council that the required 
wartime strength was 6,300, of whom 1,744 were women.858  Thankfully, the meetings with 
women’s organisations were bearing fruit and in February the number of female volunteers stood at 
1,309 out of 2,182, a figure that included the war reserve.  A further appeal for female volunteers on 
10 February targeted women who could drive but had not yet volunteered for ambulance work.859  A 
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Bolton Standard article reinforced this by appealing for more volunteers for all areas of civil defence.  
The same article noted that the national newspapers had praised the state of ARP in Bolton, and 
therefore people could no longer question the appointment of the Chief Constable as ARP Officer.860  
Nonetheless, Bolton remained short of its target.   
 
The satisfactory state of ARP did not prevent dissension in the letters column of the Bolton Evening 
News following the crisis.  Some writers were adamant that they were not prepared to offer their 
services to the local scheme.  ‘Ex-corporal’ and ‘Ex-lieutenant’ were two former military personnel 
who were not prepared to undergo training from people with no experience of a war situation.861  
This attitude drew criticism from ‘Another ex-lieutenant’. ‘Head Warden No.61 Sector’ and ‘Young 
A.R.P.’ who viewed this as a poor excuse and informed the public that several ex-service personnel 
involved.  ‘Young A.R.P.’ viewed their attitude as particularly unhelpful as it forced the young to 
volunteer.862  People’s reluctance to volunteer harmed the scheme, as ‘Civicus’ highlighted in the 
Bolton Journal and Guardian on 23 September.  He attacked the council over the general state of 
preparations in the town, specifically volunteer numbers, public apathy, gas mask distribution, and 
the lack of information about shelter provision.863  These criticisms went unchallenged by local 
officials and ‘Civicus’ made no apology as he felt that it was his duty to draw the public’s attention to 
these matters, an attitude supported by the Bolton Evening News.864  Unlike ‘Civicus’, local labour 
activist J. B. O’Hara took a broader view, arguing that ARP preparations made people fearful of war 
thus making them susceptible to accepting the Munich surrender.  O’Hara’s comment about the 
psychological aspect of ARP echoed an earlier one made by Tom Binks,865 who returned to this 
theme on 2 October.  He argued that ARP should be abolished to help build on the peace established 
at Munich.866 
 
The subject of ARP returned to the streets of Bolton when M-O undertook a short piece of work in 
January 1939.  The number of people questioned as part of this work was small but the comments 
made reflected a range of attitudes to the subject of ARP:867  
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 Working-class woman, 22 – I think it’s just a waste of money.  They could have found better 
thing to do with it. 
 Working-class man, 45 – it’s natural if it came to a do for other people to run to help those in 
trouble.  I think that’s a natural thing, and it will happen without any organisation.  Look at 
Kirk Street during the war, they didn’t have to ask there, everyone around turned out as a 
matter of course.  Of course, it’s useful to have one or two trained people around.  IN any 
case its only to make people think something is being done and to prevent a panic.  The only 
real solution is tunnels.  Dug deep with forty feet of earth on top of them, they would 
probably be safe.  
 Engineer aged 40 with two children – think that ARP is all right.  They do now not very much 
besides training people.  And what he has heard this training is all right.  People learn what 
to do if gas comes and how to deal with incendiary bombs. 
One of the aspects highlighted by the comments was training.  Two training exercises took place in 
late January and early February.  The January exercise was a trial blackout and first aid exercise.  The 
Bolton Journal and Guardian urged people to observe the blackout and provided tips on how to do 
so.  The trial was effective, though it was evident that drivers needed to improve their geographical 
knowledge of the town.868  The second exercise showed a marked improvement as drivers knew 
where they were going.  A wardens’ exercise also took place in the form of a treasure hunt to find all 
the fire hydrants in their areas.  This revealed that many only had small signs that were difficult to 
find.869 
 
The exercises provided some reassurance to the public.  However, the provision of information 
lagged, as the Bolton Journal and Guardian reported that questions about gas masks were a regular 
occurrence when wardens called at houses.870  Gas masks were only one of the protective elements 
that people were trying to obtain information regarding.  Shelters were another.871  Lack of 
information was not the only flaw.  Bolton, like other areas, was struggling to recruit for the auxiliary 
fire service.  Those who had volunteered faced the task of having to build their own fire engine as 
detailed in a letter received by Bolton Trades Council from the Vehicle and Metal Workers Union.  
                                                          
868 Bolton Journal and Guardian, 3 February 1939. 
869 Bolton Evening News, 6 March 1939. 
870 Bolton Journal and Guardian, 10 February 1939. 
871 Bolton Standard, 10 March 1939. 
173 
 
The union offer off assistance with this task provides another example of trade co-operation with 
ARP.872 
The revelation of flaws was a natural part of the testing process.  One development that caused 
complaint was a job advertisement for a typist for ARP work.  This paid position was criticised in four 
letters to the Bolton Evening News, as others gave their time voluntarily.  W. Taylor, an ex-corporal 
and resident of Valletts Lane in Bolton, argued that the unemployed and many ex-servicemen would 
be happy to do paid ARP work instead of volunteering.873  This incident echoed events a year earlier 
following the announcement that the Chief Constable would receive extra payment for being the 
ARP officer.  The editor criticised this attitude, arguing that regular staff were required to ensure a 
highly organised and efficient department.   
 
 
Wing Commander Hodsoll’s observation that Munich was a pivotal turning point is correct in that it 
produced public acceptance of the need for ARP.  This manifested itself in the form of increasing 
volunteers and reinforced the idea that the nation would be prepared to serve when the time came.  
The crisis revealed that even the best-prepared local schemes, in this case, Bolton and Bedfordshire, 
still had some way to go, largely due to the initial shortage of trained volunteers.  This had been the 
result of public indifference, which the crisis helped to overcome.  The sudden surge of volunteers, 
whilst welcomed by the authorities, was also criticised as the lack of volunteers prevented a more 
effective implementation of the plans.  Such criticisms were prevalent in Bedfordshire, with little 
reference to them made in the other geographical areas.  All three areas continued to struggle to 
recruit for the auxiliary fire service.  Aside from the question of volunteers, however, the local 
authorities had an outline plan available for putting into action.  This was an advance from the time 
of the Anschluss.  Bolton’s plan was the most effective as it included the distribution of masks from 
fixed locations.  Fulham and Hammersmith remained woefully behind, a fact seen in the costs that 
each authority had to bear.  Hammersmith further hampered preparations due to its attitudes 
towards organisations who wished to assist, as they viewed matters from a political rather than civic 
perspective.  Public views on ARP schemes were limited in terms of specific criticisms.  Writers 
acknowledged that the authorities had achieved satisfactory results within the constraints they 
faced and encouraged people to volunteer to prevent a repeat of the unpreparedness that the crisis 
revealed.  These appeals would continue following the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 
1939. 
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March – September 1939 
The Munich crisis provided the catalyst for the development of ARP and preparations for war, which 
increased when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia.  In March 1939, the Civil Defence Act became law, 
which introduced a series of ARP obligations for employers with more than 50 employees.  The BBC 
heightened public awareness of ARP by making regular reports on the progress of the legislation and 
reminding listeners that 120,000 volunteers were still required for the auxiliary fire service.874  Even 
with the passing of the Civil Defence Act, questions continued in Parliament covering; opinion poll 
outcomes,875 shelters,876 and the education of the public.  The opinion poll in question revealed that 
over half of adults did not know what to do in case of an air raid.  The April opinion poll had asked 
questions on the subject, revealing that only 19% had undergone training, 20% knew what to do if 
an air raid occurred whilst at work and 28% at home.  The May and June polls also asked question 
related to ARP, revealing that 53% disapproved of the decision not to provide deep shelters and that 
over 70% could not reach a shelter on foot within 7 minutes.877 
Following the German march into Prague, M-O investigated the subjects of ARP and national service.  
The general response to both directives indicated that people were volunteering to make a useful 
contribution to the national efforts.  Comments made included:878 
 Girl, 24 from Liverpool – well I can drive a car, and I’d be doing something. 
 Male air raid warden – wanted to do something for his country 
 Man 26 – joined auxiliary fire brigade, for the sole reason that he hopes he will not be called 
to the colours should the emergency come, but can be allowed to stay at home, on the 
strength of his ARP training. 
These actions were all part of the continuing recruitment drive.  In Bedfordshire, the authorities 
attempted to direct people towards the most appropriate service for their skills.  Luton’s scheme 
had initially aimed to do this with women encouraged to become nurses rather than wardens.  This 
gender stereotyping angered J. E. Cooper, a resident of Beech Road in Luton, who argued that 
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people should be able to choose whilst gaps remained.879  The Chief Constable added to this at a 
meeting two weeks later, stating ‘I see that we have at least one lady present so I shall have to be 
careful what I say’.  These words left J. K. Rice, a resident of High Town Road in Luton, feeling like an 
interloper and she promptly resigned.  However, she soon returned following a series of abusive 
letters that she had received from a Great War veteran.880  Bedford also continued to recruit.  On 2 
June, the Bedfordshire Times published a mixed report showing shortages for - wardens, fire, rescue, 
and repair - whereas first aid and decontamination had a surplus.  The overall count was at the 
required number but maldistributed.881  Further evidence of the shortages came on 9 June when the 
paper reported that the warden service still required 119 men and 85 women, whilst the fire service 
required 240 volunteers.882  These differences were part of a wider pattern occurring across the 
country. 
 
In the middle of April, Luton received a visit from Wing Commander Hodsoll, the ARP Inspector 
General.  During his visit, he attended various meetings, including one at Vauxhall Motors.  This 
included a demonstration from various parts of the firm’s ARP organisation and co-operation with 
Luton auxiliary fire service.  It provided further evidence of the co-operation between employers and 
local authorities.  Hodsoll praised the training of the volunteers and the shelter provision made by 
Vauxhall.  His note of the visit included a reference to other large employers such as Skefco being in 
a similar position.883 
 
To encourage recruitment for all the defence services, national service weeks took place throughout 
the county.  These had a dual purpose: to provide the public with a chance to see what was going on 
and to allow volunteers to put their training into practice.  The Leighton Buzzard parade drew praise 
from local newspaper columnist ‘Candidus’, who described the importance of the parades as 
‘showing what is being done in the interests of civilians in war time’.884   The demonstrations were 
part of a series of practices that took place throughout the county in the summer of 1939.  One of 
these was a blackout in August, which revealed a major flaw in Luton’s plans, namely the need for 
communication between ARP officials and the aerodrome.  ‘A.R.P.’ suggested that flights over the 
town should occur to determine how successful the blackout was.885  The Bedfordshire Times and 
Standard provided in-depth coverage of the August blackout in Bedford, with reporters present in 
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the control room and out on the street.  Householders responded positively with most not turning 
on lights during the ‘raid’.  However, there was some confusion as despite the cancellation of the 
national blackout, Bedford went ahead on its own, which resulted in criticism from the Queen’s Park 
ward.  Overall, the Bedford ARP chair was happy with the result.886  Further reports on 18 August 
revealed that many had not made the necessary preparations to help achieve a total blackout.  The 
report regarded those who were careless as shouldering a heavy burden towards their fellow 
citizens, and encouraged everyone to take precautions.887 
 
Some deficiencies were expected.  Strong criticism of Bedford’s scheme occurred in April when A. W. 
Sanders, the head warden of the De Parys ward, wrote to the Bedfordshire Times criticising the 
council for the slow rate of progress and failing to address concerns raised through official 
channels.888   Bedford council discussed these and took the same view as Luton, namely that the 
action was inappropriate and Sanders should resign.  Sanders refused, as he had the support of 
wardens in his ward but under official pressure, acknowledged that his conduct had been 
inappropriate.889  H. A. Young supported Sanders and called for an official statement.890  The Bedford 
and District Daily Circular viewed the debate as healthy and urged the council not to ignore the 
criticisms as it had on other occasions.891  Once again, this highlighted the issue as to whether 
wardens had the right to criticise in a public forum.  It was understandable that local authorities 
disapproved as they did not want to cause panic, but as an editorial in the Bedfordshire Standard 
argued, the wardens were holding a public office and were therefore acting in the public interest.892 
 
The trial scenarios became a reality when the international situation deteriorated in late August, 
forcing Luton’s Chief Constable to interrupt his holiday to ensure that local matters were in hand.  
However, even by 1 September and despite significant efforts, some gaps remained in Luton’s 
scheme.  The situation report on 1 September noted that there was still a shortage of some 
respirator categories and of whole-time personnel.  This situation was a significant improvement on 
a year earlier and allowed Mr Graham, the clerk to the county council, to deem that the county 
overall was ready.  He said, ‘the public can rest assured that the county is as ready for an emergency 
as any county in Britain’.893  Despite this and information that had appeared in local newspapers, 
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people were still asking the Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph for information on 31 August, which 
they printed on the following day.894  
 
Bedfordshire made steady progress with its preparations during the final six months of peace.  
Discussion of conscription dominated newspaper coverage for parts of this period, which reduced 
the amount of column space devoted to ARP preparations.  The period continued to see the 
recruitment of volunteers and practice drills, coupled with some criticisms of the scheme in Bedford.  
However, by September, the county was ready for war.  
 
 
Fulham’s ARP preparations were the subject of an in-depth M-O study.  M-O chose Fulham as by 
March 1939, it had one of the highest volunteer counts in London. Table 15 provides a percentage 
breakdown of volunteers by age and gender. 
 
Table 15: ARP recruitment in Fulham by age and gender895  
Age Male Female Total % of volunteers 
15-35 42 50 46 
36-50 32 35 33 
51 and over 26 15 21 
 
Most volunteers came from the lower middle and working classes, though female volunteers were 
predominantly upper class.  Upper class volunteers read either The Times or Daily Telegraph, whilst 
the lower classes favoured the Daily Express, News Chronicle, Daily Mirror, and Daily Worker.896  
Newspapers were only one source of information people used with others including word of mouth, 
radio and leaflets.  The main reason for increased recruitment during the winter months was 
wardens providing information and enrolment forms as they delivered gas mask containers.897  The 
survey also found that most had volunteered out of the desire to do something:898 
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 Lower working class man, 26 – Well, my guvnor really was the one.  He said that he was 
going to join and he chatted to the other fellows and myself and we decided we would also 
join.  But I think if the time came I’d sooner be in khaki. 
 Upper class man, 35 – I don’t know.  That’s rather difficult isn’t it?  Sort of civic spirit and 
that sort of thing.  Public duty. 
 Lower working class woman, 41 – to do my bit for the country as a British subject 
 Upper class woman, 64 – because I’m a citizen and a Britisher.  I want to help the country. 
 
The above comments are in keeping with the findings of the M-O directive on national service.  This 
also found that recruitment peaked during international crises. 
 
The increases reported by M-O continued in the months following the German invasion of 
Czechoslovakia.  This was good news for Fulham, though overall London remained 132,000 
volunteers short.  Fulham’s major weakness was its inability to provide rapid training, as Table 16 
indicates, only half of the volunteers (numbers in brackets) had received training by September 
1939.899 
The trained volunteers took part in a public demonstration in May 1939 attended by over 7,000 
people.  Summerskill was surprised at the efficiency displayed during the demonstration, prompting 
her to say that Fulham had one of the finest ARP units in the country and it proved that volunteers 
were worth more than conscripts were.  Astor and De Palma, who shared Summerskill’s view about 
the volunteers, joined her at the display.900 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
899 LSE: BBC Home Service Nine P.M. News 19 July 1939. 
900 LSE: Summerskill 4/3, 7,000 Watch A.R.P. Demonstration; West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 12 May 
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Table 16: Fulham ARP recruitment (April 1939 – September 1939) 901   
Date reported Number 
required 
Number   
enrolled 
Men Women % of 
required 
number 
Lecture 
attendance 
5 April 1939 4,449 2,689 1,804 
(964) 
885 (536) 60.4 1,089 
10 May 1939 4,449 2,975 1,981 
(1,033) 
994 (562) 66.9 2,035 
21 June 1939 4,449 3,419 2,207 
(1,211) 
1,212 
(770) 
76.8 3,710 
19 July 1939  4,449 3,787 2,390 
(1,231) 
1397 
(940) 
85.1 1,940 
 
 
 
Part of M-O’s investigation examined what people thought about local preparations.  Many 
volunteers felt that the council had failed to provide sufficient training.  An example of this related 
to incendiary bombs.  A 62-year-old group warden told an investigator that ‘I’ve got 18 wardens and 
not one of them has handled an incendiary bomb.  It’s all wrong because they are the ones who will 
have to put them out’, thereby confirming the statistical evidence about training rates.902  Examples 
like this reinforce Hinton’s conclusion that ‘the enthusiasm from volunteers was being stifled by 
incompetence and inefficiency’.903   
By this time, Hammersmith’s scheme was also showing progress.  The number of volunteers was 
increasing at a rapid rate and by July they had achieved their target, a remarkable achievement given 
their previously slow progress. 
 
                                                          
901 HFA: Minutes of Proceedings of an Ordinary Meeting of Metropolitan Borough of Fulham Council, 5 April, 
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Table 17: Hammersmith ARP recruitment, April-June 1939904 
 April 1939 May 1939 June 1939 
Wardens 704 751 905 
First Aid 744 810 1,444 
Light Rescue 157 172 208 
Decontamination 72 75 90 
Report 59 70 250 
Messengers 153 169 211 
Drivers  149 164 122 
Miscellaneous 143 160 334 
Total 2,181 2,371 3,554 
Target 3,095 3,095 3,095 
 
Hilda Mabillard, a Hammersmith resident during this period, provided additional details about ARP 
recruitment and training in Hammersmith.  Training took place during the evenings and weekends, 
with the aim of raising awareness and preventing panic.  Evening meetings took place in locations 
like Addison Gardens schools, where the public could come to receive guidance on what to do in the 
event of war.905  
 
The progress of the two London boroughs in the year following Munich, allowed them to catch-up to 
some degree with the other geographical areas, though Hodsoll commented that Bolton’s progress 
was already ‘ahead of others’.906  The March crisis occurred as Bolton council were making plans for 
a second blackout.  In preparation, a Bolton Evening News report asked people to co-operate and 
said that letters had gone out to over 100 employers asking them to forgo some production in order 
to assist.907   The result was an effective blackout without the need for compulsion, prompting one 
Home Office observer to comment that he came to Bolton and was unable to find it.908  However, 
not everybody obeyed, as the paper reported that several houses along the Chorley road were 
brightly lit, while the Bolton Journal and Guardian reported that traffic lights could be seen on the 
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hills a couple of miles away.  Nonetheless, the paper praised the gas works for achieving a degree of 
lighting restriction that the authorities did not think was possible.909 
 
Figure 14: Bolton’s blackout, Bolton Evening News 21 March 1939 
 
The blackout trials helped recruitment and to raise awareness.  Bolton’s recruitment had been 
largely successful but Councillor Talbot still appealed for help with rescue and demolition work.  He 
suggested that the building trade might be able to assist, and a well-attended meeting took place.  
Nearly 400 attended and most agreed to enrol.910  This added to the numbers but even with street 
conversations about ARP taking place911 the town remained 2,500 short of its target based on figures 
published by the Bolton Evening News on 26 April.  The shortfall showed a reduction in May, the 
final set of detailed figures published prior to the declaration of war. 
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Table 18: Bolton ARP recruitment, April-May 1939912 
 Required  April May 
Wardens 2,690 2,227 2,331 
First Aid 495 495 495 
Ambulance drivers  859 258 282 
Rescue 576 576 576 
Decontamination 220 164 168 
Auxiliary fire service 1,550 859 656 
Messengers 292 121 154 
Special Constables 800 800 800 
First aid parties 855 450 537 
Total 8,337 5,680 5,999 
 
 
The rising numbers hid a fall in fire service volunteers, a service that all three geographical areas had 
struggled to recruit.  This remained the case after war had been declared, though more people were 
volunteering, confirming the Bolton Evening News prediction that many would only respond at the 
last minute.913 
 
The Bolton Evening News’s coverage during this period concentrated on practices.  The subject of 
drivers came to the fore again in April and May.  April’s practice found that drivers were happy to 
drive with white kerbs, though without their lights fully screened.  May’s test included ambulance 
drivers, three of whom complained, that others who had not passed their driving test, could 
practice.  If this was going to be the case, they were not surprised that people were not prepared to 
enrol.914  ‘Minx’ supported them and viewed the first practice as badly organised.915  Complaints 
about practices continued to appear, as ‘No More’ complained that no work had occurred overnight 
due to industry’s co-operation with the practice.916  However, the authorities regarded the May 
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practice as a success, with 90% of the wardens turning out on a wet night, a point highlighted by 
Hodsoll in a letter to the town clerk.917 
 
The practices formed part of the volunteers’ training.  Other training included an experience in the 
gas van, showing people how to fit gas masks, and (in the case of the Scouts), signals work for 
training as messengers.  July’s practice was also wet, but 1,500 volunteers and all services took part 
in a practical ARP experience including incendiary bombs and putting out a blaze at ARP 
headquarters.  The Bolton Evening News viewed this as the best form of training.918  Even so, despite 
previous practices, people continued to disobey the blackout.  On 15 July, the Bolton Evening News 
reported that two ARP wardens had gone to the house of a woman who still had her bedroom light 
on.  In answering their knock at the door, she proceeded to turn on all the other lights in the house 
and then claimed the she had not heard about the blackout.919  However, incidents of this nature 
were isolated.  August’s practice brought a further complaint about non-participation.  The Auxiliary 
Fire Service was unhappy about not getting the chance to take part in public demonstrations.920  This 
came after they had had to build their own engine, which gives the impression that the council 
neglected this service. 
 
Sporadic complaints did not prevent the continuation of recruitment efforts at a wide range of 
places, including football matches.  However, as the Bolton Journal and Guardian admitted, the best 
source of recruitment came from a source that nobody wanted, an international crisis.921  One began 
to develop following the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  ARP work sped up with light screening, kerb whitening, 
and householders purchasing material for blacking out windows.  The latter led to a rush for 
appropriate material and a realisation amongst women about the seriousness of the international 
situation.922  The rush continued into September, when the Bolton Evening News reported a woman 
complaining that, ‘it’s such as rush having to do everything at the last minute’.  The editor found the 
rush surprising given the amount written in the preceding months.  The rush did not prevent people 
being very good at blacking out windows, a process they were perfecting.  This was the view of one 
warden after visiting thirty homes.  He found that people were coping with the restrictions in a calm, 
sensible manner.923  The reported rush for material is not surprising based on the results of an M-O 
survey on 27 August, which surveyed 73 working-class households and found that 46 had not yet 
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prepared, due to cost.924  Only 38% had reportedly prepared.925  Last minute purchases continued 
into 4 September as shops opened for this purpose.  However, pubs were not amongst those making 
purchases, as a routine inspection tour by the emergency committee found that they had made little 
effort.926    
 
 
The third period witnessed a change in emphasis away from recruitment towards the reporting of 
practices.  Appeals for volunteers continued, particularly for the auxiliary fire service where 
recruitment remained problematic.  All three areas were approaching war strength by the time of 
the declaration of war.  The work undertaken by M-O in Fulham provides a detailed insight into 
people’s motivations for volunteering and their opinions on the state of local preparations.  M-O 
found a population willing to volunteer but a council that seemed unable to train volunteers quickly.  
Local newspapers reported on the practices taking place, though Bolton’s were more regular.  The 
practices identified weaknesses and provided a clear indication to the public about the work 
undertaken for their protection.  The papers urged people to co-operate and cited examples of non-
cooperation.  This occurred in Bolton and Bedfordshire.  It is harder to judge for the two London 
boroughs, as their practices were part of London-wide ones.  A separate practice in Fulham provided 
surprise for Summerskill in terms of the efficiency of the local unit.  The practices demonstrated that 
for the most part, people were prepared to help the nation prepare for an event that they hoped 
would never come.  However, this did not prevent people in Bolton from leaving it to the last minute 
to prepare. 
 
 
Shelters 
The ARP Act included shelter provision, a subject ignored until after the Munich crisis when 
discussion began to occur.  This discussion led to the conclusion that blast and splinter rather than 
deep shelters would be the most suitable, mainly due to time and cost constraints.  Parliamentary 
discussion of shelter policy occurred during questions about ARP.  In December 1938, Sir John 
Anderson made it clear that deep shelters, even in heavily congested areas, formed part of a longer-
term strategy.927  In January 1939, a series of letters to The Times highlighted the lack of clarity 
surrounding the government’s shelter policy and advocated the adoption of a mixed shelter policy 
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including deep shelters.  Oliver Simmons, the President of the Air Raid Precautions Institute, 
supported the latter, as did J. Johnston Abrahams, who wanted deep shelters to prevent the medical 
services from being overwhelmed.928  However, they accepted that blast and splint shelters were 
required in the short-term.  Spurred on by a growing clamour for deep shelters, the government set 
up the Hailey Commission to examine the evidence, following an application by Finsbury to construct 
a deep shelter.  Haapamaki described this action as a public relations exercise to justify government 
policy.929  Prior to the publication of the report, the government admitted that it contained some 
interesting material and that deep shelters were appropriate in certain areas.930  The government’s 
decision not to implement a deep shelter policy went against opinion poll findings, which revealed 
that only 34% of respondents agreed with government policy.931  Whilst the commission had been 
investigating, the distribution of Anderson blast-and-splinter shelters had begun.  These were free to 
people who earned less than £250 per annum, prompting Mr Thorne, the Labour MP for West Ham 
Plaistow, to state that it was unfair if a man had children and earned over this amount.932   
 
 
Local discussion of shelters did not begin in earnest until after Munich, despite acknowledgement 
that it was ‘one of the government’s most urgent problems’.933  Prior to the crisis, few references to 
shelters occurred in Bedfordshire.  At the end of July, Councillor Roberts raised the subject with 
Luton council, who responded that a survey was taking place and would lead to a report in due 
course.934  Bedford was also considering shelters.  Rumours had circulated that caverns existed 
underneath the town, though water was a potential danger.  Retired Captain F. L. Powell argued that 
a competent engineer would be able to deal with it.935  The investigations were still ongoing when 
the crisis occurred. 
 
The subject returned to the agenda at the end of December when Luton council considered the 
survey report.  After due consideration, a delegation visited the Home Office to discuss the 
possibility of constructing tunnels in the town centre and surrounding hills.936  ‘F. J. C.’, a resident of 
Luton and former chief gas NCO to the 29th division during the Great War, and ‘Another Wartime 
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NCO’ warned against constructing tunnels in the hills, as chalk residue indicating construction would 
be visible from the air.937  The Home Office approved the town centre tunnels and on 2 March came 
the announcement that construction would begin.938  The tunnels were not deep shelters and this 
topic received little attention in Luton.  The only reference came in July 1939 at a joint meeting 
organised by the Luton Labour and Co-operative parties.  Addressing the meeting, Councillor Roberts 
argued that adequate protection from high explosives was required.939  This, like similar meetings 
across the country, did not persuade the government to change its mind. 
 
Deep shelters received greater attention in Bedford.  Mr Francis, a Labour member of the ARP 
committee, urged the examination of this option.  Francis believed that no work had been 
undertaken, but the council informed him that they were awaiting a reply from the Home Office.  
Captain Powell, ‘Air-raid Warden’, and the Bedfordshire Standard made similar calls.940  One street 
even managed to get a petition signed by 98% of the residents supporting better shelter provision.941  
The subject came before the ARP committee following a resolution from wardens in Group B for an 
investigation, which again received the response that the council were awaiting a reply from the 
Home Office.942  Shelter provision was one of the points criticised by A. W. Sanders in a letter to the 
Bedfordshire Times on 14 April.943  The general theme of the letter was Bedford’s slow ARP progress.  
However, the wardens must have had a valid point, as the council terminated the contract of the 
ARP officer for this reason.  After this brief flurry of letters, little further discussion took place. 
 
 
Meanwhile, discussion of shelter provision was more prevalent in London, where protecting the 
population was a major challenge.  The first mention came in January 1938 when Mr C Fisher, a 
member of the LCC LNU staff branch, accused the government of doing nothing to provide 
bombproof shelters.944  Further discussion took place at a meeting of the London Trades Council, as 
it affected their members.  To explain the topic, Professor Haldane spoke to the delegates meeting, 
who recommended the arrangement of a London-wide conference to hear him speak.  The 
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executive committee agreed to this suggestion but the organisational records do not state if the 
meeting ever occurred.945 
 
Shelter provision remained in the background for the remainder of 1938.  Even after the Munich 
crisis, there was little mention of it in the local papers serving Fulham and Hammersmith.  The only 
reference located is a letter from E. H. Fraser, a resident of Baron’s Court Ward, who supported the 
view expressed by Councillor Nicol in a letter to electors that he ‘stood for the immediate 
completion of all measure of air raid precautions necessary for your full protection in the event of 
any future emergency’.  Fraser urged Astor to use his influence to ensure the construction of deep 
shelters in Fulham.946  Given the perceived vulnerability of London in the ‘official’ mind, the lack of 
public debate is surprising.  This changed in January 1939 following discussions between the LCC, the 
Metropolitan Boroughs, the London Chamber of Commerce, and the Home Office.  During these 
meetings, suggestions for air raid shelters included underground car parks.947  A similar suggestion 
occurred in the West London and Hammersmith Gazette, which suggested undertaking a survey to 
identify potential sites for underground shelters, as Anderson shelters were not suitable for all 
houses.948 
 
The vulnerability of London meant that Fulham and Hammersmith were amongst the boroughs 
entitled to receive free Anderson shelters.  The distribution of shelters began in February, 
accompanied by a reassurance from Astor that this did not mean that war was inevitable.949  
Fulham’s work in this area was vigorous and by the end of June 8.092 had been delivered, while in 
Hammersmith the figure was 3,751.950  As part of the Civil Defence Act, employers had a duty to 
provide shelter for their employees.  The Hammersmith branch of the Postal Workers Union duly 
raised the matter with their employer, who informed them that the bike shed would be adapted to 
become a shelter, a decision that the union urged their employer to reconsider.951  These two 
references to shelters did not mean that the campaign for deep shelters had subsided.  The 
Hammersmith Communist Party submitted a scheme for consideration to the council, which 
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commented that it had no observation to make, which does not tell us if the council supported the 
idea.952   
 
The Left’s desire for deep shelters did not reflect the broader public mood, as work by M-O on 
shelters discovered.  Some of this related to Fulham.  One man of 45 considered the trench provision 
adequate, though not if it received a direct hit.953  Another had received his shelter and was not 
going to take a chance in the event of war, whilst a woman of 55 reported that she did not have 
room for an Anderson shelter.954  The mixed views expressed at the end of August 1939 had altered 
by November.  Alderman Lancaster during an interview with an M-O observer expressed the view 
that people had not wanted shelters before the war, an attitude that had now changed.955  His view 
is correct as evidence from the pre-war council minutes refer to applications for the removal of 
shelters.956  He continued by saying that Fulham was ahead of the rest of London regarding shelters, 
a stark contrast to its ARP preparations a year earlier.  Nonetheless, the November 1939 evidence 
revealed defects in the borough’s performance as some houses had two shelters for no apparent 
reason.957    
 
 
Bolton’s shelter experience was different from the other two geographical areas, as wider discussion 
occurred in 1938 not 1939.  It began in March when members of the Junior Imperial League 
discussed the need to seek shelter underground.958   The Bolton Master Spinners’ Association held a 
similar discussion but accepted that deep shelters were unlikely, noting that while other shelter 
forms did not protect against a direct hit, they did offer a degree of protection.959  The Munich crisis 
acted as the catalyst for discussion, which had been absent at council meetings.  ‘Civicus’ duly 
attacked this and the lack of information about shelter provision.  His letter asked for information 
about which basements were shelters and whether plans existed for the digging of trenches.  The 
public had not been provided with this information.960   ‘1914’ added to the points raised by ‘Civicus’, 
arguing that trenches dug during the crisis would not provide adequate protection against high 
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explosives and that heavy rain had resulted in them become waterlogged.  ‘1914’ went on to urge 
people to seek shelter underground,961 a view supported by ‘J.E.R.’, who encouraged people to 
campaign deep shelters.  However, both writers and others expressing a similar point of view, failed 
to take account of the cost.962 
 
The criticism about the lack of information received a correction at the start of November in two 
Bolton Evening News articles detailing the development of ARP in the town.  These stated that 
shelter provision had been a source of concern since July and that to make adequate provision 
people counts had taken place in the town centre at peak periods.  These revealed a need for shelter 
accommodation for 8,000 people and subsequently an investigation of basements had begun.963  
One aim of the articles had been to raise awareness of what was involved in the ARP scheme, in 
which the Bolton Journal and Guardian believed that shelters were the least understood item.  
Therefore, in line with findings from Barcelona, it recommended more numerous small shelters to 
reduce the risk of casualties.964 
 
The start of 1939 mirrored 1938 with only a couple of references to shelters.  Both occurred in 
February one referring to costs incurred while the other noted that Bolton would not be among the 
first towns to receive Anderson shelters.  The lack of references continued until May when the 
‘Town Topics’ column revealed that a shelter survey needed to be completed within seven days, 
resulting in officials working 15 hour days to complete the task.  Householders hindered progress by 
asking officials to come back at a more convenient time.  Nevertheless, progress was good.965  This 
mention in the Bolton Evening News was the penultimate one in the paper before the declaration of 
war, with other papers providing coverage instead.  The precise nature of the shelters had not been 
determined when the survey occurred, though the ‘In a Bolton Mirror’ column in the Bolton 
Standard noted that a local aviator from the Great War supported Anderson shelters as they 
provided protection from shrapnel.  This had been one of the biggest killers during the conflict.966 
 
Following the completion of the survey, trench construction began in June on a scale unknown 
previously.  The Bolton Journal and Guardian urged the public to become familiar with the layout as 
                                                          
961 Bolton Evening News, 10 and 13 October 1938; Bolton Journal and Guardian, 14 October 1938. 
962 Bolton Evening News, 11 and 28 October 1938. 
963 Bolton Evening News, 4 November 1938. 
964 Bolton Journal and Guardian, 11 November 1938. 
965 Bolton Evening News, 1, 2 and 5 May 1939. 
966 Bolton Standard, 12 May 1939. 
190 
 
part of their own ARP preparation.967  The shelter survey revealed that 87,000 people were entitled 
to free shelters but not everyone would be able to obtain one, as many lived in houses that had no 
space to erect one.968  The space problem was not one that the council alone faced.  Mr Barnes, a 
member of the Bolton Master Spinners’ Association executive committee, highlighted a similar 
problem, as most buildings in the town did not have room in the cellar for a shelter.969  The Bolton 
Standard, given the problem of where to locate shelters, wondered if the question of underground 
shelters should be re-examined to provide protection.  It even suggested possible locations, but the 
council made no comment.970  This was the penultimate mention in the local papers.  The final 
mention occurred in a Bolton Evening News report, which stated that the crisis was bringing out the 
community spirit in people, as people worked together to construct shelters in areas where there 
was no room for individual ones.971  Once again, this demonstrated that the public would answer the 
call when it came. 
 
 
Shelters form a subset of ARP due to their supposed importance within the national debate, 
particularly on the Left.  Locally, the subject received little attention until after the Munich crisis.  
However, it is surprising that the predominant local discussion in 1938 occurred in Bolton, which was 
furthest from the danger zone.  The main point here was the lack of information provided to the 
public about shelters specifically, as the wider ARP preparations received extensive coverage.  This 
was also true of Bedfordshire but limited in the two London boroughs.  The debate shifted in 1939 
from north to south, with greater discussion in London than in Bolton, though the subject remained 
an active one.  One feature in all three geographical areas was that debate tended to appear in 
reports and editorials rather than in the letters column.  Occasionally a letter appeared from a 
concerned citizen or warden.  Council officials viewed the latter as inappropriate, even if they did 
have some valid points to raise. 
References to deep shelters occurred in all three areas with support from the Left in Fulham and 
Hammersmith.  Despite indicating their preference for deep shelters, both London boroughs actively 
pursued shelter distribution.  Here, Fulham led the way, which was in stark contrast to previous 
attitudes detectable in the borough, which by 1939 had come to accept the need to prepare even if 
it was not the preferred solution.  Fulham and Hammersmith were not the only local authorities to 
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adopt a common-sense approach to shelter provision.  Luton adopted a similar policy when it 
submitted a scheme that included tunnels in the town centre as part of a mixed shelter policy. 
 
 
Existing historical writing has focussed on the national situation, which places an emphasis on public 
indifference and the Munich crisis as a turning point.  The local evidence from all three cases studies 
confirms the main tenets of these conclusions but also highlights the different rates of progress, 
both in terms of recruitment and public co-operation with local practices, which existing work 
overlooks.  Its inclusion furthers the argument that by the time war came, the public accepted the 
need to fight, even if there was no desire to do so, as highlighted in previous chapters. 
The slow rate of discussions at a national level hindered progress and recruitment, which resulted in 
the ARP Act not becoming law until January 1938, though the local authorities had undertaken some 
preparatory work.  Slow progress continued until an ARP broadcast and the Anschluss in March 1938 
produced the first recruitment rush.  This set the trend for increased recruitment during 
international crises.  In Bolton, the ARP department quickly became the council’s busiest and the 
crisis recruitment in Bedfordshire at a time where the local authorities were trying different 
methods of public engagement.  Yet the response in the two London boroughs was pitiful, a 
situation made worse in Fulham by people not knowing how to register.  This provided a further 
example of the council’s opposition to ARP. 
Following an initial surge, recruitment slowed until the Munich crisis took the country to the brink of 
war.  This made people realise how far the international situation had deteriorated and in the week 
leading up to the agreement, people rushed to volunteer, prepared to do any job that would help to 
prepare Britain’s defences.  Ironically, in Luton, this occurred a few days after a poorly attended ARP 
demonstration, thereby indicating the prevalence of public apathy.  The eagerness of people to 
assist meant that gas mask assembly and distribution proceeded quickly.  The volunteers assembling 
the gas masks came from all backgrounds and worked in a good atmosphere, undertaking work for 
an event that they hoped would never occur.  
The crisis provided the impetus that the country needed in terms of volunteers.  The efforts of 
volunteers were widely praised, though some criticisms were made that more could have been 
achieved had people been fully trained.  In terms of numbers, Bolton and Bedfordshire were better 
prepared than the two London boroughs, a finding in keeping with the conclusion that London was 
behind the rest of the country.  Bedfordshire’s scheme (excluding Bedford and Luton) came close to 
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achieving the required number of volunteers, despite rural areas often lacking masks.  The schemes 
of the two London boroughs were woefully inadequate, a fact reflected in the large amount that 
they had to spend compared to the other two areas.   
The lessons learned during the Munich crisis convinced the government to launch a voluntary 
national service campaign in January 1939, which encompassed broader civil defence preparations.  
Despite the campaign, overall numbers remained below their allotted targets, partly due to the 
government decision to increase the targets by 25% to create a war reserve.  The German invasion 
of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 added to the numbers still further and maintained the link between 
recruitment and international crises. 
The link between recruitment and crises is evident in the M-O study of ARP in Fulham (Figure 15).  
The M-O study of ARP in Fulham is important within the historiography of ARP as it provides an 
indication of people’s motivation for volunteering and their opinion on local preparations.  
Respondents stated, in line with the directive in national service (discussed in chapter 7), had 
volunteered out of a desire to ‘do their bit’.  However, the local council hindered their enthusiasm by 
failing to provide information or practical work during training, and treating residents like children.    
By March 1939, practice drills had begun in Bolton and Bedfordshire.  The first practices in both 
areas highlighted problems, which improved over time and local schemes became more proficient.  
The biggest problem in both areas was people leaving lights on during blackout practices.  The local 
papers reported several occurrences of this, often women who were waiting for their husbands to 
come home.  With each practice, public co-operation increased.  Bolton’s practices produced a few 
complaints from those who were not give the opportunity to participate, but letters of this type did 
not appear in either of the other geographical areas.  The rate of progress had increased 
dramatically in Fulham when it held a display in May, whose efficiency surprised Summerskill.  The 
council was also very active in pursuing the distribution of Anderson shelters, even though it would 
have preferred deep shelters.  This was part of an increasing acceptance on the part of Fulham about 
the need to prepare.  By contrast, no information about ARP demonstrations in Hammersmith has 
been located.   
 
 
A common factor throughout this chapter for all the geographical areas has been the role played by 
the local newspapers.  They had many roles: providing information to the public, encouraging people 
to volunteer, and providing space for criticisms.  In short, they all served their local areas and acted 
in what they deemed to be the best interests of the local population.  This meant that they 
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supported ARP work.  Of the newspapers, the Bolton newspapers were probably the most active in 
this regard.   
The international crises that occurred during 1938 and 1939 produced an increasing willingness 
amongst the public to help to prepare the nation for war.  The critical turning point in this process 
was the Munich crisis with the revelation of the true state of the nation’s defences.  The air defences 
at this point were insufficient and would have been ineffective against aerial bombardment.  In the 
11 months following Munich, a lot of preparation took place and the time gained meant that Britain 
would be able to withstand the initial onslaught though it would take the fall of France in 1940 to 
make the public fully aware of the danger.   
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Figure 15: Monthly enrolment in Fulham 972 
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Chapter 6: The Safety of Children 
 
Evacuation, Davies, Foster, and Steele argue, was one of the biggest social upheavals in twentieth 
century Britain and one that would contribute to the Beveridge report.  They highlight that the 
contemporary or ‘official’ version portrays a well-organised process with city children having a 
wonderful time in the countryside.  The official version was the one produced by newspapers at the 
time to maintain morale.  However, this version hid another story, which as historical writing on the 
topic has expanded, has included the diversity of those who took part and the actual experience of 
the evacuees themselves.973  The ‘official’ history produced by the government requires the use of 
two volumes, The History of Civil Defence974 and The Problems of Social Policy.975  Taken together it is 
possible to piece together the full story.  Of these two, the latter volume is of more use.  Titmuss 
discusses the 1931 committee of investigation, which reported in 1934.  However, the preparation 
for evacuation is traceable back to December 1924 when the need for evacuation was recognised. 976  
The 1934 report did not deny the need for evacuation, and considered the problem to be one of 
preventing panic.  It recommended the evacuation of 3.5m people from London alone due to the 
estimated potential devastation from aerial bombardment.  Reinforcing the ‘official’ fears was 
cinema newsreel coverage of, and literature about, the Spanish Civil War.  This included the 
bombing of Guernica and the bombing of a school at Getalfe in Madrid, which killed 70 people.977  
Despite these concerns, little advanced work was undertaken.  A further examination took place in 
1938 under the auspices of Sir John Anderson.  The committee’s report was due for publication in 
July but did not appear until September, in the middle of the Munich crisis.  Instead, the work of the 
LCC formed the basis of evacuation planning.  The crisis revealed that the government had failed to 
undertake any substantial work on evacuation, a shortcoming that William Eady admitted.978  
However, the crisis acted as the impetus for work to begin in earnest to refine the plans that had 
begun to take shape.  This included finding evacuee billets, determining who would pay, and dividing 
the country into danger zones.  Expressions of opinion about these tasks occurred in parliamentary 
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questions, newspaper articles, and letters to the editor.  The concerns raised were valid, as evidence 
from September 1939 demonstrates.   
 
The plans were refined in the eleven months following the Munich crisis and went into operation on 
31 August with the announcement of Operation Pied Piper, the coded signal for evacuation to begin.  
The arrangements in the evacuating areas were indeed orderly, hence the claim in the ‘official’ 
version.  Some of the credit must go to voluntary organisations such as the WVS and the Girl Guides.  
The WVS worked with local authorities and other organisations, but by July 1939 they were 
concerned about the lack of a lead from the government.  Therefore, they began to make secret 
preparations with other organisations, such as the Guides to determine who would take charge 
where.979  The Guides assisted by looking after younger children and helping to prepare houses for 
evacuees.  Their history of the war noted that no social matching took place during evacuation.980  
The lack of social matching prior to evacuation and during the billeting process, triggered the social 
clash that is a feature of the alternative narrative.  John Welshmen and A. D. K. Owen, the latter of 
whom acknowledged that the nation rose to the challenge, both refer to it.981  This is partly 
attributable to the government’s lack of interest in social research.982  It was only a small part of the 
failure by the authorities to perfect and communicate the plans.  A bigger failing in the reception 
areas, which the History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series acknowledges, 
concerned the neglect of facilities in reception areas, as the emphasis was on evacuating people.983  
The Anderson report had recommended additional facilities, which local authorities refused to 
spend money on until officially sanctioned by the government, which did not authorise the work 
until August 1939.984   This added to the concerns about ‘dirty’ urban children.  Further evidence of 
the government’s failure concerns Jewish children, particularly those who had arrived on the 
Kindertransports.  Many could not communicate with their hosts properly, and the government 
failed to communicate the dietary requirements of Orthodox Jews.  The result was that many local 
shops in the reception areas did not stock kosher food.  These examples are only a few of those 
found in the alternative narrative that challenge the ‘official’ view of a smooth process.     
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This chapter examines the development of various plans for the safety of children.  These plans and 
the reaction to them varied depended on the status of an area as either evacuation, neutral, or 
reception.  Amar-Flood provides a brief description of these:985 
 Evacuation – those designated for evacuation, which were often found in the large 
conurbations  
 Neutral – occupied a position between conurbations and rural districts  
 Reception – largely rural areas and considered to be in least danger of German attack 
The chapter seeks to demonstrate that London was ahead of the rest of the country in evacuation 
planning, thanks to the work of the LCC.  These benefits came to the fore during the Munich crisis, 
which provided the impetus for the development of a national plan as allowed for by the ARP Act.  
The LCC’s planning continued following the crisis and its work allowed for a well-executed 
evacuation procedure when the time came.  However, it failed to communicate properly with 
authorities in the reception areas, which, along with a lack of government foresight, meant that they 
were not fully prepared for evacuation.  This exacerbated some of the fears displayed in reception 
areas such as Bedfordshire.  The evidence presented will further the argument for a well-planned 
evacuation but at the same time reinforce the opposing emphases of the alternative narrative.  
These include the theme of dirty children and the failure to communicate with reception areas.   
 
Evacuation and the general safety of children from air raids produced few mentions in the case study 
areas prior to the setting up of the Anderson committee in May 1938.  The first came in January 
1938, when the Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph and the Bolton Evening News reported on a 
circular from the Board of Education.  This advised that the wartime evacuation of children was 
desirable.986  Bolton’s education committee responded by beginning to make plans for children’s 
safety at school by agreeing that each school would have a member of staff trained in gas 
precautions, while caretakers would receive ARP and fire training.987  However, a lack of finance 
would prevent further progress until April 1939.  George Doland, the chair of the House of Commons 
evacuation sub-committee, addressed the lack of overall progress in a letter to The Times in May 
1938.988  He, like other letter writers agreed that evacuation was desirable.  One of these writers was 
John Ryle, who suggested that counties and small towns adopt city boroughs where the children 
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could come from in wartime.989  These letters appeared a few weeks before the Anderson 
committee began to hear evidence. 
 
 
Prior to the hearings commencing, the LCC had written to the Home Office advising that any scheme 
would require the involvement of the teaching profession.  Mr Mander, the general secretary of the 
National Union of Teachers, reaffirmed this when giving evidence on 14 June.990  Abigail Bregman 
refers to the role of teachers in British preparations for war in her examination of teachers’ attitudes 
to domestic and international problems.  She identifies the Anschluss as the beginnings of a turning 
point, with the Munich crisis as the moment of actual confirmation about the necessity of ARP and 
evacuation.  From the events of this period, teachers and the government would clearly need to 
work together as part of the process.991  Another witness questioned by the committee was Colonel 
John Stevens, the Chief Constable of Bedfordshire, whom the committee asked about the number of 
evacuees that the county would be able to receive.  Sir John Anderson suggested 230,000.  Stevens 
rejected this figure on the basis that a lot of the available accommodation would be in Bedford and 
Luton, towns containing strategic targets.  Stevens stressed that children would be easier to 
integrate than adults and that despite public indifference due to the lack of belief in the likelihood of 
war, local ARP work was progressing well.992  Following the completion of the hearings, the 
committee wrote and submitted a report to the Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, in late July.  Hoare 
acknowledged receipt of the report in response to a question from Mr Simmonds, a Conservative 
MP, who hoped for the publication of the report within a few days due to the need to carry public 
opinion on this matter.  Hoare stated his intention to publish the report in full, but said that it would 
take more than a few days.993   
 
 
The publication of the report occurred in September, at a time when the Beds and Herts Evening 
Telegraph was speculating that it would recommend undertaking an accommodation survey.  The 
report did make this recommendation, but rejected the use of camps and failed to provide details 
about the arrangements that local authorities would need to make.  Publication came after ad-hoc 
plans had been set in motion due to the international situation.  An internal LCC memorandum 
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reported that the government had worked out an evacuation scheme for children but a lack of 
railway rolling stock meant that any evacuation would initially be to counties close to London.994  
Local authority representatives received a briefing on 16 September, which included how many 
evacuees they would need to accommodate.  Bedfordshire’s figure was 49,950. 
 
Table 19: Bedfordshire billeting capacity995 
Authority Number 
Kempston Urban District 2,900 
Bedford Rural District 10,600 
Sandy Urban District 1,600 
Biggleswade Urban District 2,300 
Biggleswade Rural District 6,200 
Dunstable 6,550 
Ampthill 900 
Luton Rural District 7,100 
Ampthill Rural District 8,700 
Leighton Urban District 3,100 
  
Total 49,950 
 
 
Following rapid recruitment, local officials set to work on a secret accommodation survey, in which 
E. J. Morgan participated.  Morgan had to present a letter to householders asking for the 
information.  It informed them that they must not divulge the nature of the work to others thereby 
preventing panic.996   
 
 
Bedfordshire’s hastily put together plans were in stark contrast to Bolton, where the only reference 
to evacuation was in a newspaper report about two meetings held at County Hall.  The first was for 
town clerks from evacuation areas and the second for those from reception areas.  They covered the 
evacuation of non-combatants from industrial areas.997 
 
 
By contrast, London’s planning outstripped the rest of the country.  On 13 September, the LCC 
circulated an outline of its plans for school heads to comment on their feasibility, a process that 
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remained secret to prevent panic.998  A more detailed version became available on 23 September.  
The plan advised schools to explain to parents that devastation from bombing, as seen in China and 
Spain could occur.  Therefore, parents were encouraged to entrust their children to teachers in the 
event of evacuation.999  So serious was the situation that authorities insisted that school staff should 
be available over the weekend of 24-5 September.  On 26 September, schools such as Harwood 
Road Infant School in Fulham received emergency instructions, followed two days later by advice to 
stand by for evacuation.1000  Further examples occurred in the logbooks of Burlington and St Paul’s.  
Burlington had taken the LCC’s advice and informed parents.  The report of the headmistress praised 
the efforts of staff and the co-operation of the local authority for supplying gas masks.1001  As St 
Paul’s was outside LCC control, they did not have this option and developed their own scheme.1002  
The LCC’s decision to develop a scheme highlighted the detailed planning required and that the co-
operation of teachers was essential.  Additionally, given the speed and secrecy required, the work 
that took place was a testament to the efforts of local officials and schools.   
 
 
A Times leader, which said that the scheme was ‘gigantic and will require exact organisation’, 
criticised the secrecy surrounding evacuation planning and the lack of public information about it 
during the Munich crisis.  The leader was criticised by Mr Robertson, chair of the LCC Education 
Committee, as it did not do justice to the achievements of those working on the scheme.  The 
scheme had gone from nothing to a point where the railway times were scheduled and parents 
consulted.1003  In a letter of 5 October, Hereward Wake from Courteenhall explained the challenges 
that rural areas would face, including a greater call on their health and sanitation facilities.  The 
letter implied that these points had not been considered and would need to be in order to ensure 
careful implementation; a process that the formation of local committees to educate people as to 
why evacuation was necessary could assist with.1004  This would allay some of the fears present in 
reception areas, especially as William Eady admitted that there were no plans for how to deal with 
evacuees in these areas.1005 
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The fears alluded to at the national level were expressed in Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire.  An 
unidentified audience member at a meeting of the Harpenden Women’s Conservative Association 
highlighted the unreasonable demands made during the crisis.  She said ‘I was told I must 
accommodate eight children and a mistress’, but did not specify what type of mistress.1006  This 
article hinted at attitudes towards compulsory billeting, which F. G. Brownson had written about a 
few weeks earlier as being resented and undemocratic.1007  One way of overcoming this objection 
would be to use volunteers, while another would be to provide information, a step viewed as 
essential by the Bolton Women’s Association if the evacuation scheme was to be a success.1008  
Comments about evacuation outside London were scarce, and those made in the other geographical 
areas came from women. 
 
 
London’s own plans received comment from a variety of sources including school magazines.  The 
autumn edition of the Central Fulham School magazine praised the efforts of staff and the attitude 
of parents, as did the Latymer School magazine.1009  Comments in three other school logbooks 
reinforced this: Sherbrooke Road, St Paul’s, and Burlington Girls.1010  During speeches at Burlington’s 
prize day in November, Bea Lambert, chair of governors at the school, praised the staff who had 
worked long hours making the necessary preparation for the school’s evacuation.1011    
 
 
 
Following the Munich crisis, a review of evacuation procedures began.  Once Parliament 
reassembled on 1 November, questions ranged from the number of people requiring evacuation1012 
to the issuing of instructions to the reception areas.1013  The LCC requested information from schools 
including numbers attending, siblings at other schools (a point that worried Fulham council, as it did 
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not want the senior schools to be flooded with infant relations and affectionate parents)1014 and the 
number of staff willing to assist with evacuation.  Mr Rich from the LCC interviewed the President of 
the London Teachers Association and former mayor of Fulham, Mr S Vanderhook.  Vanderhook 
advocated the need for shelters, keeping schools together, and the commencement of evacuation 
before the outbreak of hostilities.  His most crucial point was that the impact upon children should 
be minimal,1015 a view shared by Miss Callendar, the head of the county secondary school in 
Fulham.1016 
 
 
At a national level, evacuation work was progressing at the Board of Education, where it was the 
subject of meetings in November and December.  On 14 November, discussions included a house-to-
house survey.  Sir Maurice Holmes, a civil servant at the Board of Education, advised that it needed 
to be emphasised that teachers would supervise most children during the day. 1017  A December 
meeting discussed area categorisation, the basis for which had been two factors, congestion and 
vulnerability.  The discussion indicated that vulnerability should be emphasised.1018  In other 
meetings, evacuee numbers for each area were decided.  Although Bedford and Luton’s 
classification was neutral, the county would initially receive 34,000 evacuees.1019    
 
 
By the end of 1938, the attention given to evacuation planning reflected the growing seriousness of 
the international situation.  However, the plans nationally and in the reception areas were woefully 
behind those of the LCC.  The Munich crisis demonstrated this, but even the LCC’s plans lacked 
sufficient detail, in an equivalent way to the ARP plans.  The lack of detail meant that reception areas 
such as Bedfordshire were prevented from preparing.  Instead, there was fear and resentment at the 
prospect of billeting, resulting from a failure to provide relevant information.  The crisis and its 
aftermath, however, meant that by January 1939 more detailed planning could begin.   
 
 
The start of 1939 began with a series of letters to The Times proposing the use of camps for 
evacuation purposes, an option rejected by the Anderson report.  George Doland viewed it as a good 
                                                          
1014 LMA: LCC/EO/WAR/1/, Education Committee, 24-27 October 1938. 
1015 LMA: LCC/EO/WAR/1/5, Notes of Statement Made by the President of the London Teachers Association at 
an Interview with Mr Rich, 14 November 1938. 
1016 LMA: LCC/EO/WAR/1/5, Miss B Callender to Dr Hughes, 25 November 1938. 
1017 TNA: ED/136/110, Conference in Sir George Chrystal's Room, Ministry of Health, 14 November 1938. 
1018 TNA: ED/136/110, Note of Conference in Sir George Chrystal's Room, 20 December 1938. 
1019 TNA: ED/136/110, East Anglia, 1938; TNA: ED136/116, Reception Areas, 1938. 
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long-term solution,1020 while Alwyn Parker, a resident of Godalming, argued that making use of the 
unemployed would speed up camp construction.1021   The debate in The Times was only one of the 
discussion points.  Parliamentary debate covered area designation, private evacuation,1022 and 
compensation arrangements.1023   September 1938’s accommodation survey had revealed the 
number of potential billets.  A more detailed survey began in January 1939 with volunteers, 
including teachers and women’s organisations, undertaking the work in Luton.  The volunteers 
generally received a positive reception, with only 1 in 30 surveyed described as ‘frosty’.  Most of the 
objections occurred when the men of the household were at home, as they felt that ‘an 
Englishman’s home was his castle’ and therefore it was up to him to decide what to do.1024   
Harpenden resident R. F. Halcomb raised some of these objections in a letter to the Luton News.  
Halcomb acknowledged the need for evacuation but argued that the health concerns associated 
with private billeting would sap the morale of the home front, which was vital in wartime.  In a 
further letter, he indicated support for using camps, a sentiment expressed in private letters that he 
had received.1025   However, ‘A Harpenden mother’ and J. Cauldwell, a local representative of the 
Transport and General Workers Union, rejected Halcomb’s claims.  Cauldwell stated that he would 
gladly build himself an army hut to live in so that evacuated children could use his house.1026   The 
letters exchanged in the Luton News underlined the need to educate people, but even this would 
not provide a guaranteed method of removing any objections.   
 
 
The start of 1939 also brought the revelation of Bedford and Luton’s designation as neutral areas.1027   
Both councils, supported by Bedfordshire County Council, protested due to the presence of strategic 
industries within their vicinity.  The government provided a partial explanation in a letter to Joseph 
Graham, the clerk of the county council.  It explained that England’s small size meant that safety 
anywhere was only relative.1028  The government’s response did not satisfy the councils and they 
continued to argue for reclassification on a strategic basis as Graham explained in a letter on 11 July.  
He stated that ‘Luton was the first town of any magnitude north of London, with its numerous 
                                                          
1020 The Times, 4 January 1939. 
1021 The Times, 10 and 13 February 1939. 
1022 Hansard, HC Debs. Volume 347, Columns 980-1 and 87-8 (15 May 1939) 
1023 Hansard, HC Debs. Volume 349, Columns 611-2 (29 June 1939) 
1024 Luton News, 26 January 1939. 
1025 Luton News, 26 January and 2 February 1939. 
1026 Luton News, 2 February 1939. 
1027 Luton News, 2 February 1939; BA: WW2/AR/C2/14, J. B. Graham to the Secretary, Ministry of Health, 1 
April 1939. 
1028 BA: WW2/AR/C2/12, J. Russell Smith to Clerk of the County Council, 9 February 1939; BA: Bor.L/CA/1/27A, 
J. Russell Smith to the Clerk of Bedfordshire County Council, 14 July 1939. 
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industrial undertakings; it would prove an easy target to any aeroplanes’.1029   Prior to this letter 
there had been a partial success as the need to find military billets had reduced the number of 
evacuees by 2,000.  Yet this still left the county potentially in receipt of over 80,000 evacuees, with 
over 47,000 in Bedford and Luton.1030  These figures did not please the Beds and Herts Evening 
Telegraph editorial, which summed up the local attitude by stating ‘Luton wants to know not so 
much under what conditions they should be billeted but why they should be billeted at all, as the 
town is recognised as being vulnerable to air attack’.1031   However, Luton’s position had not 
prevented over 2,000 people from volunteering to assist with the evacuation scheme, a number that 
had reached 8,000 by July.  This occurred despite claims that the uncertainty was preventing women 
from volunteering to accept evacuees.1032    
 
The concerns raised by a small minority of the public and local officials concentrated on the county’s 
status as a reception area and on health concerns.  To be effective as a reception area, dispersal 
plans were required, part of which were revealed by the Bedfordshire Standard on 12 May.  Bedford 
fairground would be the central clearing point and all local schools would close for an initial period 
to facilitate the reception process.1033  However, this was only part of the plan.  Only officials from 
the relevant councils knew the remainder.  Part of the LCC’s plans involved visiting the reception 
areas, and one such visit to Bedfordshire took place in April.  Dr C. F. Strong’s report on the visit 
noted a lack of plans for the continued education of the children.1034  Moreover, there was a general 
lack of requests for information from the reception areas, which surprised LCC clerks.1035  The LCC 
were not the only ones worried about the impact on education.  Lennox-Boyd raised a related 
question with the Board of Education, asking if those transferred to central schools from village 
schools would have to return to free up places.  The Board informed him that evacuated and local 
children would be educated together.1036  The local council and the LCC hampered the planning by 
failing to share or request the relevant information. 
 
 
                                                          
1029 BA: Bor.L/CA/1/27A, J. B. Graham to the Secretary,, 11 July 1939. 
1030 BA: Bor.L/CA/1/27A, J. B. Graham to the Secretary, 1 April 1939; BA: WW2/AR/C2/14, Russell Smith to 
Clerk of the Country Council, 17 April 1939; LMA: LCC/EO/WAR/1/198, London Reception Areas, 1939. 
1031 Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph, 2 May 1939. 
1032 BA: Bor.L CA/1/24, Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Borough of Luton National Service Committee, 24 
May 1939; Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph, 11 July 1939; BA: Bor.L/CA/1/27A, Secretary to the Town Clerk, 
26 July 1939. 
1033 Bedfordshire Standard, 12 May 1939. 
1034 LMA: LCC/EO/WAR/1/6, Evacuation Scheme Confidential Bulletin No.10, April 1939. 
1035 N. Gartner, Operation Pied Piper: The Wartime Evacuation of Schoolchildren from London and Berlin, 1938-
46 (Charlotte, NC, 2012): 57. 
1036 TNA: ED136/117, M. D. Tenant to J. Reade, 5 May 1939. 
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Bedfordshire’s concerns as a designated reception area echoed those of other areas, though much 
discussion took place away from public forums, which makes it harder to assess wider public opinion 
on the subject.  Part of the problem was a lack of knowledge of the LCC’s plans, which were 
dependent upon several factors.  One of these was that evacuation was voluntary and would require 
parental consent.  The Anderson committee recognised this and one of the LCC evacuation sub-
committees confirmed it.  The LCC sub-committee recommended holding meetings with parents like 
those held during the Munich crisis.  For these meetings, head teachers required as much 
information as possible, some of which the LCC duly requested from schools, as information was key 
to the success of any evacuation scheme.  However, the LCC clearly stated that it was not 
responsible for the arrangements in the reception areas.1037  One of the pieces of information not 
provided to schools was their destination, a point flagged by the Education Officer in a 
memorandum dealing with transport arrangements.  He hoped that pairing of evacuated schools 
with similar ones in reception areas would occur.1038  The provision of this information to reception 
areas would have allowed more effective planning and could have alleviated other problems.  The 
Jewish community were concerned about the practice of religious observance in some of the 
reception areas, a matter they raised with the LCC.  However, the LCC refused to inform them of the 
precise destination of each school in advance.1039  Another problem was the potential breaking up of 
families, a point discussed during evacuation rehearsals in July.  The file for each reception area 
listed each householder’s requirements and contained instructions to the teacher in charge of the 
party that families should remain together.  If this was not possible, then their billets should be close 
to each other.1040  Evacuation as families was one option, whilst doing so as schools was another, but 
the latter would not allow siblings at different schools to stay together, an option that Fulham 
council favoured.1041 
 
Concerns about keeping families together provide a partial explanation for some of the newspaper 
reports in the two London boroughs.  In late May, the Fulham Chronicle reported that mothers with 
under-fives were reluctant to register for evacuation.  The paper concluded that people were not 
enthusiastic about official plans, a state of affairs that remained unchanged a month later when 
                                                          
1037 HFA: DD/1026/26, Government Evacuation Scheme, 30 March 1939; HFA: DD/1027/15, Harwood Road 
Junior Mixed and Infants School Log Book, 1933-1948. 
1038 LMA: LCC/EO/WAR/1/38, Memorandum by the Education Officer, L.C.C.: Transport Problems, 25 May 
1939. 
1039 LMA: LCC/EO/WAR/1/219, Evacuations Scheme Bulletin No.21, 1939. 
1040 LMA: LCC/EO/WAR/1/24, Rehearsal of the Reception of Evacuated School Children, 28 July 1939. 
1041 LMA: LCC/EO/WAR/1/173, Evacuation and A.R.P., 1939. 
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fewer than 20% in Fulham had registered for this type of evacuation.1042  A letter to The Times 
suggested that strong family connections made mothers reluctant to go, which the Fulham figure 
seems to confirm.1043 
 
The health of evacuees was a primary concern for reception areas and featured in the West London 
Observer at the end of June when ‘G.P.’ wrote to the paper.  He praised the work undertaken but 
raised concerns about education, the types of air raid shelters in the reception areas, and the failure 
to improve health and drainage facilities in these areas.1044  The West London Teachers Association 
had similar concerns, which ‘G.P.’ highlighted in a further letter on 28 July.  ‘G.P.’ reported their 
resolution calling for full information so that they could recommend the scheme to parents.  The 
resolution stated that ‘in the best interest of the policy of evacuation it is essential that the teachers 
of both the evacuation and reception areas should be in possession of the fullest possible 
information’.  They, like ‘G.P.’’s original letter, called for adequate shelter provision,1045 though this 
was not an area that the LCC had control over. 
 
 
Official concerns differed from those raised in newspapers.  Officials were concerned to ensure that 
they had the necessary information available, which they were reluctant to share due to the need to 
maintain secrecy, avoid panic, and prevent misrepresentation by the foreign press.  Had more 
disclosure occurred then some of the problems encountered in September 1939 might have been 
preventable.  As the months passed, the lack of information became a concern for the public, 
notably teachers.  Accompanying this unease were concerns about the provision of air raid shelters 
and the degree of safety available, a concern displayed in Bedfordshire.  However, as the 
government argued, the small size of England meant that safety was only relative.      
 
 
Shelter provision was the primary area of concern in Bolton, an area classified as neutral.  Councillor 
Ashmore, a member of the Independent Labour Party, was unhappy with this and urged the council 
to appeal to Whitehall for re-classification as a danger area.  She, along with Alice Foley, a local trade 
union activist, asked questions about the provision of shelters in schools, questions that had gone 
                                                          
1042 Fulham Chronicle, 26 May 1939. LMA: LCC/CL/CD/01/089, Registration of Children under 5 with Their 
Mothers, 26 June 1939. 
1043 The Times, 2 June 1939. 
1044 West London Observer, 30 June 1939. 
1045 West London Observer, 28 July 1939. 
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unanswered.1046  On 12 May 1939, the Bolton Journal and Guardian reported that the education 
committee were working on a scheme.1047  Soon, the paper reported that teachers and caretakers 
would receive training and that shelters were essential to prevent children from returning home.  
Despite this progress, Mrs Ashmore questioned the scheme and referred it back, as protection for 
only 6,000 out of 23,000 children would be available.  Part of the problem was that this area of work 
had been late commencing, as no money had been available prior to April 1939 despite discussions 
on the subject in January 1938.1048   
 
Bolton’s focus on the provision of shelter for schools, contrasts with the other two geographical 
areas.  References to work in this area are available in school logbooks, an overlooked source in the 
study of ARP and evacuation, though the details contained within them are minimal.1049  The entries 
for Bolton schools indicate that many of the staff assisted with ARP during the Munich crisis:1050 
 27/9/38 School closed for the remainder of the week.  Being used for the fitting of gas masks 
 26/9/38 School closed as required as a distribution centre for gas masks.  Staff attended to 
assist with clerical work 
 27/9/38 School closed for the distribution of gas masks.  Teaching staff and caretaker 
attended daily until 10pm to carry out the ARP scheme 
This is an example of the role played by schools in helping to protect the public, a role that 
continued into 1939.  The All Saints logbook contains entries for March and May, noting the 
distribution of leaflets for children to take home to their parents that detailed arrangements for trial 
blackouts.1051   The logbooks of three schools, Great Lever CE,1052 St John’s CE,1053 and Smithills 
Church Road Council school,1054 all refer to Bolton’s scheme for protecting children at school.  On 7 
March, the head teacher of Great Lever CE spoke to the owner of land adjoining the school, who 
agreed to make it available for trenches in time of national emergency.  This enabled the school to 
submit a plan on 9 May, as requested by the Bolton education committee in April.  The other 
logbooks also referred to this request.  Bolton’s concerns and the school logbooks reinforce the 
                                                          
1046 Bolton Journal and Guardian, 5 May 1939; LSE: Bolton Trades Council, Council Meeting, 17 May 1939. 
1047 Bolton Journal and Guardian, 12 May 1939. 
1048 Bolton Journal and Guardian, 2 and 9 June 1939. 
1049 The use of school logbooks is restricted due to the Data Protection Act.  The various archives used have all 
applied different interpretations of the historical research clause contained within the act.   
1050 BLHC: SLB/11/3, Log Book 1936-1961; BLHC: SLB/1/1/5, Log Book 1938-1953; BLHC: SLB/51/3, Log Book: 
(Mixed) 1920-1949. 
1051 BLHC: SLB/1/1/5, Log Book 1938-1953,  
1052 BLHC: SLB/27/1/2, Managers Minute Book 1921-1951. 
1053 BLHC: SLB/58/4, Log Book: Mixed 1931 - 1962. 
1054 BLHC: SLB/72/3, Log Book: (Mixed) 1924-1950. 
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earlier evidence from London that teachers would have an essential role to play in the safety of 
children and that the provision of timely information was of paramount importance. 
 
 
The concerns of the three geographical areas differed between January and mid-August 1939, based 
upon the status held by each.  London was concerned with ensuring that it had sufficient 
information available to make the scheme workable, information that its councils were reluctant to 
share with reception areas.  This had a knock-on effect, in that reception areas failed to plan 
provision for health and education.  However, as ‘G.P.’ argued, this was largely due to lack of 
funding.  The lack of funds was Bolton’s reason for not having made adequate provision for air raid 
shelters in schools.   
 
 
The preparation that had been taking place for almost a year swung into action on 31 August 1939, 
with the announcement that Operation Pied Piper would commence on 1 September.  The Cabinet 
made this decision despite Chamberlain’s objection that people would be more willing to accept the 
decision following a declaration of war.1055  The increasing likelihood of war prompted M-O to ask 
observers to keep a daily dairy, in addition to the usual directives.  These diaries provide some 
insight into the evacuation process and give the general impression of a calm, subdued affair.1056   
However, individual entries sometimes told a different story.  One diarist, S. F. Well, detailed the 
experience of a London teacher.  The diary records a great deal of ARP activity and an annoyance 
amongst some school staff at the cutting short of their holiday.  On evacuation day, the diarist 
assisted at the school, where police and special constables were on duty.  The children were in a 
cheeky and cheerful mood.  The 2 September entry described difficulties in the reception areas with 
many billet offers withdrawn.1057  These two days alone provide an indication of the different 
versions of the evacuation story.   
 
The annoyance recorded by Well came following the recall of London teachers by the LCC.  In a letter 
on behalf of the education committee, E. O. Rich, the Education Officer, expressed regret at having 
to implement that decision but he was pleased with the response, describing it as ‘in accordance 
with the highest traditions of the London education service’.  Part of the recall included an 
evacuation rehearsal, which went well, to the point that government ministers expressed 
                                                          
1055 TNA: CAB 23/100 46 (39), Cabinet Conclusions, 30 August 1939. 
1056 M-O A: Diary 5269, 1939. 
1057 M-O A: Diary 5229, 1939. 
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themselves as being highly satisfied.1058  Reports of the recall and rehearsals appeared in the Fulham 
Chronicle and the West London and Hammersmith Gazette.  These indicated that the children were 
cheerful, including those at the King’s Road and Latymer schools.  The children were not the only 
ones taking it well.  Parents were the same, often following liaison work done by teachers, thereby 
reinforcing the message that teachers had a vital role to play in the evacuation process.1059  M-O 
confirmed the newspaper reports.  Following the announcement of Pied Piper, observers in Fulham 
collected various notes on the subject:1060 
 
 3.30 Cassidy Road, working class – 4 women talking at gate.  One recognised obs and smiles.  
Obs asks about evacuation and if children are going. “No, mine aren’t goin.  They didn’t want 
to.  I wish they were.   
 Hambledon Road – observer meets around 20 children, mostly boys.  Boys are going the 
following morning at 10.30. 
 Acknian Road School – notice saying the mothers with children under 5 must be there at 
1145 on Sunday.  Others are going tomorrow.  Conversation of 2 walking away from the 
school – going to let lad go tomorrow – other replied that it is only for the kids. 
 
In conclusion, the observer noted that people were taking the news calmly, a mood that existed on 1 
September at railway stations across London as noted by other M-O observers. 1061   
 
The concentration on events around this period helps to provide an indication of the public mood at 
the coming of war and to provide examples of the workings of the evacuation process.  Schools from 
the Fulham area were evacuated to locations to the west of London including High Wycombe, 
Windsor, Berkhampstead and Oxford.1062  The experience of some schools is traceable through 
published accounts or archival records.  For example, Godolphin initially evacuated to Windsor 
before eventually moving to Newbury.  Two reports by the headmistress and the school magazine 
refer to overbearing officials destroying the careful arrangements made by the school, but do not 
specify what they did.  The situation deteriorated as residents withdrew billeting offers.  Some of 
those who did take evacuees treated them like servants, as one teacher found when she checked up 
                                                          
1058 LMA: LCC/EO/WAR/1/175, Evacuation Rehearsal, 30 August 1939. 
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1060 M-O A: TC 5/1/C, Evacuation - Fulham, 31 August 1939. 
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on pupils taken by a former naval officer.  The children ended up in five separate places but thanks 
to staff efforts, everyone was located eventually.1063  By contrast, Burlington’s evacuation ran 
smoothly.  Prior to the announcement of evacuation, the school staged a drill to make sure its plans 
worked and to advise parents.  When the evacuation order came, 300 out of 473 pupils evacuated to 
Oxford, which made the billeting process easier.  Burlington’s headmistress, Miss Burgess, received 
extensive help from local officials in Oxford and duly sent a letter of thanks to the Oxford Mail and 
Times.1064  These are just two examples of the experiences that evacuees faced. 
 
The school stories demonstrate a mixture of experiences, but what of the children?  Many of those 
evacuated have recorded their experience in interviews for the Imperial War Museum, some of 
whom came from the Fulham area.  One of those evacuated was Derek Watts, who was living in 
Fulham.  After the declaration of war, he moved to join relatives in Oxford before going on to 
Addlestone to join the rest of his school.  He eventually drifted back towards London.1065  James 
Cadman also lived in Fulham and joined his school’s evacuation.  He remembered congregating at 
school and being bussed to a station, which he believed to be Waterloo.  From there his school 
travelled to Woking, which given the distance, there did not seem much point evacuating to.  Once 
in Woking, the school went to a large centre, where people selected those they wanted based on 
appearance and the numbers they wished to accommodate.  He eventually ended up billeted in a 
large house where several families had to share the kitchen, which created tension.1066  The second 
of these examples demonstrates both sides of the evacuation story, namely the organised departure 
from London and the chaotic scenes in a reception area. 
 
The experience of the evacuees was part of a story that whilst known at the time, did not feature in 
local newspapers.  Reports in the Fulham Chronicle and the West London and Hammersmith Gazette 
took the ‘official’ line, namely that evacuation had gone well.  This was in part thanks to the work of 
teachers and voluntary helpers.  In addition, the Fulham Chronicle reported a sense of sadness 
amongst some children, whereas parents were facing the situation with resolve.  The paper also 
reported that children had sent letters from villages in Surrey describing how they were enjoying 
their new surroundings.1067  All this helped to support the morale of the nation. 
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The experience of the schools and children referred to above suggested a degree of confusion in the 
reception areas.  However, published sources in Bedfordshire indicated that local officials believed 
that evacuation had gone well despite an increase in the number of expectant mothers who arrived.  
This created a problem, as householders were less willing to billet them than they were unattended 
children.  By the end of the first day in Luton, 4,887 children and 548 teachers had arrived, which 
was considerably fewer than expected.  The children were reportedly in good spirits.   
 
Moving away from official sources and newspapers it is possible to discover alternative stories 
within the county.  A good example of this and the LCC’s failure to supply information concerns a 
Jewish school evacuated to Shefford, a town on the eastern side of Bedfordshire.  Upon departure 
from King’s Cross the party leader received information that the school was bound for Biggleswade, 
where, upon arrival, pupils were put onto buses and dispersed to various parts of the county by local 
officials, who failed to communicate this to the party leaders.  Shefford was one of the destinations.  
Upon arrival, the teachers discovered that buses had gone to other locations and thus began the 
process of tracking them down.  When staff finally met up, they reported problems, as the Jewish 
children were refusing the food that had been prepared for them.  Host families were not aware of 
Jewish dietary requirements.  This caused resentment and the local vicar received complaints as 
people felt cheated out of doing their bit to help the country.  Despite this bad start, however, the 
local community soon adopted the school as its own.1068 
 
Jewish children were not the only ones to experience problems relating to billeting.  Betty Helliar, a 
London teacher, described her school’s evacuation to Peter’s Green, a village two miles outside 
Luton.  Upon arrival in the village, the children went to their billets.  At this point, she discovered 
that she did not have a billet, but was soon able to find one.  There were a couple of cases where 
billets had to be changed.  One elderly couple had asked for adults but received children, whilst a 
younger couple had asked for children and received nobody.  In addition, there were reports of 
bedwetting and head lice, the latter of which caused indignation.  The final problem confronting 
Betty was where to teach the children, as the village school was full.  She ended up teaching in the 
church after spending a few weeks teaching in the open air due to a spell of pleasant weather.1069    
 
The above are just two examples of stories of confusion in reception areas, which differ from the 
traditional narrative of a well-ordered process.  They also confirm some of the concerns raised by a 
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small minority in the months before evacuation: the health of children, continuity of education, and 
the impact on local communities.  However, the host communities were generally tolerant of 
evacuees.  
 
 
London and Bedfordshire provide examples of the different evacuation experiences.  By contrast, 
Operation Pied Piper had less impact on Bolton, where no evacuees were expected.  This did not 
prevent discussion.  In the M-O report on evacuation, an overheard pub conversation indicated that 
people were talking about a woman in Blackpool who refused to let five children sleep in her beds 
until they had a bath.  They initially refused but eventually took one all together, which left quite a 
mess.1070 
 
The small towns and villages surrounding Bolton did receive evacuees.  The Bolton Evening News 
reported on 1 September that those arriving in Turton were in good spirits, though fewer than 
predicted arrived.1071  M-O covered the arrival of evacuees in Turton, where prior to their arrival, a 
local group of about 20 people had been arranging accommodation, though many of those they 
spoke to refused to take children.1072  The arrivals process did not go as smoothly on 2 September.  
Most of those arriving were mothers, who, having sent the older children ahead, wanted to be close 
to them.  The arrival of evacuees signalled to people that war was imminent.1073  A few days later, an 
M-O observer spoke to people in Turton.  One local shopkeeper believed that the process had gone 
relatively well, despite a few grumbles about the range of goods he stocked.  Further evidence 
collected by M-O found that there had been difficulties and that some children were ill and bad-
tempered. 1074   
 
 
The declaration of war resulted in the pre-planned closure of all Bolton schools, partly due to a lack 
of air raid shelters.  The school logbooks reflect the closure but staff attended to witness the 
work.1075   The local paper reported that the scholars would not be able to attend until suitable 
shelter accommodation was available.1076     
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This chapter has demonstrated a mixture of continuity with and difference from the other chapters.  
In continuity terms, the Munich crisis was once again a turning point.  Prior to the development of 
this crisis, the subject of evacuation had received little attention despite several investigations, 
which had all expressed its desirability, especially from London.  It is therefore not surprising that the 
LCC led the way in terms of evacuation planning.  They began to develop a scheme without 
permission from the Home Office as they realised the scale of the task.  This advanced start paid 
dividends during the Munich crisis, when secret plans for evacuation were required.  It was a 
testament to the efforts of officials, both nationally and locally, that by the end of the crisis a 
transport plan and arrangements for the first night’s accommodation were complete.  However, no 
plans existed beyond this.  The crisis also revealed a major point of difference from the ARP picture, 
namely that London led the way.  The lack of a plan beyond those put together during the Munich 
crisis explains why the chapter primarily examines 1939.     
 
The work begun during the crisis continued in the subsequent months.  By the start of 1939, the 
government had laid down a national framework and more detailed planning had begun.  This 
included an accommodation survey undertaken by volunteers, who for the most part found that 
people were willing to take in evacuees, a further example of the public being willing to serve when 
the time came.  The volunteers amongst women in Luton for the evacuation scheme are further 
evidence of this.  However, not everyone welcomed the prospect of receiving evacuees, due to fears 
about the health of evacuees and the lack of additional facilities in reception areas to handle the 
increased numbers.  The views on these points depended upon the status of the geographic area.   
 
The actual test of all the planning came with the commencement of Operation Pied Piper.  From the 
London perspective, the process ran smoothly with parties making their way to the designated 
departure points as planned.  Witnesses described both children and parents as being in good spirits 
and accepting the need for evacuation, as evidenced by some of the statements recorded by M-O in 
Fulham.  Descriptions of this nature support the ‘official’ and ‘published’ portrayals of evacuation in 
the press.  However, the story in the reception areas had some variations.  Here, the process was 
relatively smooth given the numbers involved and made easier as there were fewer evacuees than 
expected.  Local officials in the reception areas also encountered billeting problems due to the 
sudden withdrawal of offers and their own interference with plans that schools had made.  Some of 
the difficulties, particularly in the case of Jewish children, were avoidable but the failure of the LCC 
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to inform schools of their destination until the day of departure prevented remedial action.  The LCC 
therefore contributed to both the strengths and weaknesses of the process.  
 
The one geographical area that stands out as a point of difference in this chapter is Bolton, as it did 
not receive any evacuees.  This did not mean that it was unconcerned about the safety of children.  
Its attention focussed on ensuring protection from air raids whilst pupils were still at school.  This 
was another area of delay as initial discussion occurred at the start of 1938 but work did not begin 
until after April 1939 due to lack of money.  The result was that schools remained closed in the 
weeks following the declaration of war whilst work was completed.     
 
The differing attitude of officials in the three geographical areas is one of the main findings of this 
chapter.  The prominence of ‘official’ opinion is also different from the preceding chapters, which 
show a greater element of ‘public’ discussion.  Part of the explanation for this contrast stemmed 
from the secrecy that surrounded the evacuation plans, though the sharing of information between 
authorities would have made the planning more effective.  The limited ‘public’ discussion that did 
take place in local newspapers reflected the concerns of officials, though this was dependent upon 
an area’s designated status.  The differences largely emerged following the Munich crisis, which 
once again played a pivotal role in the shaping of British preparations on the road to war. 
 
To conclude, the nature of the subject and the secrecy surrounding it makes it difficult to get a true 
sense of what the public thought about it.  However, it did form part of the psychological 
preparations for war and the failure to act would have had a detrimental effect on the morale of 
home front in the event of a declaration of war.  As seen during the Munich crisis in the previous 
chapter, the majority appear to have silently accepted the scheme as a necessity.  Hence the co-
operation with the accommodation survey and the willingness to volunteer to assist with 
evacuation.  This was all part of the public’s psychological process of becoming increasingly willing to 
accept war.  
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Chapter 7: Serving the nation 
 
‘National service’ is an idea associated with this and the two previous chapters.  In this context, it 
means volunteering to undertake duties related to civil defence.  However, it can also be interpreted 
to mean volunteering for service in the armed forces, including the Territorial Army (TA).  Taken 
together they form part of the process of rearmament.  The key word underpinning all of this is 
voluntary, as the phrase ‘national service’ is often associated with conscription.  The military 
authorities - going back to the time of the Napoleon wars when the Duke of Wellington believed that 
one volunteer was worth five conscripted men – have historically favoured voluntary service.  This 
continued to be the case down to 1914, when the military authorities moved to being marginally in 
favour of conscription once it became apparent in September 1914 that a large army would be 
required.  The idea had found favour with some Conservatives but other political parties opposed 
conscription, believing that it went against progressive social measures and personal freedom.1077 
 
The prolongation of the Great War eventually forced the government to introduce conscription 
under the auspices of the Military Service Act 1916, following a census of available labour resources.  
This came despite opposition in Parliament and from the trade unions, who still feared the potential 
impact on the rights of the working-man when the subject arose again in the late 1930s. 1078  The 
1916 Act was problematic due to the lack of civilian oversight when it came to dealing with matters 
of conscience. 1079   Following the end of the conflict, voluntary service in the forces resumed despite 
recruitment problems even during times of high unemployment.  This meant that it took additional 
time to train conscripts put the required skills into place during a time of war.   
 
Interwar sentiment about conscription was generally ambiguous, though a 1937 Gallup poll found 
that Britain was three to one against its introduction.1080  This changed during 1938 and 1939 as the 
international situation deteriorated.  However, this did not lead to increased recruitment for the 
armed forces, with people opting for other forms of ‘national service’.  The multiple usages of the 
term give it an ambiguity that Philip Wainwright discusses.  To him, it was about training a reserve of 
men rather than creating a conscript army along continental lines.  Wainwright also discussed other 
forms of ‘national service’ suggested by groups opposed to conscription.  These included 
                                                          
1077 T. M. La Goy, 'Soldiers of Conscience: Conscription and Conscientious Objection in the United States and 
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humanitarian work or projects that provided social progress.1081 
 
 
The deterioration of the international situation led to discussion about the need for a national 
register of manpower and the potential for conscription.  In Conscription Conflict, Hayes 
demonstrated that Chamberlain was reluctant to introduce any compulsory training at the time of 
the Anschluss, as he regarded this as going against his pledge not to introduce compulsory training in 
peace time.  Chamberlain’s view remained unaltered during the Munich crisis and the months 
following it, despite increasing advocacy from both sides of the debate. 1082  Hayes reiterated his 
point about Chamberlain’s attitude in Challenge of Conscience.  However, as catastrophe moved 
closer, it became a logical step. 1083  The government tried to avoid this step, despite increasing 
French support for a move towards conscription as Daniel Hucker details in his article on the subject, 
in which he also explores the impact of public opinion on the question of conscription.  Hucker 
argues that France applied diplomatic pressure at a time when public opinion favoured such a move, 
therefore arguing that there was a fusion between domestic and international pressure. 1084 
 
When conscription was introduced in April 1939, Chamberlain took the credit for it, especially in 
relation to its timing.  However, as Peter Dennis argues, it was a Decision by Default.  Dennis 
demonstrated that British policy developments during Chamberlain’s administration meant it 
became more and more necessary to introduce conscription since not enough volunteers were 
coming forward.  Chamberlain tried all feasible options before implementing this step, stating that: 
1085 
 
‘Compulsion is not in accordance with the democratic system under which we live or 
consistent with the freedom that we have always striven to maintain.  We are confident that 
we shall get all the volunteers we want without resort to compulsion’. 
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Chamberlain feared the reaction of the trade unions.  Despite some objections, this was not as 
strong as feared, as the bill was moderate and protected the rights of conscientious objectors (COs) 
better than during the Great War.1086  Many COs commented that there was less hostility, and 
although people might disagree with their view, they respected their stance.1087  This was one of the 
lessons learned from that conflict, with another being that it takes time to create a reasonably 
trained army, meaning that training had to occur in peacetime. 1088 
 
The chapter begins with a brief examination of calls for a national register and national service 
during the crisis periods in 1938 before focussing on the national voluntary service campaign and the 
introduction of conscription in 1939.  This will include a brief mention of military volunteering, 
primarily in relation to the TA at a national level, with some inclusion of local evidence as sources 
allow.  It will be argued, in line with the two previous chapters, that people became more willing to 
serve as the threat increased.  The addition of evidence from a local level highlights the range of 
arguments employed by both sides of the debate and enables the addition of new dimensions such 
as the role of religious ministers regarding COs.  However, despite some opposition, the decision to 
introduce conscription received general acceptance. 
 
 
Prior to the Anschluss, there was some discussion about military recruitment within the highest 
levels of government.  Whilst acknowledging that rearmament was making steady progress, 
recruitment to the armed forces - such as the RAF needed to increase - despite Sir Maurice Hankey 
stating that recruitment had been good in a letter to Sir Alexander Cadogan.1089  This was not the 
only acknowledgement about the increase in armed forces recruitment.  On 3 March, an editorial in 
the Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph praised the work of Leslie Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of State 
for War, whose reforms to the army were slowly helping to improve recruitment, a point reiterated 
in a report on 3 May.1090  The slowness in recruiting for the armed forces can be taken as a reflection 
of a November 1937 opinion poll, which found that only 38% of men were prepared to volunteer.   
 
At a local level, the idea of a national register appeared in the Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph on 
10 January 1938. The report detailed a speech that argued that ‘a citizen army, properly trained and 
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properly equipped, can be the equal of any force in the world’.  The speaker, Sir Thomas Keens, 
praised Luton employers for allowing their employees time off to attend training.1091  A similar article 
praising the value of volunteers appeared in the Bolton Evening News on 17 February, following a 
parade by the local battalion, which had announced earlier in the month that there were vacancies 
for up to 60 people to join.1092  After the parade, Colonel Bennett stated that ‘he believed the 
country to be the best in the world as it used volunteers rather than conscripts’.  He continued 
nonetheless by arguing that Britain must be prepared, a feeling that as ‘Politicus’ argued, many 
could not accept even after the Anschluss.1093  M-O had an observer at the parade, who noted that 
the mayor made a similar statement about volunteers and the need for recruits, some of whom 
recruitment officers hoped to obtain after some of the high proportion of young people had been 
home to ask their mothers.1094  The key point, at both a national and local level, was on the need for 
and value of volunteers.    
 
 
The Anschluss in March 1938 resulted in a national service discussion in the letters column of The 
Times.  Ronald Tree, the Conservative MP for Harborough in Leicestershire, urged the broadening of 
the government and the introduction of a national register to organise manpower in the event of 
war.1095  The former Director of National Service, A. C. Geddes, supported this.1096  The question of a 
national register is one that the Minister of Labour, Ernest Brown, outlined in a paper to the Cabinet 
in April.  He concluded that the type of register being envisaged, namely one where people could 
indicate their preference for a specific ‘public’ service, for which they might be unsuitable, would 
‘serve no practicable purpose’.1097  The same paper also noted that the TA were keen to ensure that 
enrolment did not affect munitions production.        
 
 
On the question of enrolment, the TA faced competition from the ARP recruitment campaign.  These 
concerns were discussed at the highest levels of government between Leslie Hore-Belisha and Sir 
Samuel Hoare.  In a letter to Hoare dated 13 May, Hore-Belisha outlined the situation as of 1 April, 
when the TA still required 966 officers and 33, 324 in all other ranks.  This came amidst a series of 
                                                          
1091 Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph, 10 January 1938. 
1092 Bolton Evening News, 4 February 1938. 
1093 Bolton Evening News, 17 February and 18 March 1938. 
1094 M-O A: Worktown 42/G, Fifty Third Bolton Field Brigade. 
1095 The Times, 19 March 1938. 
1096 The Times, 24 March 1938. 
1097 TNA: CAB 24/276 91(38), National Register, 7 April 1938. 
219 
 
discussions about potentially lowering the age limits for ARP recruitment, since the rate of 
recruitment (particularly in London) was a cause for concern.1098  These deficiencies were still in 
existence at the end of July and would grow worse later in the year when the government aimed to 
start raising new units.1099  The shortages reported were despite improved recruitment for the TA in 
the preceding months and years, as detailed in Tables 20-22.  The years covered by Tables 21 and 22 
show peaks and troughs within the year, whilst following a broadly similar pattern.  One can only 
speculate, given this pattern, as to just how much impact international events had on recruitment 
figures in 1936 and 1937.  However, there is a clear jump in the figures for March 1938, a month that 
also saw a spike in ARP recruitment. 
 
Table 20: Strengths of the Territorial Army, by arms, all ranks on 1 October 19381100 
Year Yeomanry Royal 
Artillery 
Royal 
Engineers 
Infantry Royal Army 
Service Corps 
Other Total 
1934 4752 27492 9474 81736 1505 8776 133735 
1935 4831 27751 9442 79096 1555 8942 131617 
1936 4964 30902 11863 81220 2521 9929 141339 
1937 5610 38366 23256 75323 3399 10811 156765 
1938 5650 45018 38862 81735 4652 12504 188241 
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Table 21: Territorial Army Recruitment 1 April 1936 – 31 March 19371101 
 
                                                          
1101 TNA: WO287/38, Statistical Review of Officers and Other Ranks of the Regular Army, Regualr Army 
Reserve, Supplementary Reserve, Territorial Army for Financial Year 1936/1937, 1937. 
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Table 22: Territorial Army Recruitment 1 April 1937 – 31 March 19381102 
 
                                                          
1102 TNA: WO287/79, Statistical Review of Officers and Other Ranks of the Regular Army, Regualr Army 
Reserve, Supplementary Reserve, Territorial Army for Financial Year 1937/1938, 1938. 
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Locally, the discussion of ‘national service’ following the Anschluss was limited.  In a letter to the 
West London Observer, L. Taddy-Friend from Chelsea referred to a recent speech by Edward Grigg, 
the Conservative MP for Altrincham, explaining that a national register was not conscription and that 
it would enable everyone to do his or her share in an emergency.  Taddy-Friend supported the 
measure and used the example of Britain’s experience at the start of the Great War as 
justification.1103  The reference by Taddy-Friend was the only one to appear in Fulham and 
Hammersmith following the Anschluss.  In Bolton, a limited reaction also occurred.  On 18 March, 
‘Politicus’ argued in the Bolton Evening News that there had to be a moral basis to rearmament and 
national service, meaning that Britain had to put ‘itself on the right side in the minds of her 
people’.1104  This letter contained a reference to 1914, a year referred to by an editorial supporting a 
national register on 24 March, with the aim of preventing the difficulties encountered in that year.  A 
further reference to 1914 came a day later at a meeting of the Bolton Conservative Association.  The 
chairman, Colonel Grierson, argued that the country had to face up to its responsibilities and that it 
would do if this were achieved voluntarily rather than via regimentation.1105 
 
The reactions highlighted above during the Anschluss period reflect the continuing desire for any 
form of ‘national service’ to take place on a voluntary basis, whilst arguing that a register was 
required to prevent a repeat of 1914, when workers from vital industries had flocked to join the 
army.  This rush to the colours had negatively impacted upon Britain’s industrial production in vital 
war industries.   
 
In the period between the Anschluss and the escalation of the Sudeten crisis in early September, 
there was some, mainly local, discussion about voluntary opportunities.  At the end of May, a letter 
appeared in the Manchester Guardian, highlighting the formation of the air cadets to help to 
introduce the young people of the country to aviation.  It was hoped that this initiative would assist 
with building a reserve of men.1106  Another step in this direction featured in the Luton News during 
July and August, namely the formation of the Civil Aid Guard.  The aim of this initiative was to 
provide instruction for those who wanted to learn to fly, which would help to strengthen Britain’s air 
defences.  Within Bedfordshire alone by 11 August, 300 applications had been received with women 
amongst the most enthusiastic.1107  Both of these steps helped towards the creation of a trained 
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reserve, very much in keeping with Wainwright’s interpretation of ‘national service’.  These were 
steps that would help the armed forces if required.   
 
At the start of September, the Sudeten crisis began to develop and the threat of war increased.  
These developments were accompanied by a series of letters in The Times discussing the TA.  O. 
Lewin, writing on 1 September, was impressed by the potential of the TA but felt that more needed 
to be done to ensure the best use of resources.1108  However, as a ‘Territorial Company Commander’ 
outlined the following day, training had to be kept simple and interesting, because many had used 
much of their mental energy in their day jobs, meaning that they could not be expected to have the 
efficiency of the regular army.1109   This meant that it was unlikely that they would undertake any 
additional reading on military subjects.  Additionally, letters also highlighted the lack of equipment 
and training time.  Lord Ogmore confirmed this state of affairs in 1965 when he wrote about his 
experiences during the crisis.1110   
 
The crisis work undertaken by M-O in Fulham primarily concentrated on people’s opinions about it.  
Amongst the responses given were a couple of references to military service and conscription.  Two 
of the responses indicated a willingness to serve, though there was no actual desire for war.  The 
third comment came from a 25-year-old ex-miner from South Wales, who said ‘They’ll not get me, 
not for anything now, it’s no game for anybody.  I think they’ll have one but they’ll never get the 
workers like they did, not me anyway’.1111  The attitudes in evidence towards military service would 
come more to the fore during 1939 but provide a good indication of the general attitude, namely the 
willingness to serve if needed whilst wanting to avoid a conflict. 
 
 
The crisis itself revealed the true state of Britain’s defences, though the national level discussion 
focussed on the lack of ARP volunteers, leading Carson Roberts to call for some form of national 
service.1112  A. J. H. Stewart, a resident of Mincing Lane in London, supported this by claiming that 
75% of people would be in favour, a point confirmed by October’s BIPO poll in which 78% of 
respondents indicated that they were in favour of a national register.1113  However, this did not 
mean respondents were in favour of conscription and as is often the case with opinion polls, the 
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December 1938 poll contained a direct contradiction, with only 29% of respondents indicating that 
they would volunteer for the national register.1114  The figures cited are reinforced by the results of a 
ballot run by the Daily Mail in October 1938, which showed that support for conscription declined as 
international tensions eased.1115 
 
In the case of the TA, the crisis, as with ARP, acted as an impetus for recruitment. Table 23 details TA 
recruitment from April 1938, which had seen a high recruitment rate following the Anschluss until 
December 1938.  In both cases, it was the months immediately following the crisis that had the 
highest recruitment rates, though this was in accordance with the peaks and troughs detailed 
previously.   The TA were not the only ones to receive applications as the Civil Air Guard continued 
to attract volunteers with over 34,000 signing up nationwide.   
 
The presence of the TA attracted more attention in Luton after the crisis led to a renewed sense of 
pride in the likes of the Territorials, who had previously paraded in Luton unnoticed.  However, this 
did not necessarily mean that people were willing to join the TA.  Bedford’s mayor, Alderman 
Sowter, predicted the introduction of some form of conscription, a prospect that did not alarm the 
affected age groups, as the Bedford and District Circular column ‘Round the Town’ found out.  The 
number of young people advocating conscription surprised the column’s writer but as A. K. G. 
Brown, a member of an unnamed Oxford based movement stated a month later, they were waiting 
for a lead. 1116  
 
 
Bedfordshire lacked extensive discussion on this topic following the Munich crisis but it was greater 
than in Fulham and Hammersmith.  On 21 October, a West London Observer editorial supported 
Chamberlain’s determination to press on with rearmament as referred to in a speech by Sir John 
Simon, which hinted that manpower planning was taking place but without compulsion.   The 
editorial argued that compulsion went against the British tradition and that people needed to train 
in advance. 1117  Sir John Anderson confirmed the commitment to the voluntary principle on 9 
December, when he argued against conscription.1118  No further mentions appeared until early 1939 
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Table 23: Territorial Army Recruitment 1 April 1938 – 31 December 19381119 
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Bolton’s interest was greater, as discussion in the Bolton Evening News focussed on the need to 
improve the defences, especially the perennial problem of personnel.  Ronald Andrew favoured 
conscription, as the voluntary system placed an unfair burden on those who were prepared to come 
forward.  However, others argued that the public was unwilling to accept the necessity of measure, a 
theme present at the time of the Anschluss.1120  The idea of a national register found greater favour.  
Colonel Grierson advocated the creation of one at several Conservative meetings, which duly passed 
supporting resolutions.1121  For instance, Bolton Conservative Association’s resolution, which passed 
unanimously, stated its belief that the time had come for some form of national service.  The 
national register did not have universal support.1122  On 8 November, Reverend Dabi criticised the 
idea, arguing that ‘it forced people to do the will of the state’, which smacked of Nazism.1123  
Nonetheless, the Bolton Standard accurately summarised opinion by stating that the current 
moment required a register but not conscription, which is a fair summary of the evidence.1124   
 
The Munich crisis made a limited impact on opinion concerning a national register and conscription 
in Bedfordshire and Bolton.  The former gained greater acceptance, despite acknowledgements that 
the latter might be required in the coming months.  By the close of 1938, plans for the development 
of a register and a voluntary national service campaign were underway.  The register would identify 
people whose skills would exempt them from military service.  The plans were subject to 
Parliamentary questions in December in which MPs asked how they could assist, the need to prevent 
employers from putting pressure on employees, and when the campaign would begin.1125   
 
 
The campaign began quietly prior to its official launch at the end of January, when Chamberlain 
broadcast to the nation.  British Gaumont newsreels reinforced Chamberlain’s message, emphasising 
that Britain needed to prepare and that people were free to choose how to serve.1126  However, 
some organisations were suspicious.  George Lansbury, the former Labour leader, wrote to the 
Manchester Guardian stating that the trade unions would resist because it was the first step towards 
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the conscription of labour.1127  The slow response to the campaign caused some concern.  In 
Parliament, questions on 23 February concerned enrolment on the special register, liaison with the 
British Legion to stimulate recruitment, and the provision of air raid shelters for those who had 
volunteered. 1128  M. P. Huthwaite, a resident of Newcastle, shared the findings of his limited 
investigation on the matter in a letter to The Times on 23 February.  The letter suggested several 
reasons as to why people were not volunteering: the labouring classes were too shy, small 
tradesman saw it as bad for business, and there was a lack of confidence in the scheme.  Huthwaite 
used these arguments as the basis of his support for compulsion.  Germany provided a further boost 
to recruitment with the invasion of Czechoslovakia, with numbers doubling in some parts of London, 
thereby enabling the BBC to report that 650,000 people had volunteered since January.1129  Some of 
the volunteers offered to serve in the TA, as the recruitment numbers increased substantially in 
February and March when compared with the same period in 1937 and 1938 as shown in Table 24.  
By the end of March, recruitment was proceeding well nationally, but how were the geographical 
areas faring? 
 
 
Bedfordshire’s previous discussions on the subject indicated a level of support for a register and 
potentially conscription.  Mrs Milner, secretary of the Luton Women’s Conservative Association, 
believed that the campaign did not go far enough and urged that everybody needed to be involved 
for the country to mount an effective defence.1130  To encourage recruitment, the county formed a 
national service committee.  The committee were keen to recruit volunteers for evacuation, the 
hospital auxiliary service and the auxiliary fire service.1131  The committee soon received offers of 
assistance, 57 of which went directly to Luton’s town clerk.1132  Amongst the organisations offering 
their services was Bedfordshire Scout Association.  At the Bedford and district AGM on 20 February, 
the District Commissioner, Lieutenant Colonel Craig, outlined details about what the Scouts might do 
in wartime.  Introducing a national service badge would help this process but only those over 14 who 
had parental consent could take part.  However, the County Commissioner expressed some 
reservation but agreed that it was vital for the Scouts to take part. The Scouts offer was unsurprising 
compared to the one from Home Counties Newspapers, which, following the Munich crisis, had  
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Table 24: Territorial Army Recruitment 1 January 1939 – 31 March 19391133 
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refused to provide space freely for appeals.  An offer to space was made in a letter to Luton’s Town 
Clerk on 8 February.  The letter stated that the paper would appreciate payment but would not 
prevent the publication of vital information.1134  These two examples highlight several types of 
assistance and further reinforce the idea of the nation beginning to come together in the face of 
adversity.  
 
Not everyone expressing an opinion in Bedfordshire supported the campaign.  Fred Smith, the 
general secretary of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, spoke of his dislike of it at the Luton 
district annual dinner, whilst A. Kendall wrote to correct the impression that all members of the 
British Legion were willing to serve.  Meanwhile, L. C. Turner, writing at the end of March, believed it 
would only appeal to those of a militaristic nature. 1135   The local population seemed to share this 
lack of enthusiasm, as only 292 in Luton and 381 in Bedford had volunteered by the end of 
February.1136  The publication of these figures came after the county committee decided to hold a 
meeting at Bedford Corn Exchange.  Before an audience of over 700, Sir Thomas Keens, Leslie 
Burgin, Sir Richard Wells, Norman Mickle, Mr Howell (Trade Unions) and Mrs Lawton (women) spoke 
about the various elements of national service.  The speakers stressed the need to ensure that the 
country was prepared, though Mickle did criticise the government’s foreign policy despite 
supporting the campaign.1137  The large numbers attending the meeting suggest that people were 
interested to learn more but there remained opposition government’s foreign policy. 
 
 
Bedfordshire’s meeting was only one way of encouraging recruitment.  In Fulham, Reverend J. W. 
Huxley-Williams, used several.  In February 1939, the Fulham Chronicle reported that his monthly 
parish letter was entirely devoted to the subject,1138  whilst in March he attempted to address the 
crowd at Craven Cottage, home of Fulham FC.  This proved disastrous, as the crowd increased its 
volume to prevent the speech from being audible.  The paper reported this as demonstrating public 
apathy, a theme Huxley-Williams touched on in his March letter.  Despite this, he believed that ‘the 
man in the street intends to be there and will be there when the peril is upon us’, 1139 yet another 
example of the belief that the nation would fight when the time came.  William Astor also tried to 
encourage recruitment in his March letter by arguing that one of the incentives for people to 
                                                          
1134 BA: Bor.L/CA/1/24, National Service and Defence Schemes, 8 February 1939. 
1135 Luton News, 9 February and 30 March 1939  
1136 Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph, 3 March 1939; Bedford and District Daily Circular, 4 March 1939. 
1137 Bedfordshire Times, 3 March 1939. 
1138 Fulham Chronicle, 10 February 1939. 
1139 HFA: Christ Church Parish Magazine, February and March 1939. 
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volunteer was a desire to avoid conscription.1140 
 
The Left were keen to avoid conscription and were suspicious of the campaign.  The January edition 
of the East Fulham Citizen warned that national service talk might lead to conscription, a theme 
echoed by the North Hammersmith Citizen, which went further in maintaining that national service 
meant conscription.1141  However, the West London and Hammersmith Gazette, whilst echoing these 
concerns, was prepared to recommend conscription if the required numbers did not come forward.  
Examples of opposition to, and public indifference towards the campaign continued to appear in 
newspapers serving the boroughs.  On 17 February, the West London Post reported on a debate that 
had taken place amongst local youth organisations.  Joe Lamler from the LNU indicated that youth 
were willing to serve provided they knew the reason for their service.  Miss Ina Wilson from the 
Christian Auxiliary Youth Movement had a similar message.  She was convinced that youth would 
serve, provided the government had a comprehensive peace plan.1142  The youth debate further 
demonstrates that the public was cautious about the campaign, with a degree of suspicion towards 
the government.  R. C. Belcher, a resident of Shepherd’s Bush, reaffirmed this in a letter to the West 
London Observer on 24 February, which stated that youth ‘refuses to help the National Government 
in its present policy’. 1143 
 
March brought further indication that people had a cautious but willing attitude.  At a delegates’ 
conference organised by the Hammersmith Labour Party and Hammersmith Trades Council, Denis 
Pritt, stated that the Socialists (presumably meaning Labour) would support a war against fascism 
and back the continuation of home defence preparation.  However, he advocated that labour should 
use its position to prevent dilution1144 of skilled jobs and industrial conscription.1145  The meeting 
made clear that the Left supported the campaign but were guarding against conscription. 
 
Further encouragement to volunteer came from the vicar of St James’s Church in the West London 
and Hammersmith Gazette.  He blamed the government for public apathy while at the same time 
stating that national service did not mean war was inevitable.1146  The campaign was a precaution to 
ensure that the nation was prepared.  The differing definitions of ‘national service’ came into the 
                                                          
1140 West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 10 March 1939. 
1141 East Fulham Citizen, January 1939; North Hammersmith Citizen, January 1939. 
1142 West London Post, 17 February 1939. 
1143 West London Observer, 24 February 1939. 
1144 Dilution is the process of replacing skilled workers with unskilled or semi-skilled workers.  The process was 
accepted by the unions as an emergency measure. 
1145 West London Post, 3 March 1939. 
1146 West London and Hammersmith Gazette, 10 March 1939. 
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spotlight in a letter from W. G. Parish, a resident of Kier Hardy House in Fulham, to the West London 
Observer.  He argued that working for peace was the highest form of national service and 
participation in the government campaign aided its war policy.1147   
 
The London boroughs’ reaction to the campaign was one of lukewarm support.  In Bolton, the idea 
of a national register had featured in the weeks following the Munich agreement.  By December, the 
Bolton Evening News supported a compulsory register to ensure that everyone was included,1148 a 
suggestion that Tom Binks objected because it would signal that the country was preparing for 
war.1149  However, the editor believed that it was necessary as more than liberty might be lost in the 
long term due to invasion.   
 
The paper continued supporting national service with a long editorial on 23 January.  The editorial 
highlighted the inherent contradiction in the campaign: rendering of service without persuasion and 
that it was the duty of all.  The contradiction being that if it was the duty of all,1150 then it should be 
compulsory.  The editorial agreed with wider opinion that the completion of a national register was 
necessary due to the gravity of the international situation, though public apathy remained an 
obstacle.1151  The campaign’s launch and accompanying editorial drew comment from letters.  ‘A.B.’ 
indicated that he was one of the younger generation that was not prepared to serve, but ‘Y.Z.’ 
argued that if the register was not completed then compulsion would follow.1152  Tom Binks added 
to the arguments by reiterating his previous point that such a step showed that the government was 
preparing for war.1153  The letters reinforced the contradictions highlighted by the editorial. 
 
The public response was not spontaneous with only 75 applications made at the labour exchange by 
30 January.  They were joined by a further 78 applications for ARP.1154  The job of recruiting fell to 
the town’s national service committee. To try to stimulate interest, the Conservative Association 
offered the use of Derby Hall for a meeting.  The offer was unsurprising given the views of the 
Association’s chair, Colonel Grierson, who served on the national service committee.1155  By 7 
February, recruitment had increased to 445 but remained below expectations.  The publicity sub-
                                                          
1147 West London Observer, 10 March 1939. 
1148 Bolton Evening News, 2 December 1938. 
1149 Bolton Evening News, 6 December 1938. 
1150 Bolton Evening News, 23 January 1939. 
1151 Bolton Evening News, 23 January 1939. 
1152 Bolton Evening News, 24 January 1939. 
1153 Bolton Evening News, 24 January 1939. 
1154 Bolton Evening News, 30 January 1939. 
1155 Bolton: FDC/1/1/6, Meeting of the General Purposes Committee, 30 January 1939. 
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committee discussed ideas including a recruitment parade, circular letter and a recruitment 
barometer. 1156  These were just some of the ideas discussed by the committee.  Mr Dutton provided 
details of the views of working class people obtained through enquiries.  Based on this he suggested 
the idea of holding works meetings and demonstrations.  He used his own mill as an example, where 
Chief Inspector Gledhill had spoken on the subject.  Many attended, with sensible questions asked, 
resulting in the number of applicants doubling.  Mr Schofield from the Operative Spinners 
Association supported the idea, as smaller meetings were more productive and personal. 1157  All of 
the ideas were in response to concerns about the rate of recruitment. 
 
Figure 16: Bolton’s recruitment indicator, Bolton Evening News, 10 March 1939 
 
 
The campaign during the first ten weeks of 1939 witnessed local authorities and newspapers keen to 
encourage participation to prevent compulsion.  This aim was clear to the Left in Fulham, with 
constant warnings about the need for labour to be on its guard.  All three areas encountered the 
problem that they had experience with ARP volunteering, namely public indifference.  Local 
authorities used different awareness-raising ideas, ranging from public meetings to speaking at 
                                                          
1156 Bolton Journal and Guardian, 10 March 1939. 
1157 Bolton Evening News, 28 February 1939. 
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football matches.  These efforts occurred during a lull in the international situation, a time when 
people were less concerned or likely to volunteer.   
 
 
The lull did not last much longer.  On 15 March, Germany invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia, 
thus providing an impetus for recruitment and renewed calls for the introduction of conscription.  
This suggestion came at the Cabinet meeting on 18 March, which Ernest Brown rejected, as he did 
not believe that the country was ready for conscription.1158  Nevertheless, in Parliament on 22 
March, Major Stourton, the Conservative MP for Salford South, asked for the full implementation of 
the national register.  In reply, Hoare stated that doing so would not add to measures already in 
progress.  The Communist MP for West Fife, William Gallacher, interrupted the end of this exchange 
by shouting that the country would need to get rid of Chamberlain before its introduction.1159  At the 
end of March came the announcement that doubled the TA, which many had been opting to join.  
However, as the BBC news bulletin on 29 March and the Cabinet minutes for 5 April noted, large 
numbers were still required for the Army and the RAF.1160  Chamberlain deemed this decision 
politically acceptable since the freedom to choose remained.  He continued to oppose the 
introduction of conscription, but the Italian invasion of Albania and a need to show a determination 
to resist prompted him to re-evaluate his position.  Reluctantly, he took the decision to introduce 
conscription. The announcement of the decision in Parliament created a rush from those aged 20-1 
to join the TA, thereby avoiding compulsion.  This resulted in many TA branches reporting that they 
were at war strength at the end of April.  The Left opposed the introduction of conscription, 
particularly in Scotland.  In response to a question on 15 May about military training, Chamberlain 
revealed that he had received 90 telegrams from Scottish organisations.  Many came from the 
Labour Party or trade unions. However, no answer came to a follow-up question from Robert 
Boothby, the Conservative MP to East Aberdeenshire, about whether this meant that the Scots were 
less patriotic.1161   
 
 
Discussion about the options open to the government occurred in the letters column of The Times.  
These included the benefits of national service and conscription, the latter of which George 
Hamilton, a resident of Saxmundham, believed would be difficult to implement due to previous 
                                                          
1158 TNA: CAB 23/98 12 (39), Cabinet Conclusions, 18 March 1939. 
1159 Hansard, HC Debs. Volume 345, Column 1281 (22 March 1939). 
1160 LSE: Fiche B50, BBC Home Service Nine P.M. News, 29 March 1939; TNA: CAB 23/98 18 (39), Cabinet 
Conclusions, 5 April 1939. 
1161 Hansard, HC Debs. Volume 347, Columns 980-1 and 87-8 (15 May 1939) 
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promises.1162  Hamilton, along with Alfred Horsfall, a resident of Clarence Gate Gardens, supported a 
compulsory register, though the latter also supported compulsory national service, believing that 
everyone had an obligation.1163  Other writers contended that compulsion sent a clear message that 
the country was prepared to meet the challenges it faced.  These included Martin Lindsay, a resident 
of Brig, who believed that conscription would not divide the nation, as the working-man realised 
that Hitler needed stopping.1164  The letters published indicate a clear support for conscription 
amongst its readers, though the considerable number published reflected its support of government 
policy.    
 
 
By contrast, national service and conscription featured less in the Manchester Guardian in the weeks 
following the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, though there was a brief mention of the civil air 
guard and the air cadets.1165  Relevant letters began appearing from mid-April, with the introduction 
of conscription producing a spate of letters.  James Norbury, a member of the Manchester PPU 
branch, registered a strong objection, as he believed that no man could be another man’s keeper 
when it came to conscience.  Correspondents with a religious background also used this argument.  
P. N. Milne, writing on behalf of the Methodist ministry training college at Richmond, and Winifred 
Garnett, chair of the Manchester Friends Peace Committee, objected on this basis.  However, 
Richard Smith, a resident of Romily, reminded them that the church had a duty to support all 
citizens, not just COs.1166  Others joined the objectors.  B. Eastland, P. C. Quinn and E. F. Reader, all 
from Banstead in Surrey, did not see why they should serve in the forces of the crown when they 
were ineligible to vote.1167   A. L. Rowse took a different line, warning the labour movement to be on 
its guard especially as no alliance with the Soviet Union existed.1168  Not all letters writers objected.  
Wilfrid Allott, a resident of Leeds, and Otto Rothbaum, a resident of Gidea Park in Essex, supported 
the decision, the latter arguing that it was the best method for fighting the Nazis. 1169  Overall, the 
debate was broader than in The Times, a reflection of the paper’s interest in the rights of the 
individual and freedom of expression.   
 
                                                          
1162 The Times, 1 April 1939. 
1163 The Times, 6 April 1939. 
1164 The Times, 25 April 1939. 
1165 Manchester Guardian, 16 and 17 March 1939. 
1166 Manchester Guardian, 2, 3 and 15 May 1939. 
1167 Manchester Guardian, 28 April 1939. 
1168 Manchester Guardian, 29 April 1939. 
1169 Manchester Guardian, 27 April and 2 May 1939. 
235 
 
 
The letters to the national newspapers highlighted divisions within ‘informed’ opinion.  M-O 
evidence provides a broader perspective on national attitudes.  The March and April directives asked 
questions about national service and conscription.  Additionally, fieldwork took place in London.  The 
free text responses to the directives indicated a willingness to serve and ‘do their bit’, even if there 
was some reluctance amongst respondents.  Comments included:1170 
 
 Young man, 21 from London – no natural inclination for soldiering.  He was keener 
on music but had joined the Territorials as his lass had decided to learn to drive an 
ambulance 
 Man, 19 from London – emotionally disliked the whole thing but approved as it was 
the will of the people 
 Man, 25 from Newport - people at work are undertaking service as think that they 
need to in order to keep their jobs safe 
 
These examples provide insight into people’s motivation for volunteering.  The reference to the will 
of the people is interesting, as a 1940 M-O report referred to a BIPO poll taken the day before the 
conscription announcement.  This showed 39% in favour, a figure that had risen to 58% a week later, 
thereby demonstrating how quickly the ‘public mood’ can change.1171  The London M-O surveys used 
street interviews to collect information but did not cover Fulham and Hammersmith.  The small 
numbers interviewed provide a snapshot of opinion, with responses revealing a similar divide to the 
nation newspapers, albeit with different arguments.  Women generally opposed conscription, 
particularly those who had children affected by the call-up and feared the loss of household income.  
Some men shared this concern.  The under 40s agreed that conscription was necessary as it signalled 
Britain’s determination to resist.  However, this did not mean the failure of the voluntary scheme.  
The surveys agreed with the Manchester Guardian letters, namely that people objected to the 
interference with their liberties despite understanding the rationale behind the decision.1172  One of 
the key themes to emerge from the M-O data is the impact on the individual.  
    
 
                                                          
1170 M-O A: DR1075 Crises 2 - March 1939, April 1939; M-O A: DR1496, Special Report on Conscription, April 
1939; M-O A: DR1122 Crisis, April 1939. 
1171 M-O A: TC43/1/B, 'What Is Public Opinion?', 19 August 1940.  The M-O claim about the polls being only a 
few days apart is suspect.  The BIPO data available from the UK Data Service provides this data for April and 
May, which would support the M-O claim. 
1172 M-O A: TC29/1/C, Miscellaneous, 27 April 1939. 
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The German invasion of Czechoslovakia increased calls in Luton for the introduction of conscription, 
Alderman Hart, a member of the Luton Conservative Association, advocated a scheme that would 
allow people to train.  His opinion featured in a Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph survey.  Other 
views included a bus driver who supported conscription and an unemployed man, who believed that 
conscription would trigger a revolution.1173  However, even if, as Alderman Hart suggested, a training 
scheme could be implemented, not everyone could participate due to working hours.1174   
 
 
With indications of local support for conscription increasing, the authorities continued their 
recruitment efforts, often using speeches to encourage people.  For example, V. E. Goodman, the 
chair of the Bedfordshire Territorial Association, made an appeal during a dance, stating:1175 
 
‘I want some of the young fellows and girls beside you now to realise what a serious thing 
we are up against.  I feel, as do many others that to have compulsion would be a nasty thing 
but it will not be necessary if there is a ready response to the call to join the Territorial Army.  
I appeal to young fellows with guts to come forward and help their country, and if tonight I 
get 20 of you to join the Territorials, I will be grateful.  You believe in standing by your trade 
union, I am now asking you to stand by your country’. 
 
Implicit in the speech’s undertone was the difficulty of encouraging the working-man to volunteer.  
The recruitment figures during the early part of the national service campaign reflected as detailed 
in Table 25.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1173 Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph, 17 March 1939. 
1174 Luton News, 27 April 1939. 
1175 Luton News, 13 April 1939. 
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Table 25: Weekly national service campaign enrolments1176 
 
Week ending Men Women Total 
28/1/39 14 2 16 
4/2/39 155 21 176 
11/2/39 91 8 99 
18/2/39 61 13 74 
25/2/39 51 9 60 
4/3/39 29 3 32 
11/3/39 27 9 36 
18/3/39 95 2 97 
25/3/39 98 39 137 
1/4/39 98 19 117 
8/4/39 110 5 115 
15/4/39 72 18 90 
22/4/39 140 69 209 
29/4/39 259 102 361 
6/5/39 469 237 706 
13/5/39 300 87 387 
    
Total 2069 643 2712 
 
The recruitment campaign received two boosts at the end of April and the beginning of May.  The 
announcement of conscription resulted in 40 applications to join local anti-aircraft units, whilst 
Luton National Service week boosted the figures, though as the table below details, recruitment for 
the TA was still below its target. 
 
Table 26: Enrolment before and after national service week1177 
 Required 29/4 6/5 Deficiency 
ARP (men) 1613 1410 1592 21 
ARP (women) 801 536 743 58 
Auxiliary Fire 
Service 
1200 375 470 730 
RAF Volunteer 
Reserve 
502 182 373 129 
Territorial Army 1359 611 733 586 
 
Shortages continued to exist and had only slightly improved by the time the committee met on 24 
May.  At the time of the meeting the numbers required were as detailed in Table 27. 
 
                                                          
1176 BA: BorL/CA/1/24, Review of the Work of the Borough of Luton National Service Committee During the 
Period 25 January to 6 May 1939. 
1177 BA: BorL/CA/1/24, Review of the Work of the Borough of Luton National Service Committee During the 
Period 25 January to 6 May 1939,  
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Table 27: Deficiencies as at Midnight on 23 May 19391178 
 Men Women 
Auxiliary Fire Service 416 40 
   
Royal Air Force Volunteer 
Reserve 
  
Pilots 33  
Observers 49  
Aircraft Crew 167  
Ground Section 61  
   
Territorial Army   
Royal Artillery 31  
Royal Engineers 73  
5th Beds and Herts Regiment 54  
Royal Army Service Corps 203  
 
 
In the case of both tables 26 and 27 there was an ongoing struggle to recruit for the military 
volunteer forces.  This situation continued to be the case at the end of July, when the committee 
received notification that their request to form a local anti-aircraft unit had been rejected as the TA 
units in the country were still below strength.  The largest shortage was in infantry in Luton.1179 
 
 
Bedford’s national service week occurred a week later.  It included a parade through the town, 
described as the pinnacle of the week by the Bedfordshire Times, whilst the Bedfordshire Standard 
believed that ‘it could not fail to stir the imagination of the people’.1180  Other activities included 
meetings and a house-to-house leaflet drop, all of which aimed to raise awareness and increase 
recruitment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1178 BA: BorL/CA/1/24, Deficiencies as at Midnight on 23 May 1939, 23 May 1939. 
1179 BA: BorL/CA/1/24, Secretary to the Committee to the Town Clerk, 28 July 1939. 
1180 Bedfordshire Standard, 12 May 1939. 
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Figure 17: Bedford’s Citizen Army, Bedfordshire Standard 19 May 1939 
 
Nonetheless, the labour movement in Bedfordshire opposed the introduction of conscription.  A 
Luton News article, published during Luton’s national service week, detailed a resolution passed by 
Luton Trades Council encouraging the working-class to resist:1181 
‘No increase in the number of men in uniform will help us if the present government’s 
policy is continued and the working people, who are the first to suffer in war, must 
demand that the wealth of Britain be conscripted to help defend the country’.  
The Trades Council took part in further anti-conscription activities as the secretary’s annual report 
noted that there was a big meeting as the Corn Exchange following the decision.1182 This may have 
been a meeting of the No -Conscription League.  Over 100 people attended the meeting from a 
range of organisations including the PPU and the Luton Communist Party.1183  Dunstable Labour 
Party and George Matthews joined the opposition to conscription.  Matthews stated that 
conscription was a double-edged sword for fighting both fascism and the trade unions.1184   
 
Conscription generated a lively debate in the Luton News following the publication of a letter from a 
group of ministers offering to support and guide COs.1185  The following week, ‘Conscript’, H. W. 
Wynter, and W. A. G. Box, all residents of Luton, wrote to oppose the attitude adopted by the 
ministers.  Box argued that it showed that they were out of touch with public opinion and explained 
                                                          
1181 Luton News, 4 May 1939. 
1182 MRC: 292/79L/41  TC77, Luton and District Trades Council Annual Report, 1940. 
1183 Luton News, 18 May 1939. 
1184 Bedfordshire Times, 12 May 1939. 
1185 Luton News, 11 May 1939. 
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why the churches were empty.1186  A. F. Webber countered this by arguing that the need for spiritual 
guidance applied to all, a point not mentioned in the original letter.  Other writers like Reverend 
Keeble, who had signed the original letter, defended their stance by referring to scripture and the 
teachings of Jesus.1187  This line of defence also appeared in a letter from A. Nelson to the 
Bedfordshire Times on 2 June.1188  The usage of scripture strengthened the argument made by 
supporters of COs but did not prevent challenges from F. E. Huckele, who wanted to know how 
divine intervention could prevent war, and ‘Mons Star’, who recognised the futility of war but stated 
that something needed to be done about Hitler and Mussolini.1189  The counter argument was 
therefore that supporters ignored the realities of the international situation. 
 
The actual joining up process began in June.  In Bedford, over 300 people enrolled, with just five COs.  
This announcement came at the Bedford PPU AGM, which noted that nineteen new members had 
joined since the introduction of conscription.1190  In addition to these five objectors, one had also 
come forward at Biggleswade.1191   Following registration and the conclusion of the letters in the 
Luton News at the end of June, national service and conscription disappeared from the local debate.  
Instead, reporting switched to the experience of militiamen leaving for, and participating in, training 
camps. 
 
 
In Bolton, following Chamberlain’s speech on 17 March, two men volunteered for service.  The 
reaction to this speech was positive, with comments attacking Hitler or referring to national service 
and ARP, which by this point was associated with the campaign.  The comments included:1192 
 
 Upper working class, 30 – heard speech.  Should have been made last September.  Discussed 
it with friends last night, and they agree with this.  People cheered Chamberlain, but it 
wasn’t a cheer of joy.  Speech should help ARP. 
 Elderly working class – had been slackening in ARP since October – this should gee it up a bit.   
                                                          
1186 Luton News, 18 May 1939. 
1187 Luton News, 25 May 1939. 
1188 Bedfordshire Times, 2 June 1939. 
1189 Luton News, 1 June 1939. 
1190 Bedfordshire Standard, 9 and 16 June 1939; Bedford and District Daily Circular, 15 June 1939. 
1191 Bedfordshire Times, 9 June 1939. 
1192 M-O A: Worktown 50/A, Chamberlain Speech, 18 March 1939. 
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 Man, 52 – when national service and ARP are really on a business footing might take some 
interest.  It’s just a sort of nightschool business at the moment, and when you’ve qualified 
for something there’s no assurance that in time of war you would be used for this purpose. 
 Man, 28 – Chamberlain’s speech made me make up my mind to join the Terriers as soon as 
possible. 
 
The mayor also urged people to join.  His appeal was debated by Bolton Trades Council, which 
agreed by 37 votes to 24 to co-operate, though the matter was referred to a constituent meeting to 
obtain a mandate.  The Trades Council noted that failure meant compulsion would follow, which 
they agreed to resist.1193  The mayor’s appeal was only part of the recruitment effort.  At the end of 
March, a public meeting took place, urging people to help Britain and thereby perform three 
services: making the country stronger, helping to ensure peace, and helping to convince other 
countries that Britain was prepared to fight.  The Bolton Evening News report on the meeting noted 
that a feature of the speeches was an appeal for all-party unity, whilst a feature of the meeting was 
the lack of attendance by those under 30, even though they were more politically conscious than in 
1914. However, this did not mean that they were not prepared to serve.  As one young man stated, 
‘I shall not volunteer but if there is conscription and I know that everybody is roped in then I shall do 
what I am called do wholeheartedly and with all the more satisfaction’.1194  It is not possible to 
generalise the attitudes of the young from this quotation but might provide a partial explanation 
about this age group’s lack of attendance at the public meeting. 
 
 
With conscription potentially looming, the Bolton Evening News ran a four-day letter competition on 
the subject between 30 March and 4 April.  ‘B.A.C.’ and Arthur Gregory, a resident of Hunger Hill, 
supported conscription because they realised that a certain level of training was required in order to 
ensure that Britain was prepared as well as to prevent defeat, thus avoiding the unpreparedness of 
the Great War.1195  This lesson was also drawn by N. C. Charnley, a resident of High Street in Bolton, 
and by Nora Longworth, who believed that it was a price worth paying if it increased the chances of 
avoiding war, especially as ‘Hitler’s treachery has unified British opinion’.1196  In amongst all of the 
                                                          
1193 Bolton Evening News, 16 March 1939; LSE: Bolton Trades Council, Trades Council and National Service, 13 
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letters favouring the introduction of conscription was one from J. Arnold that provided an excellent 
summary of why conscription was required:1197 
“Sir, - I support compulsory national service for the following reasons: -  
1. I believe in the preservation of peace, law, and order, even at the expense of a little 
liberty.  
2. I disapprove of armed aggression, and am of the opinion that compulsory national service 
in England will prove a powerful deterrent. 
3. It will be a warning to aggressors that the survival of the fittest will be grimly true. 
4. It will convert leisure (and what are probably wasted) hours into hours of usefulness. 
5. It will create a fundamental feeling of responsibility for, and a pride in, one’s country. 
6. It will create a state of preparedness, and will be a warning to law-breakers that we will 
vigorously defend our rights, our traditions, and our sense of justice. 
7. It will curtail, and rightly so, I believe, the much vaunted liberty and freedom, we as British 
subjects ‘enjoy’.  Only by curtailing this liberty can we hope to retain it for our descendants.  
8. It would have the effect of showing the people of this country that the government had 
the present situation in hand, and would instil confidence because of it.  
9. Compulsory service would ensure that each able-bodied man and woman did his or her 
share towards avoiding violation of principles. 
10. Every man should be ready to defend for himself that which had helped England to 
become so great – his home life.  Compulsory service will ensure it.  
 
Throughout the correspondence, opposition occurred.  H. Crook, a resident of St-Helen’s Road in 
Bolton, opposed conscription, as he believed that ‘press gang methods would never be tolerated by 
the English people in peace time, and if war came I do not think they would be necessary’.  John 
Merritt, a resident of Cellini Street in Bolton, joined Cook in objecting to the removal of his freedom 
to choose, writing that ‘one of the proudest possessions of an Englishman is his freedom.  Unlike the 
people of many other countries, he can do what he likes, when he likes, and how he likes.  For that 
reason alone, I am strongly against any form of compulsory service’.1198  This point was in evidence in 
the letters on 31 March, the main publication day for letters opposing conscription.  The objection to 
the removal of choice mirrored the letters that would be published a month later in the Manchester 
Guardian.  Another objection was that conscription would nullify trade union rights.1199   
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On the final day, the paper informed readers that the postbag was the largest ever and it was clear 
that the question of national service was on the minds of people in Bolton.  The letters favoured 
conscription, though the topics discussed reflected the wider national debate.  However, ‘J.W.D.’s 
letter challenged the conclusion that most were in favour by arguing that people in reserved 
occupations had not spoken up.1200  The finding that the majority of letters published favoured 
conscription is not surprising given the previous attitude of the paper and the welcome given to 
conscription a few weeks later, in light of the new commitments that Britain had made.1201  Tom 
Binks claimed that the paper’s position betrayed its liberal origins, a criticism refuted by the editor 
who argued that the decision was in the best interests of the country.1202 
 
Binks’s objection was just one incidence of opposition.  The Bolton Evening News reported other 
cases.  For example, on 1 May, the Westhoughton Labour League of Youth held a protest meeting, 
supported by Westhoughton MP, Rhys Davies.  The chair, Syd Daley, said that Chamberlain wanted 
to offer the young as sacrifices to the dictators.1203  Further opposition came from Bolton Labour 
women.  They organised a coming of age party, which one attendee, Councillor Kettle from 
Westhoughton, spoke to regarding how conscription affected those who could not vote.  She said, 
‘they were not able to register their protest against the National Government through the ballot 
box, and fascism, she contended, was one step nearer by conscription’.1204  The local labour 
movement joined the Labour Party’s protests. On 2 May, the paper reported that the Plumbers 
Union branch secretary, J. Morris, objected to the conscription of the 20-21 age group as they 
learned more of their trade at this age than any other point. 1205  Two days later, Mr Bell, President of 
the Weavers Association added to union opposition by introducing an emergency resolution 
opposing conscription, as he believed that it would cause disunity and unrest. 1206  Further protest 
came from Bolton Trades Council, where the atmosphere ‘showed stronger feelings than for many 
years’.  At the meeting, J. B. O’Hara and Mr Fagan advocated withdrawal from the national service 
movement, an amendment that was defeated.  O’Hara continued by urging the Labour Party to 
register a protest, though the problem here was that divisions of opinion existed within the Bolton 
Labour Party.1207  The discussion was complicated since those who opposed conscription had been 
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1201 Bolton Evening News, 26 April 1939. 
1202 Bolton Evening News, 1 May 1939. 
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amongst the foremost advocates of the need to combat Nazism.  This did not prevent them passing 
a resolution against conscription.1208  O’Hara acknowledged this contradiction in a letter to the 
Bolton Evening News on 6 May but still opposed the measure, as he did not believe it was for the 
purposes stated.1209       
 
The church entered the conscription debate when the Bolton Evening News published a letter, 
pledging support for COs from church ministers on 5 May.  The ministers hoped that the tribunals 
being set up would handle cases dispassionately. 1210  Church involvement in the Bolton area was 
more concerned with spiritual welfare than in Bedfordshire.  On 17 June at a meeting of the Bolton 
and District Congregational Sunday School Union, Mr Bithell asked about the support provided to 
those affected by conscription.  Responding, Mr Clift stated that the local branch of the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation was providing some support but a final decision on the matter awaited a meeting of 
the Congregational Union.1211  The emphasis, whilst focussing on COs, was much more on spiritual 
welfare than the rights and wrongs of conscription. 
 
At the start of June, registration for military training began when around 1,100 people in Bolton 
were expected to register.  An article on 5 June described the process, including how to register as a 
CO.  In total, 801 people registered with only 9 objectors.  At Farnworth Labour Exchange, 238 
registered with one objector.  The CO figures for Bolton and Farnworth were below the national 
average.1212  After registration came the process of medical examination before departure for 
training in mid-July.  Those departing were in good spirits, though some adopted a wait-and-see 
attitude.1213  After registration, public comment died away with little more said before the 
declaration of war, as was also true in Bedfordshire. 
 
The call to service was sluggish in the two London boroughs.  Colonel Van Den Bergh, President of 
the East Fulham Conservative Association, blamed the ongoing press discussion about compulsion.  
He disliked the idea of conscription, as ‘it smelt of dictatorship’ but he was out of step with William 
Astor, who supported its introduction if necessary.1214  Similarly, T. Funston, a resident of West 
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Kensington, wroteto the West London Observer, arguing that such a move would make democracy 
safe and those opposed to conscription were the most likely to be shirking their duty.1215   To some, 
like Ted Morris of Arminger Road, it was not about shirking his duty.  He clearly expressed that he 
was prepared to fight for his country but opposed conscription whilst certain people controlled most 
of industry.1216 
 
The real opposition began following the announcement of conscription.  This came from the Left and 
the labour movement.  The strength of ‘official’ opinion in Fulham came with the passing for a 
hostile resolution by the council: 1217 
 
‘This meeting of the Fulham Borough Council expresses its appreciation for those who have 
voluntarily offered their services for the protection of others.  While reaffirming its belief in 
the voluntary principle, it opposes the government’s present policy of conscription as a 
danger to democracy, trade union principles and national unity.  It believes that conscription 
should begin with wealth and not manpower.  It further believes that peace can be best 
secured by the consummation of an effective alliance between Great Britain, France, the 
USA and the USSR to oppose resolutely all fascist aggression and to promote democracy and 
social prosperity throughout the world.’ 
 
The discussion occurred after the meeting suspended a standing order, despite objection from the 
Municipal Reform Party on the basis that the council did not discuss national affairs.  Councillor 
Hutchinson spoke in favour of the resolution, as he did not believe in fighting fascism using its 
methods.  Councillor Coated agreed, stating that the government did not have a mandate of the 
decision, whilst Councillor De Palma was concerned that it made local recruitment for national 
service more difficult.1218  The Fulham Chronicle confirmed this in a report stating that people were 
withdrawing because they opposed compulsion.1219 
 
Fulham Associated Youth Council joined the council in opposing conscription.  At a meeting of the 
youth council, objections from various organisations were heard.  Jim Pike, speaking for Junior 
Labour, argued that conscription would deprive the workers of their rights, a message reinforced by 
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Alex Gossip’s argument that Chamberlain, like Hitler and Mussolini, was an enemy of the working 
class.  Miss White, the LNU representative, did not repeat the class attack, choosing instead to attack 
the government for its abandonment of collective security.  Only Frank Stafford of the Young 
Communists spoke in favour.  The meeting decided to send protest letters to Astor and Summerskill. 
1220 
 
Fulham council and the youth council were only a small part of the opposition.  At a public meeting 
held under the auspices of the Labour Party, speakers spoke against conscription, whilst both Edith 
Summerskill and Michael Stewart appealed for an alliance with the Soviet Union, drawing applause 
from the crowd.1221  The size and make-up of the crowd did not feature in local newspaper reports.  
The Fulham Chronicle stated that there was a strong body of opinion against conscription,1222 
whereas the West London and Hammersmith Gazette accused the Labour Party of ‘flogging a dead 
horse’.  The editorial emphatically supported conscription, as the language of force was the only one 
understood by the dictators.1223  Further criticism followed a week later about the resolution passed, 
which would end up ‘in the rubbish bins of Cabinet ministers’.  The paper hoped that opposition 
would die out.1224  Instead, Labour continued its campaign through its monthly newspapers.  Michael 
Stewart, writing in the East Fulham Citizen maintained that Chamberlain had betrayed the country, 
whilst the North Hammersmith Citizen went a step further.  It argued that the decision had cost the 
country the services of trained men and that it was a Conservative trick to control the working 
classes.1225  The fear of interference with the rights of workers was common across the country.   
 
Despite extensive coverage of the opposition to conscription in Fulham and Hammersmith, some 
people spoke in favour of it.  William Astor, in a speech to the Lillie Ward women’s section of the 
Conservative Association, defended the decision as one that he believed had public support.  He 
believed that it was right for all citizens to take part in the defence of their country and duly 
undertook a period of service with the Fleet Reserve.1226  He was therefore absent during July and 
August but, as he explained in a letter to his constituents, he hoped that they agreed that the reason 
for his absence was a good one.  He went on to remind people to undertake some form of service. 
1227   Astor was not the only local supporter.  Harold Smith wrote to the West London Observer on 5 
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May to argued that the age range for compulsory service be extended for men and women to 
between 18 and 63, with any objectors being denied the privileges that Britain offered.1228  His view 
on COs ignored the fact that freedom of speech was one of the privileges extended to citizens in 
Britain.  Further expression of support appeared in the paper at the time of the anti-conscription 
meeting.  On 26 May, Albert Maple argued that the international situation had forced Britain to 
introduce conscription.1229  Bernard Jolivard supported Maple’s argument and referred to the 
Harfluer speech in Shakespeare’s Henry V, which concludes ‘cry God for Harry, England and St 
George’.1230  The country needed to rally round to meet the challenge, as the situation had left it no 
choice. 
 
Discussion then disappeared from the local papers in Fulham and Hammersmith until the 
international situation deteriorated in mid-August, when the focus was COs.  Harry Granger urged 
tribunal judges to be lenient,1231 a view at odds with Bernard Jolivard, who showed his disdain for 
COs by describing them as ‘traitors to their country’.1232  However, Charles Wilkin, who praised their 
courage for sticking to their convictions, defended objectors.1233  Wilkin and his fellow defenders 
were criticised by ‘Hot X Bun’ for displaying communist leanings in their letters.  He continued by 
arguing that to prove that they ‘are the bravest class for having the pluck to state their minds’, they 
should wear a white feather in their cap, like those given to people in the Great War believed to be 
shirking to see how the public responded to them. 1234   
 
The two London boroughs displayed greater opposition than in Bedfordshire or Bolton.  Labour 
controlled Fulham council and other bodies led the opposition, though the Young Communists 
welcomed conscription.  It is unknown whether they retained this stance after the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  
As in the other geographical areas, there was concern over the threat to individual and civil liberties, 
whilst local news editorials led the support for conscription, arguing that it was vital to Britain’s 
survival.  However, compared with the other two areas, letter writers expressed less sympathy for 
COs and there is no evidence in the local newspapers that church ministers were prepared to 
support objectors.  This is borne out by other sources consulted.   
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The ‘national service’ debate was sporadic until late 1938, as concentration had been on ARP 
recruitment.  This changed after the Munich crisis revealed the actual state of Britain’s defences.  
The crisis itself led to a huge rise in the number of volunteers offering their ‘service’ - primarily for 
ARP work - which itself became a subset of the voluntary nation service campaign launched in 
January 1939.  This had the backing of the major political parties due to the maintenance of the 
voluntary principle.  However, a hint of compulsion remained present with the national and local 
debates prior to the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.   
 
Voluntary service included volunteering to become part of the TA.  As the various tables, have 
shown, recruitment for the TA followed a cyclical cycle, with peaks and troughs on an annual basis.  
The two months immediately following crises witnessed increased recruitment, though this was 
within the normal cycle.  However, the numbers were higher.  The exception to this came in 
February and March 1939 when recruitment was substantially higher in these months than during 
previous years.  The voluntary national service campaign therefore did have some impact.   
 
The German invasion marked a major turning point in attitudes to national service and conscription, 
a point of difference from the other two thematic chapters in which the Munich crisis that the 
greatest impact.  The government continued the voluntary principled, even doubling the TA to try to 
provide a way for people to offer their service without the need to introduce compulsion.   This 
continued the advocacy work undertaken by local committees in Bedfordshire and Bolton (no 
mention is made of a similar committee in Fulham and Hammersmith).  Letters to the national press 
also differed.  The Times published correspondence favouring conscription in March 1939, whilst the 
Manchester Guardian did not fully discuss the subject until late April following the introduction of 
conscription.  The latter carried a wider range of views.   
 
Bolton staged its own debate about national service and conscription, when the Bolton Evening 
News held a four-day letter competition at the end of March.  The resulting postbag demonstrated 
that the matter was on the minds of people in the town.  The letters published favoured 
conscription, which was in line with the editorial stance on the subject.  Those against used 
arguments that would occur in other areas and at the national level, namely that conscription 
removed the freedom to choose how to serve, thereby infringing civil liberties.  This debate 
continued following the announcement of conscription in April.  Reports and letters detailing 
opposition to the decision main came from the Left and the labour movement.  They feared the 
impact that it would have upon the trade union movement and that it would be the forerunner to 
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industrial conscription.  However, there was an acceptance of the reasons behind the decision. 
 
Evidence of the Labour Party attitude towards conscription emerges clear in Fulham and 
Hammersmith, where it was the constituency’s newspapers’ main topic in the two months following 
the decision.  The local newspapers reported on the activities of Labour including a mass meeting 
but their editorial opinion was that the decision was in the best interests of the country.  The 
reporting of opposition to conscription did not mean that there was no support for the measure, just 
that it was in less evidence.  Part of the explanation for this was the two-month absence of William 
Astor, who supported the measure. 
 
The newspaper editorials in Bedfordshire and Bolton resembled those in London that supported the 
introduction of conscription as a measure necessary to ensure British security.  The selection of 
comments collected as part of a small Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph survey provides an 
indication of public feeling, but the size prevents it from being anything more than a brief snapshot.  
The comments and local opinion favoured the introduction of conscription.  Opposition again came 
from the Left and labour movement but was less prevalent than in the other two geographical areas.  
The explanation for this lies in the political make-up of the county and the general weakness of the 
trade union movement within it. 
 
One issue that surfaced at various points after April 1939 was the question of COs.  Nationally, this 
question received greater attention in the Manchester Guardian.  At a local level, this was a major 
debate for about eight weeks in the Luton News, following a letter from ministers of religion who 
were prepared to support COs, whilst seemingly ignoring the spiritual needs of those who joined up.  
The matter surfaced to a lesser extent in Bolton since there was greater emphasis on spiritual 
guidance.  The question did not rise in the London boroughs, at least not in the local newspapers and 
other evidence sources consulted.  Attitudes to COs differed when references to them occurred as 
the international situation deteriorated in August 1939.  Two of the letter writers to the West 
London Observer displayed hostile attitudes to those who objected, though how reflective of opinion 
they were is difficult to assess due to a lack of data even from M-O surveys that were taking place in 
Fulham at the time. 
 
Support for national service and the willingness to accept the necessity of compulsion increased as 
the international situation deteriorated.  People accepted that Britain would eventually have to 
make a stand and needed to be prepared.  Increased understanding of the international situation 
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was crucial to this acceptance despite objections to conscription on the grounds of infringement of 
personal and civil liberties.  This was part of a wider transformation of British opinion, which had 
come to accept the need to resist Germany.  It was not a war the people wanted to fight but one 
that they recognised the need to be prepared for. 
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Conclusion: Cometh the Hour, Cometh the Nation 
 
The declaration of war on Sunday 3 September marked the end of a period that had seen the mood 
of the country change enough to accept a new conflict with Germany.  This came about after the 
country had passed through several simultaneous phases: uninterested, under-informed, relieved, 
divided and united.  These themes, used in chapter two, provide a sufficient framework for the 
conclusion, which revisits the questions posted in the introduction: 
 What was local-level opinion? 
 Was there a delay between national and local discussion of events? 
 What regional variations were there? 
 How did crises affect public opinion? 
 Were there any turning points? 
 
The change in public opinion and the ‘public mood’ was gradual, confirming Stanley Baldwin’s 
assertion that a democracy lags two years behind a dictatorship when it comes to the public 
mood.1235  Crises affected the pace of change, despite M-O data highlighting a mood of indifference 
towards foreign affairs.  Of these, the Munich crisis marked the major turning point in the ‘public 
mood’.  Until this crisis developed fully in September 1938, the public paid little attention to foreign 
affairs despite brief flickers of interest following Eden’s resignation and the Anschluss.  These two 
events revealed a greater level of opposition to Chamberlain’s policy than is normally acknowledged.  
Public meetings in Bolton during this period are a good example of the opposition.  Further evidence 
of indifference comes from the Farnworth and West Fulham by-election campaigns, where, despite 
the candidates’ focus on foreign affairs, the public were more interested in domestic affairs.  Neither 
the Eden crisis nor the Anschluss brought the threat of war close to the ordinary people unlike the 
Munich crisis.  This occurred after Chamberlain’s first flight to Germany and the commencement of 
defence preparations, which roused people from their indifference towards ARP despite the efforts 
of local authorities and newspapers. 
 
The flickers of interest referred to revealed a public that remained under-informed about foreign 
affairs and defence preparations.  This is a natural occurrence given the lack of interest in the 
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subject.  However, this did not mean that opportunities were unavailable.  The Beds and Herts 
Evening Telegraph and the Bolton Evening News both carried a daily page of news on international 
affairs.  Local newspapers also recommended books on the subject and provided a letters column, 
which discussed a range of subjects.  It is difficult to draw any precise conclusions on this point, as 
details about newspaper circulation and reading are unavailable.  The lack of official information 
available during the Munich crisis added to this, leading some people interviewed by M-O to base 
their opinions upon gut reaction. This reaction, outside of the ‘official’ channels of public opinion is 
part of the ‘public mood’, or the ‘popular mood’ as Hinton refers to in his review of England 
Arise!1236  This book stated that there was a relative indifference to the world outside of the 
domestic setting, 1237 a conclusion with which, based on the evidence presented, this thesis partly 
agrees with.  The indifference to the outside world partly explains why local authorities struggled to 
recruit for ARP work.  However, the attitudes of the local authorities towards this subject also had an 
impact.     
 
 
The Munich crisis did not dispel indifference towards foreign affairs but made individuals more 
aware of the potential consequences of international events.  The tension built up during the crisis 
released itself when the nation breathed a huge sigh of relief at the avoidance of war, a desire that 
was common throughout the period covered by this thesis.  Expressions of relief manifested 
themselves in a variety of ways from cheering crowds to attendance at thanksgiving services on the 
Sunday following the Munich agreement.  The latter was collected using communicant data found in 
Anglican service registers, thereby providing a different usage for this data.  Relief collections to help 
Czech victims of the agreement, as reported in Fulham and Hammersmith, provided another method 
for expressing people’s thanks at the avoidance of war. 
 
Despite the sense of relief, the crisis made political divisions more acute.  Conservatives supported 
Chamberlain and called for greater rearmament whilst avoiding public criticism of the Munich 
agreement.   In contrast, Labour, whilst relieved at the avoidance of war, advocated a firm stance 
and a return to collective security.  The political divisions extended to attitudes towards the Soviet 
Union.  Conservatives, nationally and locally, urged caution whilst Labour and, in some cases, the 
Liberals advocated an alliance.  The divisions on this issue became starker following the German 
invasion of Czechoslovakia and the British guarantee to Poland, when it became clear that Britain 
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required the co-operation of the Soviet Union to make this effective.  In May, Chamberlain 
reluctantly approved the start of negotiations as his Cabinet began to turn against him.  Despite this, 
Conservatives still urged caution and the need to avoid rushing into an alliance.  The divisions 
surrounding the Soviet Union had links to another issue: the potential inclusion of Churchill and Eden 
in the Cabinet.  This issue provided a clear distinction between the geographical areas, with debate 
only taking place in Bolton.  
 
 
Rearmament and ‘national service’ divided the political parties but the deteriorating international 
situation provided an avenue for beginning to unite the country.  Labour eventually accepted the 
need to rearm, though continued to campaign - as witnessed in the Farnworth and West Fulham by-
elections - for the money to be spent on improving social conditions.  However, ‘national service’, 
particularly the question of compulsory service and a national register, remained a point of division.  
The calls for its introduction following the Anschluss soon died off only to re-emerge after the 
Munich crisis had revealed the flaws in British defence preparations.  Nationally, and to a lesser 
extent locally, Conservatives called for the introduction of a national register to assist with defence 
preparations.  However, the government remained committed to the voluntary principle, a principle 
that Labour and most trade unions were willing to support when the national service campaign 
began in January 1939.  Local authorities and newspapers also supported the campaign but 
remained fearful that compulsion might follow. 
 
The divisions described above manifested themselves in relation to civil defence preparations (ARP, 
shelters and evacuation) and volunteering for service in the TA.  The local authorities all approached 
civil defence preparations differently as the Munich crisis revealed.  Part of this stemmed from 
differing interpretations behind the purpose of preparations, which letters to local newspapers also 
highlighted.  Conservative (Bolton) and Liberal (Bedfordshire) authorities were far in advance of the 
two Labour authorities (Fulham and Hammersmith) at the time of the crisis.  Political beliefs often 
had an impact on the attitudes displayed towards shelters.  However, this tended to be at the 
national level.  Despite their belief that deep shelters would provide better protection.  Fulham and 
Hammersmith councils actively engaged with the deployment of Anderson shelters in 1939.  This 
was in stark contrast to their earlier attitude towards ARP.  By contrast, attitudes to evacuation 
depended upon each area’s designation.  This topic generated little in the way of public discussion in 
local newspapers and was of more concern to local officials.   
254 
 
 
The Munich crisis acted as a catalyst in helping the process of uniting the nation.  Judging by the 
comments collected by M-O, it convinced the ‘man in the street’ that Hitler would have to be 
stopped.  This was part of a trend noticeable in all three international crises, a process that was 
accelerated by Kristallnacht, though this did not make the public any more willing to accept Jewish 
refugees.  However, opinions about the need to stop Hitler did not receive social sanction from elite 
opinion until March 1939 when the German invasion of Czechoslovakia provided definitive proof 
that Germany would not keep agreements.  Existing work is therefore only partially correct in 
identifying March 1939 as a turning point, given that a noticeable underlying change began many 
months earlier and was visible at a local level.   
 
The three major crises each created an increasing acceptance of the need for defence preparations.  
Once again, the Munich crisis had the greatest impact especially in the case of recruitment for civil 
defence.  The state of ARP preparations was one of the great revelations of the crisis and with an 
increasing threat of war, local people came forward to volunteer their services.  Both the Anschluss 
and Munich acted as a catalyst for some increase in recruitment for the TA but it was the launch of 
the national service campaign in January 1939 and the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 
1939 that led to a sharp increase in the number recruited nationally.  However, in the case of the TA 
it is notable that Luton struggled to fill its vacancies, as demonstrated by the figures provided.  The 
need to increase Britain’s military forces eventually forced the government to introduce 
conscription, a decision that divided opinion but people understood the need for such a step to 
deter Germany.  Taking all of this into account therefore, it can be argued that the Munich crisis 
helped to create the psychological framework required to unite the country into accepting that war 
might be a possibility, despite a lingering desire to avoid one.  As Wing Commander Hodsoll told the 
Chief Constables Association in 1939:1238 
‘I suppose the salient feature of the past year and the one which has had the most influence 
on the progress of air raid precautions was the September crisis.  While progress was going 
along quite well before that crisis, afterwards it went ahead in a way, which nothing but a 
crisis could have produced.  I think it brought home to all of us how real was the peril against 
which we were trying to defend ourselves and how suddenly that peril might materialise.  It 
is always extremely difficult in this country to persuade the general public to do something 
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for its own protection unless it thinks that the peril is almost on its doorstep; then with one 
mind they will turn to and do anything in the world that they are asked.’  
     
Hodsoll’s words are only one example of how British attitudes changed.  However, it provides a good 
summary of one of the conclusions of this thesis, namely that Britain accepted the need to prepare 
as the international situation deteriorated.   
 
Of the questions posed at the start of the thesis and reiterated again in the conclusion, the evidence 
presented demonstrates that international events allowed public opinion and the ‘public mood’ to 
harmonise at national and local levels.  Local expressions of opinion and related actions exhibited 
many of the features found at the national level, albeit with some variation regarding timing and 
content between the geographical case studies.  Examples of differences include the role of church 
ministers in the conscription debate (Luton), whether Churchill should be included in the Cabinet 
(Bolton), and the initial opposition of the local authority to ARP (Fulham and Hammersmith).  In 
terms of defence preparations, the Munich crisis spurred efforts in all the geographic case studies 
areas as it did nationally.  The case studies demonstrate the interaction, despite public indifference, 
between foreign and domestic policy.  This interaction allowed public opinion and the ‘public mood’ 
to re-orientate itself in reaction to international events.   
 
The thesis adds value to the scholarly record by enhancing the national evidence base through the 
inclusion of local evidence.  It has demonstrated that local authorities and, more importantly, local 
newspapers try to advocate what they believe to be best for local people. From the case studies, the 
best example of this is the Bolton Evening News, which strongly supported the need for Britain to 
prepare, encouraged participation in local defence preparations, and opposed Chamberlain’s policy 
of appeasement.  Therefore, local newspapers fulfilled one of their primary functions, namely 
reflecting the area that they served.  The inclusion of local evidence suggests that further research of 
a similar nature is required, especially relating to the Munich crisis, for a truly national synthesis of 
this period to develop.  M-O and local newspapers are essential for this research.  Additionally, a 
study of the totality of the 1938 and 1939 by-elections is required to assess the importance of 
foreign affairs in the interface between political elite with the electorate.  It would provide a further 
test of the M-O finding that domestic affairs were more important to voters than international ones.  
Again, this study would require extensive use of local newspapers thereby confirming Secker’s 
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finding about the importance of local newspapers in the study of international affairs. 1239    
 
 
In conclusion, the thesis highlights that Britain, despite entering the conflict reluctantly, eventually 
did so with a relative unity of purpose.  The ‘public mood’ was one that put the greater good first.  
However, it would take the fall of Dunkirk and the intensification of the fighting, as it had done in the 
Great War, for the British people to accept the need for the preparations that they had hitherto 
been indifferent towards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1239 Secker, 'Newspapers and Historical Research':178-85. 
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Appendix 1: Prominent People 
 
This is a brief guide to people mentioned in the text.  It has been assembled using the Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (DNB) and other sources.  Those obtained from the DNB have a full 
citation in the appropriate section of the bibliography. 
Joseph Addison (1879 – 1953). British minister to Prague from 1930-1936.  
A. V. Alexander (1885-1965).  Labour MP and supporter of collective security.  Opponent of 
appeasement.  
Sir John Anderson (1882-1958). Former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office and Lord 
Privy Seal. 
 
David Astor (1912-2001).  Son of Lord Astor.  Journalist, who was a writer for the Observer. 
William Astor (1907-1966).  MP for East Fulham, 1935-1945.  Parliamentary Private Secretary to Sir 
Samuel Hoare. 
Clement Attlee (1883-1967). Labour leader from 1935 to 1951.  MP for Limehouse. 
Robin Barrington-Ward (1891-1948). Deputy and later editor of The Times. 
Vernon Bartlett (1894-1983). Journalist and independent MP for Bridgwater. 
Lord Beaverbrook (1879-1964).  Newspaper proprietor, owner of the Daily Express and Evening 
Standard. 
Georges Bonnet (1889-1973).  French foreign minister in 1938-1939. 
Robert Boothby (1900-1986). Conservative MP for East Aberdeenshire and anti-Appeasement. 
Ernest Brown (1881-1962). Minster for Labour and National Liberal MP for Leith. 
Leslie Burgin (1887-1945). National Liberal MP for Luton.  Minister of Transport 1937-1939 and 
Minister of Supply 1939-1940. 
Richard Austen (Rab) Butler (1902-1982). Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from February 
1938 to 1941.  Conservative MP for Saffron Walden. 
Laurence Cadbury (1889-1982).  Chocolate manufacturer and owner of the News Chronicle. 
Sir Alexander Cadogan (1884-1968.) Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office 1938-1945. 
Robert Cecil (1893-1972).  Politician and leader of the League of Nations Union. 
Neville Chamberlain (1869 – 1940). Chancellor of the Exchequer (1931-1937) and British Prime 
Minister 1937 to 1940.  Conservative MP for Birmingham Ladywood. 
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Count Ciano (1903-1944). Italian foreign minister from 1939-1943. 
Sir Geoffrey Cox (1910-2008).  Former foreign correspondent with the Daily Express. 
Winston Churchill (1874-1965). British wartime Prime Minister and strong critic of Chamberlain.  
Conservative MP for Epping. 
Cyril Cobb (1861-1938). Conservative MP for West Fulham. 
J. D. Cooke (1879-1949). Conservative MP for Hammersmith South. 
Alfred Duff Cooper (1890-1954). Conservative MP for St George’s Westminster, who resigned over 
the Munich agreement. 
Viscount Cranborne (1893-1972). Conservative peer who resigned in February 1938 at the same time 
as Anthony Eden. 
Sir Stafford Cripps (1889-1952). Lawyer and Labour MP for Bristol East.  Founder of the Socialist 
League. 
Hugh Dalton (1887-1962). Labour MP for Bishop Auckland and opponent of Appeasement. 
Rhys Davies (1877-1954). Labour MP for Westhoughton. 
Geoffrey Dawson (1877-1944). Editor of The Times. 
Edouard Daladier (1884-1970).  Three times Prime Minister of France. 
Henry Durant (1902-1982).  Opinion pollster and founder of the British Institute for Public Opinion. 
William Eady (n.d.).  Under-secretary of the Air Raid Precautions department. 
Anthony Eden (1897-1977).  Foreign secretary 1935-8.  Conservative MP for Leamington Spa. 
Cyril Entwistle (1887-1974).  Conservative MP for Bolton. 
William Gallacher (1881-1965).  Communist MP for West Fife. 
James Garvin (1868-1947).  Journalist and editor of The Observer. 
Auckland Geddes (1879-1954).  Minister for National Service during the First World War and later 
chairman of the mining company Rio Tinto. 
Victor Gollancz (1893-1967).  Founder of the Left Book Club. 
Count Dino Grandi (1895-1988).  Italian Ambassador to Britain 1932-9. 
Arthur Greenwood (1880-1954).  Deputy Labour leader during the 1930s.  MP for Wakefield. 
Edward Grigg (1879-1955).  Conservative MP for Altrincham and opponent of appeasement. 
Maurice Hankey (1877-1963).  Civil servant and Cabinet Secretary. 
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Lord Halifax (1881-1959).  Former viceroy of India and British Foreign Secretary, 1938-1940. 
Tom Harrisson (1911-1976).  Ornithologist and co-founder of Mass Observation. 
John Haslam (1878-1940).  Conservative MP for Bolton. 
Konrad Henlein (1898-1945).  Leader of the Sudeten German Party during the 1930s. 
Sir Neville Henderson (1882-1942).  British Ambassador to Germany 1937-9. 
Adolf Hitler (1889-1945).  German Chancellor from 1933 to 1945. 
Sir Samuel Hoare (1880-1959).  Secretary of State for India 1931-5, Foreign Secretary 1935 and 
Home Secretary 1937-9.  Conservative MP for Chelsea 
Colonel Hossbach (1894-1980).  Aide to Adolf Hitler. 
Sir Thomas Keens (1870-1953).  Liberal leader of Bedfordshire County Council. 
Ivone Kirkpatrick (1897-1964).  British diplomat based in Germany during 1930s.  Upon his return to 
London in 1939, he recognised the need to resist the Nazis. 
Cosmo Gordon Lang (1864-1945). Archbishop of Canterbury. 
Alan Lennox-Boyd (1904-1983).  Conservative MP for Mid Bedfordshire.  Appointed as a junior 
minister to the Ministry of Labour in 1938. 
Maxim Litvinov (1876-1951). Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs until May 1939. 
Thomas Lodge (1905-1994).  Prospective Liberal candidate for Bedford in the late 1930s and later 
Labour MP for Bedford. 
Charles Madge (1912-1996).  Sociologist and co-founder of Mass Observation. 
Ivan Maisky (1884-1975). Soviet Ambassador to London. 
Geoffrey Mander (1882-1962).  Liberal MP for Wolverhampton East. 
Arthur Mann (1876-1972).  Editor of the Yorkshire Post and opponent of appeasement. 
Vyacheslav Molotov (1890-1986).  Became Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs in May 1939. 
Herbert Morrison (1888-1965).  Labour MP for Hackney South and leader of the London County 
Council. 
Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) Italian head of government from 1922 to 1943. 
Philip Noel-Baker (1889-1982).  Labour MP for Derby (DNB). 
Harold Nicolson (1886-1968).  Diplomat and National Labour MP for Leicester West. 
Henry Page-Croft (1881-1947). Conservative MP who opposed appeasement. 
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Henry Pownall (1887-1961).  Chief of the General Staff. 
Denis Pritt (1887-1972).  Labour MP for Hammersmith North. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945). President of the United States, 1933 to 1945. 
Guy Rowson (1883-1937).  Labour MP for Farnworth. 
Lord Runciman (1870-1949).  Liberal politician and leader of the Runciman mission to Czechoslovakia 
in 1938. 
Kurt Schussnigg (1897-1977).  Chancellor of Austria 1934 to 1938. 
Arthur Seyss-Inquart (1892-1946).  Austrian Nazi who played an influential role during the Anschluss. 
Sir John Simon (1873-1954).   Liberal politician.  Foreign Secretary 1931-1935, Home Secretary 1935-
19377 and Chancellor of the Exchequer 1937-1940.  National Liberal MP for Spen Valley. 
Sir Archibald Sinclair (1890-1970).  Liberal MP for Caithness and Sutherland, and Liberal leader in the 
1930s. 
J. A. Spender (1862-1942).  Journal editor and writer. 
Joseph Stalin (1878-1953).  Leader of the Soviet Union. 
Michael Stewart (1906-1990).  Prospective Labour candidate for East Fulham and later Foreign 
Secretary. 
John Stourton (1899-1992). Conservative MP for Salford South. 
Edith Summerskill (1901-1980).  Medical practitioner and Labour MP for West Fulham. 
Helena Swanwick (1864-1939).  Suffragist and former chair of the Women’s International League for 
Peace and Freedom. 
R H Tawney (1880-1962).  Economic historian. 
William Temple (1881-1944).  Archbishop of York and later Archbishop of Canterbury. 
George Tomlinson (1890-1952).  Labour MP for Farnworth from 1938. 
Ronald Tree (1897-1976). Conservative MP for Halborough and opponent of appeasement. 
Joachim Von Ribbentropp (1893-1946) German Ambassador to Britain 1936 to 1938, and German 
Foreign Minister 1938-1945. 
Adam Von Trott (1909-1944).  Lawyer and opponent of the Nazi regime. 
Sir Richard Wells (1879-1957). Conservative MP for Bedford 1922-45. 
Henry Wickham Steed (1871-1956).  Journalist and former editor of The Times. 
 
378 
 
Appendix 2: Letter writers to local newspapers 
 
Bedford and District Daily Circular 
 
 
 
 
 
Bedfordshire Standard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
379 
 
Bedfordshire Times  
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Bedfordshire Times continued 
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Bedfordshire Times and Standard 
 
 
 
 
Beds and Herts Evening Telegraph 
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Bolton Evening News 
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Bolton Evening News continued 
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Bolton Evening News continued 
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Bolton Evening News continued 
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Bolton Evening News continued 
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Bolton Evening News continued 
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Bolton Evening News continued 
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Bolton Evening News continued 
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Bolton Evening News continued 
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Bolton Evening News continued 
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Bolton Journal and Guardian 
 
 
 
Fulham Chronicle 
 
 
 
Horwich and Westhoughton Journal and Guardian 
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Luton News 
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Luton News continued 
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Luton News continued 
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Luton News continued 
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Luton News continued 
 
 
 
 
West London and Fulham Gazette 
 
 
 
West London and Hammersmith Gazette  
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West London Observer 
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West London Observer continued 
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West London Observer continued 
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West London Observer continued 
 
 
 
 
 
West London Post 
 
 
 
 
